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Social Inequality in the  
Eyes of the Public
A Collection of Analyses Based on  
ISSP Data 1987-2009
Jonas Edlund  Insa Bechert 
Markus Quandt (eds.)
The annual survey of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) provides data on topics relevant to social 
science research. Chapters included in this volume, Social Inequality in the Eyes of the Public - A Collection of Ana-
lyses Based on ISSP Data 1987-2009, examine social inequality from a citizens’ perspective across countries, for 
periods encompassing up to 20 years and beyond. Contributions come from an international group of authors 
who have extensive knowledge of the ISSP database. The selected chapters offer a cross-national comparative 
perspective on various issues related to inequality: social mobility; public perceptions of the mechanisms that 
generate social inequality; social constructs that indicate social inequality; and the effects of structural conditions 
(e.g., unemployment, income distribution) on attitudes connected with social inequality. In this book you will find 
critical input on questions related to the interplay between macro-structural conditions, citizens’ perceptions 
and attitudes towards social inequality. 
Die jährliche Bevölkerungsumfrage des International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) liefert einschlägige Daten 
zu sozialwissenschaftlich relevanten Themen. Der Sammelband Social Inequality in the Eyes of the Public - A Coll-
ection of Analyses Based on ISSP Data 1987-2009 untersucht soziale Ungleichheit aus der Bürgerperspektive im 
internationalen Ländervergleich über einen Zeitraum von zum Teil mehr als 20 Jahren. Alle Beiträge stammen 
von internationalen Autoren, die eine hohe Expertise im Umgang mit ISSP Daten aufweisen. Die einzelnen Kapi-
tel befassen sich mit verschiedenen Aspekten, die im Zusammenhang mit sozialer Ungleichheit stehen: soziale 
Mobilität; die öffentliche Wahrnehmung soziale Ungleichheit auslösender Mechanismen; Indikatoren für soziale 
Ungleichheit sowie die Effekte sozialstruktureller Voraussetzungen (z.B. Arbeitslosigkeit oder Besteuerung) auf 
die Einstellungen gegenüber sozialer Ungleichheit. Insgesamt liefert dieses Buch kritische Ansätze gegenüber 
dem Zusammenspiel von gesellschaftlichen Strukturen, öffentlicher Wahrnehmung und Einstellungen zu sozialer 
Ungleichheit.
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Introduction
About this Book
This is the third publication in a series of volumes comprising research based articles 
on ISSP data. A first volume on the ISSP “Role of Government” module data series was 
published in 2010 and is entitled “ISSP Data Report – Attitudes towards the Role of Gov-
ernment”. In 2013 this was followed by the “ISSP Data Report – Religious Attitudes and 
Religious Change” based on the ISSP Religion data series. Our third volume follows in the 
tradition of its predecessors by concentrating on specific aspects of the module series’ 
topic – here, Social Inequality – considered in an internationally comparative perspective. 
Seven informative chapters written by authors, most of them somehow connected with the 
ISSP, are included here. ISSP data is used as the foundation for each chapter, encompassing 
up to four points in time (1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009). Each manuscript accepted for this 
volume was subject to a diligent, blind peer-review process.1 
Social inequality refers to the unequal opportunities of individuals that factor into 
reaching certain goals in society, such as income, wealth, and power. Social research then 
tries to uncover whether and how such inequality in life chances is systematically related 
to different preconditions, such as class, ancestry, ethnicity, or gender. In modern societies, 
one important link between preconditions and the realization of life goals often is access to 
schooling. In this book Cinzia Meraviglia examines the question of whether social institu-
tions, such as the education system, foster or hinder social mobility – individuals’ move-
ment between social strata. The author focuses on whether individuals perceive themselves 
as being socially mobile or immobile with respect to their family of origin, then testing the 
accuracy of that perception against less subjective measures of mobility. Her results show 
that in all ISSP countries over the years an upward trend in intergenerational mobility can 
be observed. However, the correspondence of actual and perceived social mobility differs 
widely across countries. 
In each and every society some kind of, more, or less, pronounced social strata exists. A 
widely discussed question, however, is whether social class remains a relevant concept for 
understanding social stratification and, beyond this, social conflict. In his chapter, Markus 
Hadler approaches this research field via long-term data (1987 through 2009) covering a 
selected group of countries. The chapter analyzes the individual perceptions of conflicts 
between rich and poor, working class and middle class, and management and workers. 
His contribution shows that individual perceptions of conflicts are influenced by socio-
demographic characteristics, subjective perception of social inequality and social position, 
as well as the society’s level of inequality. In certain countries also economic and political 
circumstances are observed to have an impact. 
1 We would like to thank the reviewers for their careful reading of the manuscripts and their 
extremely helpful comments, suggestions and recommendations.
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The contribution by Jonas Edlund and Arvid Lindh focuses on the role of class in con-
temporary Western societies. Using data from 1999 and 2009, they make a distinction 
between social conflict (tensions in society between rich and poor) and political conflict 
(class based attitudinal differences). Their main results are, first, that social conflicts are 
more discernible in meager welfare states compared to more equal encompassing welfare 
states, and, second, that political conflicts tend to be more pronounced in large encom-
passing welfare states than in meager less ambitious welfare states. These results are in line 
with theory stressing that a key factor facilitating social cohesion is the extent to which 
class conflicts have been transferred from the social sphere into parliamentary politics, 
thereby converting informal non-institutionalized conflicts into democratic class strug-
gles. In other words, these results offer some support for the claim that the encompassing 
welfare state can be understood as a manifestation of a successful large-scale societal com-
promise between partly conflicting interests rooted in the mode of capitalist production. 
Over centuries social inequality has never lost its actuality - only its legitimization has 
changed, at least in modern societies.2 A classical legitimization base for social inequality 
has always been religion. If inequality is the will of God, the gods, or whoever is in super-
natural charge, it must be accepted, for fear of eternal damnation or more short-term spiri-
tual sanctions. With increasing modernization and secularization of societies, the legiti-
mization of social inequality has changed. In today’s secular societies, economic market 
theories serve to legitimize inequality: The market is determined by supply and demand, 
and interfering with these mechanisms of market economies (for example by supporting 
the poor via welfare state supplies) puts the market system at risk. Since everyone in a 
society benefits from a well working economy, it is argued that such interferences cannot 
be in the interest of society, not even in the interest of the poor themselves.
Arvid Lindh approaches the issue of market legitimacy from a citizens’ perspective. 
He examines public attitudes regarding the fairness of market mechanisms in stratifying 
access to basic social services. The results show that most people think that the principle 
of market justice in relation to the provision of social services is unfair – the market is 
seen as an inappropriate distributor of social services. However, the analyses also show 
cross-national variation in this perception, depending on how much citizens are used to 
market-based systems. In liberal welfare systems, citizens are more willing to accept mar-
ket principles for the distribution of services than in more established welfare states.
From a market-oriented point of view, the only proper roles for governments in society 
are setting and enforcing the rules of the economic game, and safeguarding individuals 
against violations of their rights by others (Wisman and Smith 2011, 23). Comparing a set 
of Western and Central/East European (CEE) countries over time, Anja Eder’s contribution 
examines attitudes on the question of whether states should engage in the redistribution 
of incomes and wealth, and how this relates to differences in the levels of inequality that 
those societies experience. This is especially important with a view to the rapidly chang-
ing conditions in the CEE countries. In line with other authors in this volume she finds 
differences across different types of welfare states. However, she also finds indications of 
2 For a comprehensive review of legitimizations of social inequality see Wisman, John D. and 
James F. Smith. 2011. “Legitimating Inequality: Fooling Most of the People All of the Time” 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 70 (4).
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the conventional classification of welfare regimes not always producing the expected out-
comes on redistribution attitudes. Eder hypothesizes several competing mechanisms to be 
at work that jointly form the relationship between (changing) inequality and redistribution 
attitudes. In liberal welfare states, support for state redistribution is indeed lower than in 
conservative or social democratic welfare states. Her country comparison reveals generally 
stronger support for state redistribution in Central European countries than in Western 
European countries; however, within the CEE group, the picture is very complex.
Usually, the lower the support for state redistribution, the higher the tolerance for income 
inequality. Frédéric Gonthier offers here an investigation of whether, and how tolerance 
for income inequality varies across income groups, educational groups and birth cohorts 
over time. He finds evidence of surprisingly uniform moves on this issue across subgroups 
since the beginning of the 1990s. Whereas prior research suggested that post-scarcity 
generations are most opposed to income differences, he shows that it is actually the Baby 
Boomers who are driving the generational dynamics of dissatisfaction with income gaps 
and thereby social inequality.  
Social inequality tends to go hand in hand with the poverty of the least privileged parts 
of society. The more unequal a society is, the higher the poverty rate. Effects of poverty 
can be devastating in that poor people are generally more likely to die from diseases, be 
the victims of violence, the aggressor of violence or criminal acts and consequently end 
up in prison or have to face whatever sanctions their society may provide. Individuals’ 
self-perception in society plays a crucial role herein. Often unemployment triggers poverty. 
In their contribution, Ellu Saar, Jelena Helemäe, and Kristina Lindemann examine the 
impact of societies’ economic and social characteristics on the subjective social position of 
unemployed people. In all countries examined, unemployed people rated themselves lower 
compared to other groups (employed and non-active). However, differences in subjective 
social position between unemployed and other groups vary across welfare regimes. The 
gap tends to be most pronounced in the liberal regime (UK) and the least in the South-
European sub-protective regime (Spain and Portugal).
About the ISSP Social Inequality Data
For each of the four ISSP modules focusing on social inequality in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 
2009, the basic questionnaires were designed by an elected drafting group, consisting of 
social scientists from five culturally diverse ISSP member countries. In agreement with the 
ISSP General Assembly, the respective drafting groups took care that main aspects of the 
topic were addressed and accordingly selected existing questions to be implemented, or 
developed new questions. A rule for ISSP questionnaire design is that two-thirds of the 
items are replications from earlier modules with the same topic, to allow for comparisons 
over time. The remaining questionnaire space is reserved to address issues that might not 
have been relevant in the previous modules, such as issues related to current world-events, 
new technical developments or contemporary communication channels. 
Social inequality is present in societies all over the world. Thus, the ISSP has been ask-
ing people about their attitudes towards social inequality for over twenty years now. The 
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next Social Inequality module will be fielded in 2019, again enabling new research in 
extension of the existing trend data. 
For the four ISSP modules on Social Inequality a cumulated dataset has been com-
piled, covering all 27 ISSP member countries participating in at least two Social Inequality 
modules and all variables appearing in at least two Social Inequality modules. All data, 
documentation and methodological information is accessible free of charge via the GESIS 
online data catalogue DBK (dbk.gesis.org). Documentation on variable level and the pos-
sibility for online analysis is given via the online platform ZACAT (zacat.gesis.org). Further 
information on ISSP data and metadata is available on our webpages at: http://www.gesis.
org/issp. 
About the ISSP
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a coordinated consortium of research 
institutes, whose researchers share an interest in international comparative social research. 
Starting with five founding countries in 1984, almost fifty countries around the world are 
now associated with the ISSP. Members convene once a year and make joint decisions for 
the upcoming survey topics and discuss research goals, and even the concrete wording of 
survey questions in detail. 
The largest challenge for cross-national programs is achieving true comparability of 
survey data. While the basic ISSP questionnaire is composed in British English, each coun-
try is responsible for translation into the national language or languages. However, in 
cross-national surveys translation means far more than simply linguistic translation of 
words from one language into another. More important is the attention to the cultur-
ally compatible translation of concepts into each national context to achieve functional 
equivalence across countries. 
ISSP survey topics are intentionally selected for their high relevance for social science 
research. To enable comparability over time, they are repeated periodically. The questions 
predominantly focus on attitudes, values and behavior towards topic-related issues. Each 
year, ISSP member countries conduct a survey, which, in the ISSP context, is termed a 
module. The module topic for the years 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009 was Social Inequality.
 
Participating countries 1987    1992    1999  2009
Argentina X
Australia X X X X
Austria X X X X
Belgium X
Brazil (X)
Bulgaria X X X
Canada X X (X)
Chile X X
China X
Croatia X
GESIS Series  |  Volume 17 11
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Participating countries 1987    1992    1999  2009
Cyprus X X
Czech Republic X X
Czechoslovakia   X**
Denmark (X) X
Estonia X
Finland X
France X X
Germany  X* X X X
Great Britain X X X X
Hungary X X X X
Iceland X
Ireland (X) (X)
Israel X X
Italy X X X
Japan X X
Latvia X X
Netherlands X (X) (X)
New Zealand X X X
Northern Ireland X
Norway X X X
Philippines X X X
Poland X X X X
Portugal X X
Russia X X X
Slovakia X X
Slovenia X X X
South Africa X
South Korea X
Spain (X) X X
Sweden X X X
Switzerland X (X) X
Taiwan X
Turkey X
Ukraine X
USA X X X X
Venezuela X
(X) = Not integrated, but available on request
* In 1987 Germany was still divided in West and East Germany and only the Western part of 
Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) participated in the module.
** In 1992 it was Czechoslovakia (CSFR) participating in the Social Inequality module. Since 1993 
Czechoslovakia is split up into Slovakia and Czech Republic.
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The Social Ladder
Status Mobility Across Time and Countries
Cinzia Meraviglia
Introduction1
Society can be imagined as a ladder, whereby the rungs are the different social positions. 
Social mobility is the term for how individuals and families move along this ladder, how-
ever, movement is constrained by various factors. A university degree allows an individual 
access to the mid-level to higher rungs; while similarly, a wealthy family background – 
no matter what education one gets – improves one’s chances for getting a good job, and 
remaining among the top rungs.
Social change and social mobility are seen as connected: If the same families or groups, 
generation after generation, are found on the same rungs, i.e., in the same social strata, 
society is immobile over time. However, movement among the social strata, whereby peo-
ple coming from the lower can reach the top, and vice versa, produces changes in society.
In Westernized, post-industrial countries it is common wisdom that social strata should 
be occupied based on merit. People having the right abilities, skills and motivation to hold 
prestigious social positions should be able to get to them, independent of a privileged or 
non-privileged background. Are our societies open enough to allow people from under-
privileged social strata to get to the top social positions; or are the most advantageous 
positions secured by inheritance, one generation after the other? Do social institutions (like 
the educational system) foster or hinder social mobility? Have our societies become more 
socially open over the 20th century?
A number of studies in recent decades have addressed these questions. Most of these 
have compared the social position held by individuals with that of their parents, to mea-
sure persistence or change in the various social groups; while also considering whether, 
and to what extent a privileged social origin successfully guarantees a better education per 
se, and hence a better social position, regardless of individual merits or abilities. 
Yet very few studies focus on whether individuals perceive themselves as being socially 
mobile or immobile, with respect to their family of origin. However, the subjective side of 
mobility is relevant for shaping the mobility strategies of families. Presuming that social 
inheritance prevails, parents of lesser-privileged social strata might invest less in the edu-
cation of their children, thus (unwittingly) contributing to social immobility. This will 
1 I wish to thank Andrea Maniscalco (University of Eastern Piedmont) for his help in preparing the 
data for the analyses reported in this paper.
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shape the expectations of future generations with respect to the openness of society, again 
fostering immobility rather than social fluidity between classes and strata.
Another reason for investigating the subjective side of mobility is that being socially 
mobile/immobile might be connected with one’s perception of holding the same or a dif-
ferent position than one’s parents. Are socially mobile people more likely to describe 
themselves as such; or do they think they are socially mobile even while holding the same 
social position as their parents? Do the two dimensions match or diverge? Are there any 
cross-national differences? 
This paper explores the similarities and dissimilarities between the actual and perceived 
social structure in the context of social mobility in a comparative perspective based on 
the relevant questions asked in the four ISSP Social Inequality surveys. My aim is two-
fold: First, to investigate the degree of openness of ISSP countries, also with respect to the 
influence that parental socio-economic background has on respondents’ education; and 
second, to consider how socially mobile people perceive themselves as being, whether this 
perception connects with an actual change of social position, and how this varies across 
countries. 
The next section addresses this first aim, analyzing the influence of the family of origin 
on respondents’ social outcome; in the following I will analyze subjective social mobility 
and its relationship to actual social mobility.
Social Mobility Across Countries and Over Time
Social mobility is investigated as the influence of the family of origin (i.e., the family an 
individual was raised in) on respondents’ social position. The stronger this influence, the 
higher the inheritance of social positions over generations, and the less open is a society 
as a whole. 
A simplified version of the status attainment model proposed by Blau and Duncan 
(1967), also known as the OED triangle, is a useful tool for disentangling the process of 
attaining a social position. According to this model (Figure 1), an individual’s social posi-
tion is influenced by their parents’ social position (path a) and by her/his own education 
(path c); the latter, in turn, is influenced by parental social position (path b). 
Social position
of origin
Respondent‘s
social position
Respondent‘s
education
a
b c
Figure 1 The simplified status attainment model
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In the OED triangle the focus is placed on the influence that the family of origin can exert 
in various ways (e.g., providing the offspring with endowments and assets, or exploiting 
their social network to find them a good job, or allowing their children to study for a 
long time, etc.). This overall influence is called the total effect of social origin (TESO, see 
Bernardi and Ballarino 2016b), which comprises the effect of all sources of influence that 
parents may exert over the social position of children (path a and paths b-c in Figure 1). 
As such, this total effect also includes the influence that parents may have on their chil-
dren’s educational attainment (path b in Figure 1). The latter relationship has received the 
most attention from stratification scholars over the last century. As modernization theory 
contends (Parsons 1961; Treiman 1970), societies change under pressure from increasing 
social division of labor. This in turn makes both the economic system more efficient, and 
individuals (or, better, roles) more mobile and free to “acquire knowledge and ability, [with] 
a greater likelihood that they will do so” (Mayhew 1982, 44). Increasing specialization, in 
turn, demands individuals upgrade their competences to a higher level to meet the new 
productive standards. At the same time, as rational behavior replaces more traditional 
forms of behavior (based, for example, on kinship), individuals are then sorted into occu-
pational roles according to their competences, rather than personal bonds, inheritance, 
etc. Therefore, education is key to modern societies, since it becomes the main mechanism 
allowing for the efficient allocation of individuals to roles. 
It is a fact that over the last century education has gained significantly in importance 
in the labor market. Increased bureaucratization and rationalization of Western societies; 
the growing share of the workforce employed in the service sector, and in large, organized 
firms; the expansion of the welfare state and state administration are all processes parallel 
with the expansion of the education systems, as well as with the increasing importance 
attributed to education and skill qualifications (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). Within this 
framework, families have learned to invest in their children’s education to be able to offer 
them a better future, or to continue holding a privileged position. Hence, as modernization 
theory contends, the direct effects of the family of origin should decrease over time. 
However, since individuals, families or groups can always counteract social change, the 
influence of social origin may take an indirect path through education as a means to secure 
a better future for the offspring. Again, as maintained by modernization theories (Blau 
and Duncan 1967; Treiman 1970), meritocracy theories (Goldthorpe 1996; Goldthorpe and 
Jackson 2008), as well as common wisdom, better education should allow to access better 
occupations, in turn, bringing better social positions. Whether true or not, and to what 
extent, many families invest in their children’s education in order to gain better social 
positions, or to allow them to continue holding the privileged positions they already hold 
by birth. Assuming that families seek to avoid social demotion (Boudon 1974), the indirect 
effect of the family of origin could be increasing – instead of decreasing – over time; since 
medium-high status families may send their children to better schools, and/or to support 
them in studying longer (Raftery and Hout 1993; Lucas 2001; Parman 2011). Lower status 
families, however, cannot easily afford the direct costs of education or the indirect cost of 
postponing their offspring entering the labor market.
Clarifying the role of education in the mobility process requires consideration of two 
separate issues. The first issue is whether or not access to all educational levels is granted 
to all children, independent of social background (path b in Figure 1); and the second is 
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whether a better education does indeed bestow some advantage in the labor market over 
a lower level of education (path c in Figure 1). The inequality of educational opportu-
nity (IEO), as the first is termed, enjoyed a vast amount of research over the last century 
(see among others: Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Breen and Jonsson 2005). The latter issue 
addresses the returns to education, i.e., the value (in terms of either income or social status) 
of any given educational level (Acemoglu 2002; Goldin 1999; Goldthorpe 1996; Müller 
and Gangl 2003; Bernardi and Ballarino 2016a).
Along with the above, the direct effect of social origin (the so-called DESO; see Ballarino 
and Bernardi 2016), i.e. the influence exerted by the family of origin on the offspring social 
position, net of their education, is also of interest (path a in Figure 1, once education has 
been taken into account). Comparing direct with total effect offers insight into how much 
of the effect of parental background on the offspring’s social position is via education, and 
how much is direct effect beyond education. 
Empirically the variables used for studying the relationships of the OED triangle are 
parental social background, which is obtained from father’s and mother’s occupation 
(variables V70 and V72 respectively); respondent’s occupation at time of survey (variable 
ISCO88) and respondent’s education as measured by years of schooling (variable EDUYRS). 
Parental and respondent’s ISCO-88 codes has been transformed into the scores of the Inter-
national Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996, 212)2. In order to 
have a single variable indexing respondent’s social background, the highest value between 
mother and father’s status has been considered (see Erikson 1984).
An ISEI score can only be calculated if a respondent has a paying job; the valid sample 
includes solely respondents having an extra-domestic job at the time of the interview in 
each of the four module years 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009, and in the various countries. 
Not all countries in the harmonized file provided a detailed 4-digit ISCO-88 code; in par-
ticular, Austria, France and Israel provided a 3-digit code in the year module 1999, while 
France, Finland and South Africa did the same in 2009. Indeed, South Africa (which I only 
consider in the analyses reported in the next main section) only provided a 1-digit ISCO-
88 code.
Table 1 shows the valid sample size by country, according to the availability of year 
modules, as resulting from selecting the cases with valid information on all relevant vari-
ables.3 
OLS regression was used to estimate the influence of parental background on respon-
dent’s socio-economic status. Following from the specifications given above, three kinds 
of effects will be scrutinized, namely the DESO, the IEO and the returns to education. In 
analyzing all three effects magnitude, the trend over time and the differences across the 
2 Treiman (1977) ascertained that the social evaluation of occupation remains substantially con-
stant over time and across countries. Hout and DiPrete (2006) call this result the “Treiman 
constant” and the (likely) only true universal that sociology as a discipline ever discovered. For 
this reason, I use the ISEI in my analyses in the case of both respondents’ and their parents’ 
occupation, as is customary in stratification research. 
3 This amounts to selecting cases based on listwise deletion of the three variables at once. Fur-
thermore, the sample includes only respondents at least 30 years old at time of survey, so that 
by then they would have most likely completed their education, and not older than 65, in order 
to account for retirement and differential mortality after that age.
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ISSP countries will be examined. The results will be presented by country and according 
to a geo-political classification.
Table 1 Number of valid cases by country and year module
No. Year 
modules Country
Year modules
Total1987 1992 1999 2009
4
AT 523 561 515 525 2124
DE-W 515 894 462 492 2363
HU 1619 735 640 572 3566
3
AU 1400 955 681 3036
CZ 437 1013 677 2127
DE-E 494 256 217 967
NO 693 589 778 2060
PL 906 654 701 2261
RU 869 633 701 2203
SK 257 490 643 1390
US 649 633 812 2094
2
CH 524 788 1312
CL 713 719 1432
CY 527 622 1149
ES 624 543 1167
FR 998 1529 2527
LV 576 515 1091
NZ 678 650 1328
PT 641 566 1207
SE 612 670 1282
SI 562 521 1083
1
BG 458 458
CA 524 524
IL 625 625
IT 523 523
JP 528 528
PH 691 691
Total 3181 8573 13267 16097 41118
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The Effect of the Family of Origin
Let us first consider the DESO, that is, the influence of parental background on a respon-
dent’s status, net of the effect of education, gender and work experience. The latter variable 
accounts for the fact that respondents entered the labor market at different times, hence 
differing in length of occupational career.4 
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Figure 2  Influence of parental socio-economic status on respondent’s socio-economic status 
(DESO) (left panel) over time (right panel) by country, controlled for respondent’s edu-
cation, work experience and gender. Significant coefficients are marked with black dia-
monds (p<0.05)
The ISSP countries vary with respect to strength of direct influence of parental background 
on offspring socio-economic status.5 At one end, in Bulgaria a difference of 10 points 
4 Following Ganzeboom and Treiman (1993), I approximate work experience utilising the follow-
ing equation:
 Work experience = age – years of education - 6
 Hence, I assume that respondents entered the education system at an average age of six, and 
entered the labor market soon after completing their education, and have worked continuously 
since. These assumptions are not necessarily met for everyone in the cumulative sample; none-
theless, they are reasonable and allow some control over the career effect, which would other-
wise create bias in the estimates. The approximation of work experience serves as a measure of 
time in the analysis.
5 As Table 1 shows, sample size across countries varies a lot, owing to the number of available 
surveys. Hence, in interpreting the findings relative to countries with only one or two surveys, 
some caution is warranted.
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of parental socio-economic status (say, between office clerks, who score 45 on the ISEI, 
and sales representatives, who score 55) changes respondent’s socio-economic status by 
about 3 points; at the other end, in the Czech Republic the change is just 1 point. These 
quantities are not so appreciable in absolute terms; however, note that this is the effect 
of parental socio-economic background over respondent’s status net of education, work 
experience and gender effects. Otherwise said, of all possible (and accountable) sources of 
influence over an individual’s social position, the DESO is the impact of just one among 
them, namely parental background, keeping all other known sources of influence constant. 
Therefore, even small figures are relevant since they express the direct influence of the 
family of origin per se, over and above that channeled through other variables.
In the remaining countries, a change of 10 points in parental status brings an average 
difference of 2 points in respondent’s socio-economic status score. Overall, excluding the 
non-significant effects, the size of the estimated influence of parental background is rather 
similar across the various geo-political groups, while some dissimilarities can be observed 
within groups. As an example, the countries in the East Asia and Oceania group enjoy a 
very low influence of parental background on respondent’s socio-economic status, with 
Australia, Japan and the Philippines even showing a non-significant coefficient (though in 
the latter two cases the modest sample size could be at stake). Within the Americas group, 
the USA stands out for having a low and non-significant coefficient, while Canada and 
Chile align with Southern European countries in terms of the magnitude of their coeffi-
cient.6 The group of former Socialist countries also shows marked dissimilarities with East 
Germany and Latvia at one end demonstrating very low parental influence, while Poland, 
at the other end, and, most of all, Bulgaria show a comparatively high parental influence. 
The other European countries (Northern, Southern and Central) show more similarities 
than differences; in these countries a change of 10 points of the parental socio-economic 
status delivers between 2 and 3 points of respondent’s ISEI. West Germany is an exception 
to this pattern, showing a non-significant coefficient which points towards a very low 
influence of family of origin on respondent’s social position (as indeed Eastern Germany).
A first general conclusion is that there is a substantial direct influence of parental back-
ground over offspring’s socio-economic position in almost all countries. Did this picture 
change over time towards greater independence of respondent’s status from the family of 
origin? As can be seen in the right panel of Figure 2, a significant change over time is 
observed in just 3 of 27 countries: Canada, Bulgaria and Poland. Among the remaining 
countries, the possibility that there is no appreciable reduction cannot be ruled out given 
the size of the coefficients and their generally wide confidence intervals.
These results largely replicate findings by Bernardi and Ballarino (2016a), whose analy-
ses showed that in most of the countries considered the DESO did not change over time. 
More precisely, this finding is valid for Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, 
Switzerland and the USA, for which I found stability as well. In the cases of France and 
6 This amounts to selecting cases based on listwise deletion of the three variables at once. Fur-
thermore, the sample includes only respondents at least 30 years old at time of survey, so that 
by then they would have most likely completed their education, and not older than 65, in order 
to account for retirement and differential mortality after that age.
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Israel they found rather an increase, while I found stability; and in the case of Sweden 
(where I also find stability) a decrease of DESO over time was found.
Following Ballarino and Bernardi (2016), Figure 3 compares the direct effect of parental 
background, net of education (DESO), to its total effect on the offspring’s socio-economic 
status (TESO)7. Notwithstanding the, sometimes, huge variation between countries, and to 
some extent, between the geo-political groups, the graph shows two relevant outcomes. 
First, an appreciable part of the influence of the family of origin (represented by the full-
lenght bars) is channeled through education (white bars), while second, education is not 
the only means to allocate individuals to job positions, since the family of origin exerts a 
direct influence over this process, over and above education (grey bars). As the two authors 
conclude, what we observe is “a sizeable deviation from a solely education-based merito-
cratic process of job allocation” (2016, 257) in all countries.
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Figure 3  Total (TESO) and direct (DESO) effect of parental background on respondent’s socio-
economic status by country
7 The TESO is obtained by estimating the same linear regression model used for obtaining the 
DESO coefficients, while omitting education. Details of this analysis are not shown here, how-
ever are available upon request from the author.
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Inequality of Educational Opportunity
Looking at the influence of parental background on respondents’ educational attainment 
(IEO), the usual expectation in this case is that IEO would decrease over the 20th century, 
as an effect of the prevalence of meritocratic and universalistic criteria for allocating 
individuals to occupational roles. This expectation however seldom stands up empirically. 
Research findings indicate that the 20th century was marked by the persistence of educa-
tional inequality (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Wheelan and Layte 2002; Hout and Dohan 
1996), while more recently some studies illustrate support for a decrease in inequality 
(among others, Breen, Luijks, Müller and Pollak 2009; Ballarino, Bernardi, Requena and 
Schadee 2009). Other cases offer mixed evidence, as some countries show a decline, while 
in others persistence of inequality prevails (Jonsson, Mills and Müller 1996; Müller and 
Karle 1993; Bernardi and Ballarino 2016a). 
Although most of the interest in the research literature focuses on the trend of the IEO 
over time, it is interesting to examine the magnitude of this effect in the various coun-
tries. In the estimated model, years of education are the dependent variable, while family 
background (measured by parental ISEI, as in the previous analysis) is the key independent 
variable and respondent’s birth years used as a measure of time; gender is included as a 
control variable.
The estimated influence of parental background on educational attainment in the 27 
countries appears in the left panel of Figure 4. With respect to geo-political groups, South-
ern European countries emerge as the most internally heterogeneous group. At one end, a 
change of 10 points in the parental socio-economic status brings a change of about 1 year 
of schooling in Israel and Portugal (whose coefficient is not significant). Down the other 
end, this change amounts to 4 years of schooling in Cyprus; while in Italy and Spain the 
change is more moderate (2.5 years of schooling), which is still substantial. The Americas 
present another rather heterogeneous group, as in the case of DESO: in Canada and Chile a 
change of 10 points of parental status brings a change of 2.5 years of schooling, while in 
the USA the analogous change is just half a year.
In the remaining countries, a change of 10 points of parental socio-economic status 
brings a change in offspring educational attainment between 0.5 and 1.5 years of school-
ing. The Philippines, Bulgaria, Latvia and Portugal are four countries where the coef-
ficient of parental background is not significant, indicating either a lack of information 
(as suggested by the wide confidence interval for the Philippines and Bulgaria), or – more 
puzzling – perhaps to the irrelevance of social origin, as measured by parental ISEI, on 
educational attainment.
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Figure 4  Influence of parental socio-economic status on respondent’s education (inequality of 
educational opportunity) (left panel), over time (right panel) by country, controlled for 
age and gender. Significant coefficients are marked with black diamonds (p<0.05).
With respect to the change of the IEO over time, Figure 4 (see right panel) illustrates 
changes found in 8 of the 27 ISSP countries. Changes occurred among the former Socialist 
countries of Bulgaria, Hungary and the Slovak Republic; the Southern European countries 
of Cyprus and Spain; the Northern European country of Norway; and among the East 
Asia/Oceania and American countries Australia and Canada, respectively. The direction of 
change is towards a lesser inequality in all 8 countries, save for Bulgaria, where it actually 
increased. This is also the case in two other former Socialist countries, Latvia and Poland, 
whose coefficients though are not significant. Bulgaria’s result should be understood in 
light of two considerations. For one, the particularly low sample size (as in all countries 
with only one year module - see Table 1) means that the results should be interpreted 
cautiously. The second point to consider is that, as previously reported, the influence of 
parental background is close to zero; an increase over time brings Bulgaria in line with 
other European countries regarding the level of IEO.
In total, the most relevant IEO-related result is that, over time, it did not change in 20 
of 27 countries. For some countries perhaps this is due to low sample, however, the gen-
eral sense of the finding is that – once again – there is no support for the hypothesis of 
a general shift towards meritocracy and universalism over the 20th century. These results 
confirm the persistence of educational inequalities found in the mid Nineties by Shavit 
and Blossfeld (1993). More recent results by Breen, Luijkx, Müller and Pollak (2009) point 
to a decrease of IEO, however, these authors only consider 8 European countries, with 
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strictly male data, hindering any comparison of their results8 with ours or that of Shavit 
and Blossfeld. 
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Figure 5  Influence of educational attainment over respondent’s socio-economic status (returns to 
education), 1987-2009 (b values with 95% confidence interval; black diamond markers 
indicate significant changes of parental Isei over time)
Returns to Education
The final result discussed in this section concerns the returns to education, which point to 
the value that education holds in the labor market. Does more education bring better social 
position? Has this changed over time, i.e., is more education enabling people to secure a 
higher status? 
As the left panel of Figure 5 illustrates, the ISSP countries vary widely regarding returns 
to education.9 Former Socialist countries exhibit a higher effect of respondents’ education 
on own occupational outcome than the other countries. In this group and on average, a 
change of one year of education brings a change of almost 4 points of socio-economic 
8 Actually, Breen and colleagues’ result of a decreasing IEO in Europe come from a model that 
does not fit the data, as the authors themselves acknowledge (2009, 1493). 
9 In this analysis, as in the case of DESO, work experience is used as a measure of time. Further-
more, I consider absolute returns to education, that is, the proportion of respondents with any 
given educational level reaching a specific socio-economic position. Parental socio-economic 
status and gender are included as control variables.
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status. Once again, when interpreting the size of this effect, consider that this is the net 
effect of just one variable, namely respondents’ education, on their social position, holding 
other relevant variables (family background, gender and time) constant. 
Among former Socialist countries, Slovenia displays the strongest effect of education on 
socio-economic status (ISEI 4.5 points), while Hungary shows the lowest (ISEI 3.2 points). 
Among the Southern European countries, Spain and Italy show a comparable size of the 
effect of education (about 2 ISEI points, like the two Northern European countries), while 
Israel and, most notably, Cyprus show a much higher effect (respectively 3 and 3.7 ISEI 
points), with Portugal in the middle (2.4 ISEI points). Central European countries, espe-
cially Austria and Switzerland (respectively, 1.4 and 2 ISEI points) show a rather low asso-
ciation between one’s education and occupational status. Among the American countries, 
Canada shows a lower effect of education (2.3 ISEI points), while the USA and Chile show 
much higher returns to education (respectively, 3.5 and 3.3 ISEI points). Countries in East 
Asia & Oceania also seem rather heterogeneous, with the Philippines and Japan (whose 
coefficient is non-significant) at the lower end, while Australia and New Zealand appear at 
the other end (2.7 and 2.9 ISEI points, respectively). 
Figure 5 (see right panel) provides an answer to the question of whether the returns to 
education have changed over the course of the 20th century. The answer is affirmative in 
the case of 12 countries distributed across the geo-political groups: New Zealand and Aus-
tralia; Chile and the USA; East Germany, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia; Cyprus and Spain; 
and finally Austria. Notably this last country, Austria, is the only one that witnessed an 
increase over time of the returns to education, but, while this is also the case for Japan, the 
Philippines and West Germany, their coefficients are not significant. 
This analysis demonstrates that the association between respondents’ education and 
occupation has remained stable in most of the ISSP countries, or even declined in a good 
share of them. Such findings support the hypothesis of credential inflation (Boudon 1974; 
Collins 1971; 1979), according to which a higher share of educated individuals in a given 
society, together with mass participation in the educational system, lowers the value of 
educational titles, and especially those of a higher degree, as signals used by employers to 
select potential workers. 
Summarizing the outcomes thus far presented, parental background exerts a sub-
stantial influence over the educational and occupational outcomes of their offspring in 
Western(ized) countries. The influence of the family of origin flows both in a direct way 
(DESO), and through education (IEO); in both cases, the majority of countries did not wit-
ness an equalization process, since both DESO and IEO remained essentially stable over 
time. Furthermore, the returns to education have decreased in a fair number of countries, 
partially obliterating the overall effect of social origin on offspring social position. How-
ever, élite families could well find ways of compensating this process, as some theories 
contend (see for example Lucas 2001) and as recent research findings confirm (Bernardi 
and Ballarino 2016b). Yet, in most countries the returns to education remained stable, and 
only in one case (Austria) did they increase, pointing to an overall stable frame of refer-
ence for families who shape their mobility strategies in a rather stable social environment.
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Perceived and Actual Social Mobility
The ISSP surveys on Social Inequality include a question asking respondents to compare 
the status level of their own job to that of their father’s:
Please think about your present job (or your last one if you don’t have one now). If you 
compare this job to the job your father had when you were <14/15/16>, would you say 
that the level of status of your job is (or was)…
1. Much higher than your father’s
2. Higher
3. About equal
4. Lower
5. Much lower than your father’s
6. I never had a job
7. I don’t know what my father did / father never had a job / never knew father / father 
deceased
At the root of this query is an important issue, namely that of the self-assessment of 
being socially mobile or immobile in the opinion of respondents. Although most empirical 
research in the field of stratification focuses on actual social mobility, recent research by 
Kelley and Kelley (2009) analyzes the causes and consequences of subjective social mobil-
ity, finding that actual mobility is the most important predictor of subjective mobility, but 
that the latter also depends on a wider range of factors, including a country’s GDP.
Actual mobility here denotes the difference between respondent’s social position and 
his/her father’s social position, as measured by means of the socio-economic status index 
(ISEI) used in the previous section. This directly follows Kelley and Kelley (2009) who note 
that people seem to react more to the actual distance between their own social position 
and that of their family of origin, than to the absolute place they or their family of origin 
hold in the social hierarchy. Hence this difference can be interpreted as an index of socio-
economic mobility such that the higher and positive its value, the more upwardly mobile 
is the respondent; while high and negative values refer to downwardly mobile individuals.
To familiarize the reader with this measure, average values by country are shown in 
Figure 6.10 Note that in all countries respondent’s status is higher than father’s status, i.e., 
on average all countries experienced upward, absolute social mobility. In addition, since 
the highest average difference between respondents’ and their fathers’ status score is less 
than 10 points on the ISEI scale, the distance between respondents and their fathers, on 
average, is not particularly high. 
Figure 6 clusters the ISSP countries according to geo-political groups displaying marked 
internal variations. East Asian and Oceanian countries show a higher average level of 
the mobility index, with the exception of Japan and Australia. Russia and Sweden show 
extreme values with respect to the other countries in their groups, pointing at a higher-
10 In order to have an up-to-date picture of respondents’ opinion on this matter, I restrict the 
analysis to the last available module year, namely 2009. For this reason, the countries in the 
analysis differ from those considered in the previous section.
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than average positive difference between parental and respondents’ ISEI. The European 
countries seem to enjoy a rather homogeneous level of mobility, while former Socialist 
countries (notwithstanding the high score of Russia and the rather high score for the Czech 
Republic, Ukraine and Estonia) show a lower score on average. To properly understand 
these findings, what must also be taken into consideration is that a high level of social 
mobility does not always come with an improvement in the life conditions of the general 
population. For example, Sweden and Russia are two countries with the highest level of 
absolute mobility and the former shows rather low inequality as measured by the Gini 
index (26.6 in 2009), while Russia shows far higher inequality (39.7 in 2009), that is rather 
stable over the last decade.11 
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Figure 6 Means of the social mobility index (difference between respondent’s and father’s ISEI 
score) by country (2009)
Figure 7 shows the answers to the question on respondent’s status as compared to that of 
his/her father by country in the 2009-year module. A first remark is that in all countries 
most of the people are found in the middle category (“about the same”), while few respon-
dents chose the extreme categories (“much higher” and “much lower” than their father’s 
status). An exception to this pattern is Japan, which has a conspicuous number of respon-
dents who perceive their status as “much lower” than their father’s, with very few answers 
of “much higher”.12 
11 This amounts to selecting cases based on listwise deletion of the three variables at once. Fur-
thermore, the sample includes only respondents at least 30 years old at time of survey, so that 
by then they would have most likely completed their education, and not older than 65, in order 
to account for retirement and differential mortality after that age.
12 These findings parallel those obtained by Kelley and Kelley (2009). A possible reason for this 
response pattern is that in Japanese society “those who came before” (i.e., the elderly, parents, 
grandparents, etc.) are held in great social esteem, to the point that it is extremely socially 
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centages) (2009)
undesirable to say that one’s own social position is higher than theirs. This hypothesis would 
obviously require an empirical test to be confirmed as valid.
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Considering the geo-political groups, the USA, China and Poland stand out among the 
other countries in their respective groups for the share of respondents who assess their own 
status as being higher or much higher than that of their fathers. This pattern is particularly 
evident in China, where half of the sample is found in the “higher” answer category, while 
22% of respondents answered that their status is “much higher” than their father’s – an 
overall share of 74% of respondents saying that they were socially mobile with respect to 
their fathers.
Moving one step further towards the comparison of actual and perceived mobility, a 
very general expectation is that the two dimensions are positively associated; for example, 
it is expected that respondents in China not only state that they are (highly) socially mobile 
with respect to their fathers, but that they actually are. The social mobility index (ie. 
the difference between respondent’s actual social status and that of his/her father) scores 
should be about zero for those who answered that their social position was “about equal”. 
Following the same line of reasoning, we should see negative scores on the social mobility 
index for those who answered that their position is “(much) lower” than their father’s, and 
positive scores for those who assessed their social position to be “(much) higher” than that 
of their father’s. 
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Figure 8 Association between perceived and actual social mobility by country (2009; z-transfor-
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As Figure 8 shows, countries differ widely with respect to the strength of the association 
between actual and perceived dimensions of social mobility13, however some patterns 
can be singled out. Respondents in Northern European countries (with the exception of 
Iceland) show a very high association between the perceived and the actual dimension of 
mobility. While some countries in the East Asia, Oceania & South Africa group, as well as 
13 I first calculated the Spearman’s rho coefficient; then, following Bonnett and Wright (2000), 
I transformed the Spearman’s rank correlation r into zr, which has an approximately normal 
distribution with variance 1/(N-3). The lower and upper confidence limits are then calculated as 
for the Pearson’s r. 
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in the Mediterranean region, show a rather low association between the two dimensions 
of mobility. In the Philippines, China, South Africa, Turkey and Spain those being socially 
mobile (either in an upward or downward direction) infrequently assess themselves as 
being so, similar to those who did not change their status with respect to their fathers. 
While most of the Southern European countries show a similar pattern, a different scheme 
characterizes the former Socialist countries, whose respondents show on average a rather 
good ability to assess their actual status with respect to that of their father’s.
In interpreting these results one must bear in mind that the differences reported above 
could reflect either actual differences in the way in which people in the various countries 
perceive the social structure they are embedded in, as well as their changing position in 
it, or some measurement-linked methodological factors. For example, either the question 
in the ISSP module, or the measurement of the respondent’s and their father’s social posi-
tion by means of the international socio-economic index could be especially adequate 
for perception of their own social mobility, or of their actual mobility, and more in some 
cultural areas than in others. In this vein, the Nordic countries show the highest correlation 
between actual and perceived mobility because the measurement of the two dimensions 
of mobility could be more adequate for them in particular than for other cultural areas of 
the world.
Conclusions
My twofold goal was to analyze the trends in social mobility in the ISSP countries over 
time and to explore similarities between respondents’ perception/assessment of their being 
socially mobile with respect to their father’s social position, and their actual social mobility.
This first goal, the analysis of the four ISSP Social Inequality module years (1987, 1992, 
1999, and 2009), relied on a simplified version of the status attainment model (Blau and 
Duncan 1967) or so-called OED triangle, to break down the overall effect of parental back-
ground on respondent’s social destination into four different effects (TESO, DESO, IEO and 
returns to education).
In line with the most recent findings (Bernardi and Ballarino 2016b), the results show 
that in the majority of the countries the direct influence of parental socio-economic status 
on the offspring’s status, net of the effect of education, remained stable over time. Three 
exceptions arose, namely Canada, Poland and Bulgaria, where the DESO decreased. Com-
parison between the total and the direct effect of social origin (Figure 3) indicated that the 
job allocation process departs rather markedly from that typical of a meritocratic society, 
in which education is the key resource allowing for an efficient matching between indi-
vidual skills and knowledge on one side, and occupational positions on the other.
With respect to the influence of social origin on respondents’ education (IEO), the analy-
sis documented the existence of a substantial effect of parental background on offspring 
educational attainment, although with marked variations between countries. Southern 
European countries, along with Canada and Chile show the highest level of influence, 
while Central European and former Socialist countries show a lesser IEO. This situation did 
not change over the 20th century in more than two thirds of the ISSP countries. Inequality 
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decreased in eight of them (Bulgaria, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Spain, Nor-
way, Australia, Canada), but did not change in the remaining countries. Here too one can 
speak of a substantial difference between the current state of affairs and the ideal-typical 
situation in which parental background gradually loses its influence over offspring’s edu-
cation, which in turn becomes a means to foster social openness. Education seems actually 
to foster more immobility than change, hence contributing to maintaining the actual social 
inequalities as found in the various countries.
To complete the picture I considered the returns to education, i.e., the value attached 
to education in the labor market. Once again, the ISSP countries differ with respect to 
the strength of the association between respondents’ education and occupation. Slovenia 
shows the strongest effect, with Austria showing the weakest. For 11 of the 27 countries 
in the analysis the results point to a decrease in the value attached to education over time, 
hence giving support to the hypothesis of educational credential inflation (Boudon 1974), 
while in the case of Austria (as mentioned, the country with the lowest association) an 
increase was found. 
Taken together, these findings point towards a persistence of inequality over time (with 
the few exceptions noted above), though of course the absolute level of inequality varies 
across countries in a way that the geo-political grouping can account for only to a limited 
extent. Hence these results add to previous ones that do not support the modernization 
theory (like the now classic Shavit and Blossfeld’s comparative project), or theories on 
meritocracy. Still to be ascertained is whether these findings call for a revision of these 
theories, or for a complete change of perspective.
The second goal of the paper was to explore the similarities and differences between 
respondents’ self-assessment of their social mobility, and their actual mobility. Analysis 
was conducted on the most recent year module, i.e. the 2009 dataset, and the results show 
that all ISSP countries on average experienced (absolute) intergenerational upward mobil-
ity. As for the perceived mobility, the results showed that most often people tend to choose 
the middle answer category (“about the same as father’s status”), while few respondents 
chose the extreme categories (“much higher” and “much lower” than their father’s status). 
In Japan the “much lower” answer category is selected more frequently than in other 
countries. The USA, Poland, and particularly China offered a greater share of respondents 
indicating their status to be higher or much higher than their fathers was and this was 
higher than in other countries of their respective geo-political groups.
Finally, the association between actual and perceived social mobility widely differs 
among the ISSP countries. In Scandinavian countries as well as in Austria, Belgium, and 
Poland, the perception of social mobility follows actual mobility more closely. On the other 
hand, in Venezuela, the Philippines, China, Turkey, Spain, South Africa, and Argentina 
respondents’ assessment and actual mobility are rather independent from one another. 
A possible development of the analyses discussed in this paper concerns the role of 
perceived social mobility in the status attainment process, reversing the usual direction of 
the relationship. For example, Kelley and Kelley (2009) analyzed the role of actual social 
mobility as a predictor of subjective social mobility. However, the difference between the 
two, once lagged of one time-unit (e.g., birth cohort), could be used as an indicator of how 
accurately families perceive mobility or immobility in their country and added as a predic-
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tor to a status attainment model, in order to account for the perception of society as being 
more or less open to social change. 
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Social Conflict Perception Between Long-term 
Inequality and Short-term Turmoil
A Multilevel Analysis of Seven Countries Between 1987 and 2009
Markus Hadler
Introduction
In 2011, social movements such as Occupy Wall Street, the Indignant Movement in Spain, 
and other groups sprung up in various countries, united by a criticism of existing social 
inequality and governmental austerity programs. One of their main points of contention 
was the large existing wealth and income differences between the rich and the poor, which 
was expressed aptly in the Occupy Wall Street movement’s slogan: “We are the 99%”, 
pointing to the wealth concentration among the top 1% of the US society (Keister 2014). 
These protests tempt us to perceive contemporary societies as contentious and laden with 
conflicts between the poor and the rich, whereas the death of class, declining relevance of 
class and conflicts etc. were announced a couple decades ago by scholars such as U. Beck 
(1986) and J. Pakulski and M. Waters (1996). 
Given these opposing views, this contribution seeks to investigate the changes in the 
perception of conflicts between poor people and rich people, working class and middle 
class, and management and workers – henceforth summed up as vertical conflicts – over 
time and in a cross-national perspective. The ISSP data on inequality goes back to 1987. 
Since then, several events have occurred that could have shaped the perception of vertical 
conflicts: the collapse of the socialist systems in Eastern Europe, an accelerated deregula-
tion of the labor market since the 1990s, the burst of the dot-com bubble in the early 2000s, 
the global financial crisis of 2008, and the recent problems of the European Euro zone. 
Such events can certainly influence the perception of vertical conflicts. Existing research 
on the perception of social inequality and conflicts (see Hadler 2003; Osberg and Smeed-
ing 2006; Janmaat 2013; Edlund and Lindh 2015), however, also points to the impact of 
more stable socio-political circumstances such as political regimes, the institutionalization 
of market regulations, but also to the importance of affluence and actual levels of social 
inequality. In addition, the perception of conflicts can also differ among individuals within 
a given society, dependent on their socio-demographic characteristics and social attitudes.
The following section summarizes previous findings on the influence of the context and 
individual traits on conflict perception with a focus on the structural determinants of these 
views. This discussion of previous findings is followed by a brief overview of the data, 
variables, and analysis strategy. The subsequent results section starts with a country-level 
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overview of the changes in the conflict perception since 1987. These changes are then 
discussed in relation to the particular political and socio-economic developments in these 
countries. A multilevel model analyzing the influence of societal and individual charac-
teristics concludes the result section. The final discussion and conclusion section points 
to the usefulness of multilevel models in identifying general trends and individual-level 
influences, but also emphasizes the role of specific country circumstances.
Determinants of the Perception of Vertical Conflicts
Disputes over the distribution of resources frequently undergird conflicts between indi-
viduals in lower social positions and individuals in higher social positions (Janmaat 2013). 
The distribution of income and wealth is commonly measured by the GINI index, which 
is an indicator of income or wealth concentration. It is 0 if resources would be distributed 
equally among all members of a society and 1 if all resources would be owned by a single 
individual. Research considering this measure among other societal characteristics such as 
affluence and political regimes has indeed identified independent effects on the percep-
tion of vertical conflicts (Hadler 2003; Haller and Eder 2015). As expected, conflicts are 
perceived as stronger within more unequal societies and as less pronounced in more equal 
societies.
The level of inequality is not a given, but can be influenced by political interventions. 
Early discussions revolved around class conflicts and their institutionalization in forms 
of collective bargaining agreements and similar mechanisms, which resulted ultimately 
in the development of different welfare regimes (Geiger 1949; Esping-Anderson 1990). 
The absorption of working class struggles into the political arena and the development of 
extensive welfare regimes have decreased income differences and led to a better cohesion 
among different social groups (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, 46). Inequality and social con-
flicts are thus lower in societies with strong welfare regimes and institutionalized conflict 
and bargaining processes (Hadler 2003). 
Over time societies have also become more affluent. The German sociologist Ulrich 
Beck (1986) thus proposed that intra-societal inequalities have lost their relevance as the 
entire population has become more affluent. He considered this an ‘elevator effect,’ which 
increases the overall wealth, while keeping the internal differentiation and inequalities 
unchanged. The declining relevance thus refers only to the subjective perception. In addi-
tion, according to Beck, vertical inequalities are overshadowed by other risks such as envi-
ronmental threats that affect all members of a society, regardless of their societal position, 
which in turn results in a further declining relevance of vertical conflicts.
Recent social movements such as Occupy Wall Street have shown that internal inequali-
ties are still recognized and a source of contention. The timing of the protests – after the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent visibility of inequalities and injustices – 
matches the well-known J-curve discussed in social movement literature (Buechler 2000). 
Discontent often arises when the expectation of a sustained growth – or a continued eleva-
tor ride using Beck’s metaphor – are not met. Insofar, we can also expect that the percep-
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tion of vertical conflicts is influenced by the negative effects of brief economic crises and 
larger societal transformations such as the post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe.
These societal trends can affect the members of a society very differently. A crucial ele-
ment is an individual’s exposure to a conflict (see Kemmelmeier and Winter 2000; Morris 
and Su 1999). Individuals have a tendency to exaggerate differences the more exposed 
they are to one side of a conflict. Kemmelmeier and Winter’s experiment on the perception 
of the Iraq conflict, for example, showed that the very same information was perceived 
differently depending on the role – army member, historian, or conflict mediator – the 
respondents were assigned. Similarly, in relation to inequality, Verwiebe and Wegener 
(2000) pointed out that income inequalities are perceived as stronger by respondents who 
consider themselves lower in the social stratification. Hadler (2003) applied this concept 
to the perception of vertical conflicts and was able to identify a curvilinear association. 
The perception is stronger among respondents who consider themselves as members of a 
lower stratum, followed by members of the higher stratum. Respondents who considered 
themselves as members of the middle stratum considered the vertical conflicts as the least 
strong.
The knowledge aspect also points to the importance of education. Research has shown 
that better educated individuals consider social inequality and vertical conflicts as less 
strong. In addition, the perception also differs between younger and older respondents. 
These age differences are frequently explained with different socialization experiences and 
change in individual values such as an increasing post-materialism (Inglehart and Baker 
2000). Finally, gender is also an important mediator due to differences in exposure to 
inequalities, with women usually being more often disadvantaged and thus more critical 
towards social conflicts.
Research on social protest has also shown that objective contextual characteristics need 
to be accompanied by a feeling of injustice in order to political actions becoming wide-
spread (Buechler 2000; Smith and Wiest 2012). As discussed above, when referring to the 
J-curve, we thus need to consider the individuals’ judgment of inequality as well. In this 
regard, research has shown that individuals who perceive their society as rather unequal 
and ridden by inequality also perceive conflicts as more severe (Hadler 2003).
In sum, we can expect that vertical conflicts are considered as stronger by respondents 
who see themselves as members of a lower stratum, individuals who perceive the inequal-
ity in their country as too large, younger respondents, less well educated individuals, and 
women. These individual traits are embedded in different societal circumstances. Here, we 
can expect that the conflict perception is lower in more affluent societies, rather equal 
societies, and societies with a strong redistributive welfare regime.
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Data and Research Methods
The analysis considers the seven countries that have fielded all four waves of the ISSP 
data on inequality. The resulting sample comprises 42,493 respondents and the following 
countries: Australia, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Germany, in addition, is also split into East- and West-Germany due to the dif-
ferent political histories. The 1987 wave of the ISSP data, however, is available only for 
West-Germany. 
The dependent variable is based on a set of ISSP questions on the perception of different 
conflicts in a society. The question wording is: 
In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. 
In your opinion, in <country> how much conflict is there between a) poor people and 
rich people, b) working class and middle class, c) and management and workers?
The answer categories are: Very strong conflicts, strong conflicts, not very strong con-
flicts, and there are no conflicts. 
The respondents’ answers to these three items were summed up to a single scale, divided 
by the total number of a respondent’s valid answers, and reverse coded. The dependent 
variable ranges from 0 to 3, is almost normally distributed, and can be interpreted in a way 
that 0 indicates that a respondent does not perceive any conflicts and 3 that a respondent 
perceives very strong conflicts.
Independent variables at the individual-level are: age (in years), education (5 point 
scale with no formal education=1 and a University degree=5), gender (male=0, female=1), 
subjective social position (10 point scale with 1=at the bottom and 10=at the top), and a 
question on the respondents’ assessment of the existing societal income inequality, with 1 
indicating that the inequality is too large and 5 that it is too small. Table A1 provides an 
overview of the major statistics for these variables.
Independent variables at the macro-level are the level of inequality (GINI index) and the 
level of affluence (GDP per capita). Both measures are included in two different ways in the 
multilevel model: As a country-level variable that describes the overall level of inequality 
(or affluence, respectively) in a given country and a measure that captures the changes 
over time. The models are thus able to differentiate between cross-sectional and over-time 
effects of a given variable (see Deeming and Jones 2015 for more details on this modelling 
strategy). Furthermore, the dominant political regime is considered in the descriptive anal-
ysis, with Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States representing liberal regimes; 
Austria and Germany-West continental welfare regimes, and Germany-East, Hungary, and 
Poland post-communist regimes. These macro-level data were derived from OECD, World 
Bank, and different research papers in case the first two sources had insufficient informa-
tion (see Table A2 for more details).
The results section starts with a graphic on the perception of conflicts across countries 
and over time. This graphic is based on the aggregated values of the perception index 
described above. The subsequent multilevel analysis (see Table A3 for the regression equa-
tion) estimates the influence of both societal and individual-level factors on the perception 
of conflicts. Its set-up follows the structure of the data, with countries as the highest level, 
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changes within countries as the middle level, and individual responses as the lowest level. 
The number of country-level observations, however, is very small and their effects thus 
need to be interpreted with caution (Stegmueller 2013). Therefore, alternative regression 
models that include countries as fixed effects were estimated as well. These models yielded 
similar results and are thus not reported.
The Perception of Vertical Conflicts over Time
Figure 1 shows the changes in conflict perceptions between 1987 and 2009 for each coun-
try. The lines represent the average score at a given time point and are formatted according 
to the political regimes. Dark lines indicate liberal regimes, dotted lines post-communist 
regimes, and grey lines continental welfare regimes. As for the strength of the conflict 
perception, a value of 0 represents the answers “there are no conflicts,” 1 “not very strong 
conflicts,” 2 “strong conflicts,” and 3 “very strong conflicts” when considering the underly-
ing questions. Overall, the average perceptions thus lie between not very strong conflicts 
and strong conflicts.
Considering 1987 only, these conflicts were considered relatively strong in the United 
States, followed by Hungary, Great Britain, Australia, and Poland. They were seen as rela-
tively weak in West-Germany and Austria. The 1987 ranking confirms the expectation that 
welfare states are able to mitigate the effects of inequalities and that vertical conflicts are 
perceived as rather weak by the public in these countries. It is, however, interesting that 
the then socialist countries Hungary and Poland do not differ much from the more liberal 
states Great Britain and Australia. A closer look at the specific perceptions in Hungary 
and Poland in 1987 shows that the respondents are the most concerned about conflicts 
between rich people and poor people and the least about conflicts between workers and 
the management. This might be a reflection of hidden inequalities such as differences in 
access to goods between the political elites and ordinary citizens, mixed with the ideology 
of equality at and social welfare via the work place (Henderson, McNab and Rózsás 2005). 
This initial ranking changes from 1987 to 2009, with a few trends being of particular 
interest. Figure 1 depicts a continuous and substantial increase in conflict perception in 
Hungary. This former socialist country ends up as the country in which the population 
perceives the strongest conflicts among the countries of our sample. Such a continuous 
increase is not observable in the two other former socialist countries. In East Germany, 
where the survey was fielded only from 1992 onwards, the public perceives the strength 
of vertical conflicts quite similar to Hungarians in 1992. This assessment is followed by 
small decline to 1999 and a rebound in 2009. In Poland, finally, the perception of conflicts 
increases from 1987 to 1999, but drops afterwards.
The opposite trend – a continuous decline in conflict perception – can be seen in the lib-
eral country Australia. In 1987, the conflict perceptions of Australians were in the middle 
of our sample, below the two other liberal countries – USA and Great Britain – and above 
the two welfare states Austria and Germany. In 2009, the conflict perception in Australia is 
less pronounced than in West Germany and a comparable level to Austria. The distinction 
between continental European welfare states and liberal states, which were aligned with 
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the conflict perceptions in these two groups in 1987, is thus has lost some of its distinctive-
ness over the period of the surveys.
USA
G. Britain
Australia
Austria
Germany (W)
Germany (E)
Hungary
Poland
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
1987 1992 1999 2009
Source: ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009. Aggregated values calculated based on respondents’ 
answers to the question of the conflict strength between “poor people and rich people,” “working 
class and middle class,” and “management and workers.” 0 = There are no conflicts. 3 = There are 
very strong conflicts. See methods and data section for more details. Dotted lines: former socialist 
societies. Dark solid lines: Liberal regimes. Grey solid lines: Continental welfare regimes.
Figure 1 The perception of vertical conflicts between 1987 and 2009
The trends in Hungary and Australia are statistically significant1 and can possibly be 
explained by the unique political and economic developments in these countries. The 
increasing conflict perception in Hungary – a description that also holds up when consid-
ering the full sample of countries that fielded any of the ISSP surveys on inequality – reso-
nates with the political turmoil and economic developments in this country after the fall of 
the Iron Curtain (see Ágh 2013; Csaba 2013). The liberalization of the market mixed with 
a reduction of social welfare in the early 1990s led to a recession and hardship for large 
parts of the population. Parallel, the political leadership kept changing constantly. The 
government shifted almost every single election between a more conservative and a more 
socialist party and it took until 2006 – when the socialist party MSZP was re-elected – that 
a government remained in power. This victory, however, was soon followed by protests, 
when a private speech of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyursány become public, which included a 
1 Based on a multilevel model that includes interactions between time and country in addition to 
the individual level variables depicted in Table 1.
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statement that the party had lied to win the 2006 election. This political turmoil was soon 
followed by the global financial crisis of 2008, which hit Hungary hard and led once more 
to a recession. Given these problems, it is not surprising that the conflict perception has 
increased throughout the entire period.
Contrary to Hungary, the two other former socialist countries in our sample, East Ger-
many and Poland, experienced a much smoother transition. East-Germany was integrated 
into an existing flourishing democracy and its special path was thus dubbed “Sonderweg” 
(Offe 1994). Accordingly, the conflict perception declines from 1992 and increases only 
again from 1999 to 2009 – possibly due to first effects of the beginning global financial 
crisis. Poland, the third post-communist society, also went through an initial shock therapy 
including market liberalization efforts and cuts in welfare support after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain (Kolodko 2013). Poland, in contrast to Hungary, however experienced a sustained 
increase in GDP and was able to avoid the worst effects of the global economic crisis in 
2008. Aligned with these events, the conflict perception increased only initially and then 
declines from 1999 to 2009.
Finally, the continuous decline in conflict perception among Australians could be related 
to the recent economic past in this country. Australia has had an uninterrupted economic 
growth for over 20 years and was able to avoid most of the negative effects of the global 
financial crisis of 2008 (see Saunders and Wong 2012). These developments are unique 
among the liberal countries of our sample, given that both the United States and Great 
Britain have faced economic turmoil in the same period. Australia thus could represent 
an ideal depiction of Beck’s (1986) elevator metaphor, given that its level of inequality is 
still higher than in Austria – the only other country with a similarly low level of conflict 
perception in 2009.
These interpretations are based on the descriptive trends depicted in Figure 1 and thus 
should be also tested for their statistical significance. The following section presents the 
results of various multilevel models which estimate the effects of the country level factors 
considered in this section and thus allow for verifying the interpretations offered so far. 
Furthermore, these models also include individual level characteristics such as age and 
education and add another layer to the macro-level interpretations brought forward so far. 
Determinants of Vertical Conflict Perception: Multilevel Model
This section reports the outcomes of various multilevel regressions that simultaneously 
estimate the effects of country-level and individual-level characteristics on the percep-
tion of vertical conflicts. The results are reported in Table 1 and split into four different 
substantive models. The empty model shows the variances at the three different levels and 
can be used as a baseline for gauging the explanatory power of the subsequent models. 
Model 1, then, considers individual socio-demographics as independent variables. Model 2 
adds the subjective views on social position and inequality to the previous model. Model 
3 includes both individual and societal characteristics. In addition, various interaction 
models were tested to estimate the specific country level developments described in the 
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previous section. Their results are discussed in the text, but not depicted in the table due 
the large number of different models and predictors.
Table 1 reports the unstandardized coefficients, their direction and significance, and the 
standardized values. For an easy readability, only the standardized Beta coefficients, the 
direction and the significance need to be considered. Their absolute value indicates the 
strength of their influence. As for the sign, a positive value means that the conflict per-
ception increases, when the independent variable increases, and a negative value that the 
conflict perception decreases, when the independent variable increases. Older respondents 
thus consider conflicts weaker than do younger ones. The asterisks indicate that an effect 
is statistically significant – which is the case for all individual characteristics, but not for 
all country-level variables. 
Table 1 Individual-level and contextual determinants of conflict perception*
Independent Variables
Empty  
Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta B Beta B Beta
Constant 1.406** 1.497** 2.169** 1.646**
Socio-demographics
Female .060**  .049 .053**  .042 .053**  .042
Age -.002** -.054 -.002** -.054 -.002** -.054
Degree -.040** -.092 -.027** -.061 -.027** -.061
Subjective views and attitudes
Subjective Social Position -.095** -.074 -.095** -.074
Squared .007** .007**
Perception of Income Differences -.310** -.178 -.305** -.177
Squared .041** .041**
Contextual characteristics
Overall time effects (wave) .033  .059
Country affluence (GDP *1000) -.010 -.137
GDP growth (*1000) -.007 -.088
Country inequality (GINI) .023*  .180
Gini growth .016  .057
Remaining variances
Country-level .027† .028† .024† .014†
Time-level .013** .013** .009** .008**
Individual-level .354** .350** .337** .337**
*Linear hierarchical regression with three levels. IGLS estimation. 40,159 valid cases out of a total 
sample size of 42,493. Also included as independent variables but not shown in this table: embedded 
variables for missing answers in subjective social position and the question about income differences 
(see appendix for the full specification of Model 3.) Beta values for quadric effects were calculated by 
restricting them to linear effects. Significance: †p<=.1, *p<=.05, and **p<=.01.
In addition, the remaining variances are reported in the bottom rows of Table 1. The empty 
model – a model without any independent variable – can be used as a baseline, with any 
GESIS Series  |  Volume 17 43
 Social Inequality in the Eyes of the Public 
decrease in the sum of the variances in the subsequent models indicating an increase in 
the explanatory power. All three models are able to improve the explained variance sig-
nificantly, with the total of the remaining variances decreasing consecutively with each 
additional set of independent variables from Model 1 through Model 3.
The findings regarding the individual variables are consistent across all models. Vertical 
conflicts are perceived as stronger by women, younger respondents, and less well educated 
individuals. The effects of gender and education are line with the initial expectations, 
whereas the negative effect of age opposes the view that an underlying value change 
results in a more harmonious picture of a society among younger respondents. The age 
effect is rather in line with social movement literature and the recent observations that 
the participants of the Occupy Wall Street protests are younger and more discontent with 
existing inequalities. In terms of effect strength, education has the strongest effect among 
the included socio-demographic variables, followed by age and gender.
As for the subjective social position of a respondent, the regression was able to identify 
a curvilinear effect on the perception of vertical conflicts (see Figure 2a). Respondents who 
place themselves at the lower end of the social stratum consider vertical conflicts as stron-
ger than respondents who place themselves in the middle. Individuals who see themselves 
at the top of the social strata consider vertical conflicts as stronger than do respondents in 
the middle, but not as strong as those at the bottom of the social stratification. This rela-
tionship matches the expectation that the perception of a conflict is stronger among the 
most exposed individuals – here respondents seeing themselves either at the bottom or the 
top of their society. The impact of this subjective placement is outshone only by the effect 
of the inequality perception among the individual-level variables.
The individual perception of the existing societal inequality has the strongest effect 
on the conflict perception among all included individual-level variables. This finding is 
less surprising given the substantive similarities between this attitudinal item and the 
dependent variable. As with social position, a curvilinear association between the view on 
inequality and conflict perception can be reported (see Figure 2b). Respondents who con-
sider existing income differences as ‘too large’ perceive the strongest conflicts. The conflict 
perception than reduces with a declining agreement to the question about the magnitude 
of income differences, and then levels out with only a minor increase among those respon-
dents who think that existing differences are too small. Again, this finding corroborates 
the expectation regarding the positive effects of a critical assessment of inequality on 
conflict perceptions.
Model 3 then includes the contextual variables affluence, inequality, and their changes 
over time, whereas the regime variables have been dropped due to the inconsistent trends 
observed in the descriptive analysis. Model 3 shows that only the overall level of societal 
inequality (GINI Index) has a significant effect on the conflict perception. The larger the 
overall inequality, the stronger are conflicts considered. The change of inequality from one 
wave to the next wave, however, is not significant. The perception of social conflicts thus 
is rather influenced by long term levels of inequality and not by short term fluctuations of 
this indicator, when considering the entire sample of countries.
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*Y-axis shows estimated conflict perception (0= no conflicts, 3=very strong conflicts). Based on 
Model 3 of Table 1. Calculation considered the constant plus the linear and quadric effect of subjec-
tive social position. 
Figure 2a  Subjective social position and the perception of vertical conflicts
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*Y-axis shows estimated conflict perception (0= no conflicts, 3=very strong conflicts). Based on 
Model 3 of Table 1. Calculation considered the constant plus the linear and quadric effect of attitudes 
towards existing income differences.
Figure 2b Views on existing income inequality and the perception of vertical conflicts
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As pointed out in the previous section, some countries have experienced very unique 
trends. The models presented in Table 1, however, follow the assumption that similar 
trends affect all countries and thus are not able to grasp country-specific effects. Therefore, 
interactions between a categorical country variable and time, country and GDP growth, 
and country and GINI growth were tested. The model with the country specific trajectories 
over time showed that the decline in Australia and the increase in Hungary are significant. 
The models the with country-specific growth effects of GDP and GINI showed that the 
perceptions of conflicts are independent from these two indicators in the welfare countries 
Austria and West-Germany (none significant) and that respondents in liberal countries are 
quite sensitive to inequality increases and somewhat to the change in wealth (GDP nega-
tive in AUS and GB, GINI positive in AUS, GB, and USA). The former socialist countries, 
finally, are characterized by diverse effects (different directions and significances) and thus 
cannot be summarized easily. 
In sum, these multilevel analyses add to our descriptive findings of the previous sec-
tion that the conflict perception differs within countries, dependent on various individual 
socio-demographics and subjective views. They also corroborate the country specific tra-
jectories over time and offer some clues as far as possible sources of these changes are 
concerned. However, as pointed out in the methods section, the number of countries in 
this analysis is rather small. The question of the influence of wealth and social inequality 
thus should be also revisited using larger country samples, which are available for single 
waves of ISSP data on inequality (see Edlund and Lindh, chapter 3 in this book). The inter-
pretation offered in the final section thus focuses on the specific set of countries used in 
this study and combines the regression results with the more specific trajectories discussed 
earlier in this contribution.
Discussion and Conclusions
This contribution focuses on the individual perceptions of conflicts between poor people 
and rich people, working class and middle class, and management and workers – summa-
rized as the perception of vertical conflicts – between 1987 and 2009 in Australia, Austria, 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, United Kingdom, and the United States. After considering the 
changes over time at the national level and analyzing the underlying individual and soci-
etal determinants of this conflict perception, what can be said regarding the big societal 
transformations of the last decades and their impact on individuals’ perceptions? Did we 
move towards more conflict laden societies as the recent protests around inequalities in 
the United States and different southern European countries suggest? Have all societies 
experienced similar trends or are there some idiosyncratic trajectories?
This contribution addressed these questions in different analytical ways using four 
waves of ISSP data on social inequality: Firstly, by tracing the aggregated trends over time 
in all included countries and discussing the developments in specific countries in more 
detail; secondly, by estimating the impact of the more general societal characteristics afflu-
ence and inequality in multilevel models; thirdly, by considering the impact of individual 
socio-demographics and subjective views on the respondents’ conflict perceptions within 
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the same multilevel models; and finally, by setting up specific interaction effects based on 
the interpretations of the descriptive findings presented earlier in this contribution.
The general trends depicted in Figure 1 showed that the perception of vertical conflicts 
has changed only slightly in the seven countries considered in this study. This initial 
analysis, however, also highlighted that Hungarians represent an exception with a steady 
increase of conflict perception. The discussion of this specific trend pointed to the unique 
political and economic struggles in this former socialist country, which were more severe 
than in Poland or East Germany. East-Germany was integrated into West-Germany and 
merged with a well-functioning affluent society – a transition which was thus dubbed a 
special path “Sonderweg” by scholars such as C. Offe (1994). Hungary and Poland both 
experienced harsh sociopolitical and economic shifts after the fall of the Iron Curtain, 
which were initially – as the present analyses showed – paralleled by increasing percep-
tions of conflicts in both countries. Poland, however, experienced later a sustained growth, 
which is accompanied by a recent decline in conflict perception. The multilevel models 
confirmed this specific trend in Hungary and showed – in line with this interpretation of 
country specific trajectories in these former socialist countries – that the effects of social 
wealth and social inequality differ substantially within this group.
Figure 1 also indicated a specific trend in the liberal country Australia. It started out 
with a rather strong perception of conflicts among its public, but ended up in 2009 next 
to Austria – the country where vertical conflict are considered the least strong. The multi-
level model showed for liberal countries that economic growth correlates with decreasing 
conflict perceptions and growing inequality with increasing conflict perception. Australia 
is an exemption among these countries as it has experienced an uninterrupted economic 
growth for over 20 years and was also able to avoid most of the negative effects of the 
global financial crisis of 2008 (see Saunders and Wong 2012). Australia is thus an ideal 
depiction of Beck’s (1986) elevator metaphor that increasing wealth is able to overcome 
the effects of inequality. Nonetheless the question remains if such effects are lasting. Pro-
longed periods of growth are an exception, might come to an end, and may result in 
increased conflict perception as seen in Hungary.
Alongside these country-specific trends, the multilevel models were able to find a sig-
nificant effect of inequality. Overall, conflicts are perceived stronger whenever societal 
inequality is large, which is in line with existing research (Hadler 2003; Haller and Eder 
2015). In addition to these findings at the country-level, conflict perception also differs 
within the population of a given country. The analyses showed that the most exposed 
individuals – women, poorly educated, and those at the lower end of the social stratum 
– are more aware of vertical conflicts. Additional models – not presented in the tables – 
also indicate that the differences in conflict perceptions between those at the bottom and 
those at the top of their society are more pronounced in liberal countries than in welfare 
states. We thus can see a stronger differentiation within liberal societies than in continen-
tal Europe. These findings resonate with Osberg and Smeeding’s (2006) result of a greater 
polarization of American’s views in terms of inequality. In addition, we can also suspect 
that this stronger polarization is one of the reasons why the Occupy Wall Street protests 
started in the United States despite only a minor increase in the overall conflict perception.
In sum, this contribution was able to show that the perception of vertical conflicts 
is influenced by both rather stable societal characteristics such as the existing level of 
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inequality and country specific trends and events – as seen in the Hungarian political 
and economic turmoil. At the same time, the conflict perceptions also vary substantially 
within societies, dependent on an individual socio-demographics and subjective views. A 
thorough analysis of conflict perceptions thus needs to consider all three aspects – general 
trends, specific circumstances, and individual characteristics.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of independent individual-level variables
N Minimum Maximum Mean/% Std. Deviation
Conflict 40794 .00 3.00 1.40 .62
Gender (female) 42436 0.00 1.00 54%
Age 42296 16.00 98.00 46.49 16.77
Degree 41997 .00 5.00 2.37 1.44
Subj.  social position 40789 1.00 10.00 5.24 1.77
Inc. differences too small 38920 1.00 5.00 1.96 .96
Table A2. Overview of country-level characteristics
Regime
GDP GINI
1987 1992 1999 2009 1987 1992 1999 2009
USA Liberal 20,055 25,452 34,585 46,930 37 37.6 40.2 41.1
G. Britain Liberal 14,430 18,169 25,149 36,295 35.5 36.2 38 38
Australia Liberal 15,929 19,014 26,765 40,578 33.2 33.7 34.1 35
Austria Cont. Welfare 15,842 21,327 27,753 40,642 23 23.8 25.2 26.1
Germany Cont. Welfare 15,401 21,262 25,764 37,082 28.6 30 29.4 30.6
Hungary Post-communist 6,304 8,225 11,222 20,801 21 27.9 27.8 29.4
Poland Post-communist 4,291 6,037 10,022 18,981 25.5 26.7 32.6 33.6
Main Sources: GDP: OECD. GINI: Worldbank; Verwiebe et al. (2013). When data were not available 
for a certain year, the closest available data were chosen.
Table A3. Specification of Model 3 presented in Table 1
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Social Cohesion and Political Conflict in 20 
Welfare States
The Democratic Class Struggle Revisited 
Jonas Edlund and Arvid Lindh1
Introduction
In sociology, social class has traditionally been the most important factor for explaining 
and understanding societal conflicts and developments. And, for a long time, the estab-
lished central role of social class in theory was not an issue in mainstream sociological 
debate. However, reviewing the literature over the last decades, it is apparent that the 
rhetoric and debate about social class radically changed in the 1990s. In this wave of “new 
thinking”, class-critical arguments were raised, basically questioning whether social class 
is a relevant concept for understanding social stratification, conflict, and current develop-
ments in contemporary Western democracies. Identities and interests, it was argued, are 
reflexively self-composed rather than rooted in structural conditions (Pakulski and Waters 
1996). In particular, the diminishing link between class belonging and political preferences 
was stressed. “[C]lasses have declining politically relevant effects” as Clark and Lipset 
(2001, 79) wrote in a rather modest passage in their book: The Breakdown of Class Politics. 
Commenting on this class-critical movement in general, Grusky and Sørensen (1998, 1188) 
wrote: “This development constitutes a striking repudiation of our disciplinary heritage; in 
fact, it was not so long ago that commentators as mainstream as Stinchcombe (…) could 
allege, without generating much in the way of controversy, that social class was the one 
and only independent variable of sociological interest.”2 
The role of class in contemporary Western society has remained a major source of con-
troversy in sociology. In this chapter, we will explore how class conflicts are manifested in 
Western advanced welfare states. While most would agree, even the critics, that class is an 
important factor for understanding the historical emergence of the welfare state – as well 
as for explaining historical between-country variation in welfare policy design – there is, 
1 This chapter is a revised version of: Edlund, J. and Lindh, A., (2015). The democratic class 
struggle revisited: The welfare state, social cohesion and political conflict. Acta Sociologica, 
58(4): 311-328.
2 Apparently, Stinchcombe made this statement – in a sarcastic and provocative manner regard-
ing the pivotal role of class in sociology – at Berkeley in 1973 (Clark and Lipset 2001, 33).
52 GESIS Series  |  Volume 17
Jonas Edlund and Arvid Lindh | Social Cohesion and Political Conflict in 20 Welfare States 
as hinted above, considerably less agreement concerning the relevance of class in con-
temporary Western society. The critics argue that class is becoming less important, if not 
negligible, for understanding contemporary patterns of social stratification, politics, and 
conflict in the Western countries, often citing the redistributive function of the welfare 
state and increased material welfare as important causal factors. Other schools of thought, 
however, still defend the application of class for making sense of observed patterns of 
social tension and political cleavage. This chapter attempts to resolve some of these dis-
agreements. 
An analytical distinction is made between social and political manifestations of class 
conflict. The concept of social conflict refers to tensions and antagonism between social 
categories located at different levels in the socio-economic hierarchy outside parliamen-
tary politics, for example, class conflicts played out primarily at the site of production 
or more or less violently in the streets. The concept of political conflict refers to class 
struggles that are mainly institutionalized within parliamentary politics and resolved in a 
“peaceful” way through the implementation of redistributive welfare state policies. 
The theory outlined in The Democratic Class Struggle (Korpi 1983) serves as the analyti-
cal starting point. The theory argues that in modern welfare states, institutionalized politi-
cal conflict tends to replace less institutionalized and unorganized social conflict. This is 
hypothesized to be more the case in encompassing welfare states, e.g., the Scandinavian 
welfare states, than in residual welfare states, e.g., the USA and Great Britain. 
While this theoretical construct emphasizes the role of class for understanding pat-
terns of conflict in Western societies, there is a significant number of scholars that takes 
a radically different view on the role of class. The main argument, as stated above, is that 
class may be important, but only as a purely historical phenomenon. For understanding 
contemporary social stratification and its implications, class is an irrelevant concept, or as 
Pahl (1996, 89) suggests: the concept of class is “ceasing to do any useful work for sociol-
ogy” in a paper titled: Is the Emperor Naked?  In the next section, we will provide a review 
of these class-critical arguments. This is followed by a section where we will develop the 
arguments about the continuing relevance of class in Western societies. The section ends 
with a number of testable hypotheses. Thereafter, data and measurements are described. 
Then follows the empirical section. The concluding section restates the main findings and 
discusses their implications.
The Historical Significance of Class and the “Death of Class” 
Thesis
There may be multiple causes behind social unrest and political antagonism between social 
groups in society. However, some factors seem to be more central than others. From a his-
torical perspective, class relations and inequalities have proven to be a recurring source of 
distributive struggles. The welfare state was the main social invention constructed in West-
ern countries with the specific aim of dampening social unrest caused by class inequalities 
encapsulated within a market capitalist economy (Marshall and Bottomore 1992; Korpi 
1983). However, reasons behind the implementation of welfare policies differed across 
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countries, and empirical studies demonstrate that the effects of these policies on social 
stratification and inequality were, and are, quite different (Korpi and Palme 2003). 
The power resources approach suggests that broad layers of the population have good 
reasons to prefer to locate societal bargaining in parliamentary politics rather than stay 
within a market relationship (Korpi 1983). This is because the political principle of “one 
person – one vote” does not have a counterpart when it comes to market relations. Fur-
thermore, within a democratic setting, it is argued that those in weak bargaining positions 
in the labor market favor redistribution of income by means of state-organized policy, 
while those with more market-derived resources are supposed to prefer a larger role for the 
market-property nexus in distributive processes (Korpi 2006, 172-75).  
When explaining the observed cross-country differences in the institutional setup of 
the welfare state, the power resources approach suggests that the key explanatory fac-
tors of the emergence and outcomes of the welfare state are the strategies and actions 
undertaken by organized labor in power struggles vis-à-vis capital, both in the spheres 
of production and in parliamentary politics. From a country-comparative perspective, the 
size and redistributive capacity of the welfare state vary positively with the strength of 
working-class organization. In short, in those countries where working-class mobilization 
was most successful – i.e., in Scandinavia – we find the most comprehensive welfare states, 
scoring comparatively higher on both social protection and redistributive capacity (Korpi 
and Palme 1998, 2003; Huber and Stephens 2001). 
Few would thus deny the prominent historical role of class mobilization in forming the 
modern welfare state. However, the arguments playing down the role of social class in 
contemporary societies when it comes to politics of redistribution are numerous and stem 
from different disciplines. And, quite ironically from a theoretical perspective, most of 
these arguments pertain in particular to the most comprehensive and redistributive welfare 
states – the Scandinavian ones.    
A shared intellectual property of these arguments is the following claim: In Western 
countries, class-based political representations and associated demands for reform are in 
a steady, or even accelerating, decline (Clark and Lipset 2001; Pakulski and Waters 1996; 
Inglehart 1997; Pierson 1996). The arguments for the diminishing relevance of class-based 
political conflict in contemporary welfare states emphasize different factors, but com-
mon themes are the following: the role of the welfare state and its redistributive effects 
on market-generated inequality; compositional changes in the labor market, for example, 
a shrinking segment of working-class occupations; increased heterogeneity in the social 
structure: class is complemented or superseded by new political cleavages; and rising lev-
els of material welfare and economic affluence.
The central components seem to be, at least in our view, the redistributive capacity of 
the welfare state for reducing market-generated inequalities and a historically rising level 
of economic affluence/development. The equalization of living conditions between social 
groups and the overall increase in levels of material welfare, the argument goes, reduce 
the likelihood that demands for additional redistributive policies will enter the political 
agenda; citizens, interest organizations, and political parties are more likely to stress other 
types of political issues. This suggests that in contemporary Western countries, where class 
inequalities have progressively decreased – largely due to the success of the modern wel-
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fare state – class becomes a non-significant force in shaping social identities and political 
actions. 
This family of arguments – suggesting that class should be largely irrelevant for under-
standing political conflicts in contemporary societies – is hereafter referred to as the death 
of class thesis (DCT), inspired by an attention-grabbing and provocative book title on the 
subject (Pakulski and Waters 1996). Applying the DCT in a cross-national Western world 
perspective, it is suggested that in countries where material inequality between classes is 
relatively low, the likelihood that class-related political conflicts will occur is much smaller 
than in countries characterized by pronounced material inequality. Thus, it appears that 
this prediction should be most valid in the Scandinavian countries, due to their combina-
tion of a universal comprehensive welfare state and a comparatively equal income distri-
bution, and least valid in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the USA and Great Britain, where 
we find a substantially less ambitious type of welfare state and comparatively high levels 
of income inequality.
Arguments for the Continued Relevance of Class:  
A Country-comparative Perspective
This section outlines a theoretical framework that deviates strongly from the DCT per-
spective. In short, we argue for the continuing relevance of class for understanding social 
divisions and conflict in contemporary Western political economies. However, we suggest 
that the particular character of class conflict is heavily influenced by the national socio-
economic context, in particular the institutional set-up of the welfare state and the associ-
ated level of material inequality.
Two principal types of class-based conflict are distinguished: one referring to political 
cleavages between classes, that is, political conflict or “class politics,” and the other refer-
ring to conflicts outside the domain of parliamentary politics, such as social tensions of 
more or less brutal character between classes, manifesting, for example, as physical and/
or psychological antagonism in the streets, or strikes and lockouts on the labor market. 
This type of conflict will hereafter be referred to as social conflict. In the following, we 
will provide arguments for why these kinds of class cleavages are likely to be of continued 
relevance for understanding (between-country variation in) modern welfare states.
The Welfare State and Social Conflict
The institutional configuration of the welfare state has a strong impact on the level of 
material inequality in a society. The larger the welfare state (i.e., comprehensive social 
insurance programs and social services provided as citizenship rights), the smaller the 
material differences across social groups. Thus, while the fundamental class structure is 
similar across countries, the degree of economic inequality across positions within the 
class hierarchy differs significantly between countries depending on their politico-institu-
tional characteristics (Korpi and Palme 1998; le Grand and Tåhlin 2013). Such institutional 
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effects are likely to have consequences for the lived experiences of ordinary citizens. As 
argued by Rothstein and Uslaner (2005, 46): “The rich and the poor in a country with a 
highly unequal distribution of wealth … may live next to each other, but their lives do not 
intersect. … In such societies, neither the rich nor the poor have any sense of a shared fate. 
… In turn, each group looks out for its own interests and is likely to see the demands of the 
other as conflicting with its own well-being. Society is seen as a zero-sum game between 
conflicting groups. … Government policies have a large impact on economic equality. Uni-
versal social programs that cater to the whole (or very broad sections) of society, such as 
we find in Scandinavian countries, promote a more equitable distribution of wealth and 
more equality of opportunity in areas such as education and the labor market. Both types 
of equality lead to a greater sense of social solidarity.” 
Such proclaimed institutional effects on social cohesion have been the basis for sug-
gestions that citizens in societies with greater equality tend to have greater trust in their 
fellow citizens (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Larsen 2013) and higher well-being (Wilkin-
son and Pickett 2010) compared to citizens living in relatively unequal societies. However, 
when it comes to research explicitly studying social conflict from a citizen perspective, 
empirical evidence is scarce. A couple of papers by Kelley and Evans (1995; 1999) indicate 
that citizens’ perceptions of the existence of class-based social conflict in society were 
most common in the United States, followed by other Anglo-Saxon countries, and least 
common in the European countries. 
The Welfare State and Political Conflict 
When it comes to the measurement of “class politics” from a citizen perspective, we find 
two common strategies in the existing literature. The first is to examine the relationships 
between class position and political party choice: class voting (e.g., Evans 1999). The sec-
ond strategy is to focus on specific social policy issues, and on the extent to which support 
for these policies differs across classes (e.g., Svallfors 1999). In this chapter we have chosen 
the second strategy, with an explicit focus on welfare state income redistribution. 
We see two benefits of applying this strategy. First, for both DCT proponents and their 
critics, the issue of income redistribution is a critical marker of class-relevant politics. On 
the one hand, DCT proponents maintain that the equalizing effects on economic conditions 
and opportunities caused by welfare state redistribution have already “succeeded in alle-
viating those problems it can most readily solve” (Inglehart 1990, 9). On the other hand, 
those arguing for the continued relevance of class stress that contemporary class conflicts 
are, to the extent that they are realized in action, “most often pursued on the terrain of the 
welfare state” (Svallfors 1999, 208).
Second, the strength of the class-vote link is not only dependent on the political orien-
tations of voters in different classes, but also on the strategies of political parties: “If par-
ties fail to present manifestos which appeal to the interests of different classes, then there 
is no reason for there to be a strong class-vote link” (Evans 1993, 451-52). Since we want 
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to focus on citizens rather than political parties or other organizations, relying on analyses 
of class voting would be suboptimal.3
In short, we suggest that the welfare state arrangements and the institutionalized power 
struggle they encapsulate are likely to consolidate – rather than dissolve – the political 
conflict patterns that were decisive during the formative years of the welfare state. More-
over, we argue that, as part of this institutionalization process, citizens are socialized into 
expecting/preferring that issues related to class inequality should be negotiated and cali-
brated mainly via redistributive welfare policy. Why?
First, in more encompassing welfare states, the systems of taxation, social spending, 
and redistribution involve a comparatively larger proportion of the citizenry – and their 
resources – than in relatively residual welfare states. Thus, the size of the welfare state not 
only determines its redistributive capacity, but also the extent of its influence on citizens’ 
everyday lives: citizens in more encompassing welfare states pay a larger share of their 
income in taxes and their livelihood is also more dependent on services provided by the 
welfare state (Edlund 2007). For these reasons, citizens in encompassing welfare states are 
likely to develop a stronger sense of “ownership” of the state and perceive stronger incen-
tives for being politically involved than citizens in meager welfare states (Persson and 
Rothstein 2015). 
Second, welfare policy arrangements can be conceptualized as institutionalized com-
promises/conflicts between different social groups or collective actors (Korpi 2001). Once a 
particular institution has been created, the central political actors involved in the process 
– defined here in a broad sense – can be characterized as institutional translators. These 
institutional translators are important for underpinning collective memories and world-
views among citizens (Rothstein 2000). Whether class has political meaning for citizens 
is thus likely to depend on whether or not institutional translators are rooted in class 
organizations. Rather than de-emphasizing the salience of class, an encompassing and 
redistributive welfare state where class-based organizations have been and continue to be 
substantial serves to maintain political conflict patterns structured around the class axis 
(Edlund 2007). Since countries with a strong historical track record of class organization 
and class politics typically also have the most ambitious welfare states today, we antici-
pate that political class conflicts are greater in encompassing welfare states than in less 
interventionist welfare states. Previous research points in this direction: studies on the 
class-preference link find that class differences in redistributive preferences are compara-
tively lower in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in the Scandinavian countries (Bechert and 
Edlund 2015; Edlund 2007; Svallfors 2006). 
3 For empirical studies on the changing political rhetoric exercised by parties and its conse-
quences for the observed class-vote link, see Jansen, Evans and de Graaf 2013; Evans and Tilley 
2012; Korpi 1993.
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Hypotheses
To summarize, we argue that although redistributive welfare policies may decrease class-
based social conflict this does not necessarily mean that class-based political conflict will 
diminish, as suggested by DCT proponents. Instead, as suggested by Walter Korpi (1983) 
in The Democratic Class Struggle, we argue that the modern welfare state transforms 
the character of class conflict. Rather than being played out at the site of production or 
taking the form of unorganized social unrest, class conflicts get institutionalized within 
parliamentary politics and resolved in a “peaceful” way through various redistributive 
and equalizing state policies. Hence, in modern welfare states, institutionalized political 
conflict “replaces” less organized social conflict – and more so in large encompassing 
welfare states than in small residual welfare states. The following hypotheses summarize 
the expected associations:
The larger the welfare state (Ha) and the lower the level of material inequality (Hb)... 
(H1) ... the lower the aggregate level of perceived tension between different groups within 
the class hierarchy – social conflict. 
(H2) ... the higher the level of class differences in preferences for redistribution – politi-
cal conflict. 
(H3) There is a trade-off at the country level: the weaker the political conflict, the 
stronger the social conflict, and vice versa.  
Data
The study uses data from the Social Inequality modules fielded in 1999 and 2009 by the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The working sample consists of respon-
dents in 20 relatively affluent countries with “mature” welfare state arrangements. For the 
following countries, data are available for both years: Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
States. Data from a single survey are available for Belgium, Finland, Italy, Japan, and 
Switzerland (2009), and Canada, Ireland, and the Netherlands (1999). As some countries 
lack information on class position for those outside the labor market, the working sample 
is limited to respondents currently active in the labor market (23,314 respondents). 
Measurements
Class Position
Classes can be understood as aggregations of positions in production units and labor mar-
kets. Individuals are sorted into class categories on the basis of occupation (ISCO88) and 
employment status (employee/self-employed), using the well-known EGP class schema 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). The EGP is a weak class idiom. The approach does not 
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incorporate notions of consciousness, action, and group belonging as conceptual build-
ing blocks. According to this perspective, whether identities and interests are structured 
along the axis of class or by other structural locations, and whether these interests are 
transformed into political mobilization, should mainly be treated as empirical questions 
(Goldthorpe and Marshall 1996, 101f.). Following the routine of previous research on the 
subject (Svallfors 2006; Edlund 2007), the class schema used distinguishes six class posi-
tions: self-employed; service class I; service class II; routine non-manuals; skilled workers; 
unskilled workers. 
Social Conflict
When it comes to the measurement of social tensions/antagonism/conflict between classes 
in society, we focus on the aggregate level of perceived conflict between those at the upper 
level of the class hierarchy and those at the lower level, following the same strategy as 
Kelley and Evans (1995; 1999). The following battery is used to measure people’s percep-
tions of social conflict: 
In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. 
In your opinion, in <country> how much conflict is there between… 
A. … poor people and rich people? 
B. … the working class and the middle class? 
C. … management and workers? 
D. … people at the top of society and people at the bottom? 
Response scale: Very strong conflicts; Strong conflicts; Not very strong conflicts; There 
are no conflicts.
Each item concerns the relationship between groups located at different levels within the 
socio-economic hierarchy. Items B and C refer explicitly to class-based cleavages, whereas 
item A refers to class-based economic inequalities understood in a broader sense. Item D 
does not refer explicitly to class. Still, from an empirical point of view, item D is highly 
correlated with the other three items. We therefore find it reasonable to enter all four items 
in a composite additive index. In addition, using a composite measure better allows for the 
possibility that public discourse concerning class conflict might be framed somewhat dif-
ferently in different national contexts. Cronbach’s alpha for the additive index is accept-
able for all countries, ranging from 0.70 (Netherlands 1999) to 0.88 (Spain 2009). For ease 
of comparison, the index is standardized to vary between 0 and 100, where a higher score 
represents stronger conflict.4 
4 For Canada and Japan, a 3-item scale standardized to range 0-100 is used due to missing data. 
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Political Conflict
The following item is the selected indicator for the measurement of attitude towards state-
organized income redistribution: 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? – It is the respon-
sibility of the government to reduce differences in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes.
Response scale: “Strongly agree” (coded as 100); “Agree” (75); “Neither agree nor dis-
agree” (50); “Disagree” (25); “Strongly disagree” (0). 
Very importantly, the degree of political conflict in any given country is determined by 
the level of class differences in attitudes towards income redistribution. If there are small 
(large) differences between classes in support for redistribution, then the level of political 
conflict is low (high). To clarify, this study aims to account for between-country variation 
in the level of class differences in preferences for redistribution. The aim is not to explain 
between-country variation in aggregate support for redistribution. 
The estimate of political conflict is retrieved through 20 separate OLS regression models 
(gender and age included controlling for compositional differences in countries), one per 
country, where the magnitude of differences between classes in their support for redistri-
bution indicates the level of political conflict in a country. The magnitude of class dif-
ferences – political conflict – is determined by the standard deviation of the five dummy 
variable estimates for class, a strategy commonly employed in research (cf., Hout, Brooks 
and Manza 1995; Brooks and Svallfors 2010). The larger the standard deviation, the larger 
the overall difference between classes.
Contextual Indicators:  
Size of the Welfare State, Material Inequality, and Economic Affluence
Our measure of the welfare state attempts to capture both the overall size and the redis-
tributive capacity of the state, which is a function of the levels of taxation and social 
spending (Åberg 1989; Edlund 1999). Our strategy is to use data on the outputs/effects of 
the welfare state instead of using indicators of specific institutional design characteristics. 
One major advantage of using output data is that publicly provided social services are also 
included in the measurement. To our knowledge, there are no comparative data available 
on institutional design for this specific domain of the welfare state. Moreover, it should 
be emphasized that the indicators used are highly correlated with more direct measures of 
welfare policy design. The higher the prevalence of universal/encompassing social insur-
ance programs, the higher the levels of taxation, social spending, and redistribution (Korpi 
and Palme 1998).
The size of the welfare state is measured by an additive index consisting of three indi-
cators: (i) tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (OECD 2013); (ii) social spending as a per-
centage of GDP (OECD 2013); and (iii) the level of government redistribution (Wang and 
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Caminada 2011).5 Each indicator is standardized which means that all indicators get equal 
weight in the composite index. The inter-indicator correlations are high (i-ii, .87; i-iii, .82; 
ii-iii, .87), suggesting that they cover the same underlying construct. The level of material 
inequality is measured with the Gini coefficient (post-tax and transfer household income) 
(Wang and Caminada 2011). A higher score represents greater inequality. The scores on 
each of these measures are constructed from data covering the ten-year period preceding 
the year of the survey. Thus, data covering the years 1989-1998 (mean score) are used for 
the 1999 survey, while data stretching from 1999 to 2008 (mean score) are used for the 
2009 survey.
These two measures are rather strongly correlated with each other, which underlines 
the fact that there is a strong relationship between welfare state institutions/outcomes and 
the level of economic inequality (Korpi and Palme 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001). The 
data suggest that the larger the welfare state, the lower the level of material inequality 
(Pearson’s r = -.78).
In addition, the DCT suggests that economic affluence/development diminish the 
salience of class conflicts and other socio-economic cleavages (Inglehart 1990; 1997). We 
therefore include GDP per capita (OECD 2013) as a measure of economic affluence in the 
analysis. The correlations between GDP per capita and size of the welfare state and mate-
rial inequality are, respectively: Pearson’s r = .05 (p = .840) and Pearson’s r -.34 (p = .142). 
This means that there is no association between the size of the welfare state and economic 
affluence, and that there is a non-significant tendency that material inequality is lower in 
more affluent countries compared to less affluent countries. 
In the forthcoming analysis, the relationships between the two dependent measures and 
contextual variables will be explored and presented in the form of plot diagrams. A mea-
sure of association will also be displayed: the Pearson’s r coefficient. The unit of analysis 
is country (n=20).6 
5 Wang and Caminada (2011) calculate the change in the Gini coefficient pre- and post-taxes and 
transfers, using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. Since data from New Zealand and 
Portugal are not in this dataset, data for these countries are taken from OECD (2013). 
6 The unit of analysis in this chapter is country (n=20).  In the article that this chapter builds upon 
(Edlund and Lindh 2015), we used country-year (n=32). It should be underlined that this change 
of design has a negligible effect on the results. In the article, we applied multilevel modelling 
where we were able to distinguish between-country variation as well as over-time variation. The 
latter variation turned out to be close to nil. In short, irrespective of whether the relationships 
between country level characteristics and our measures of conflict are estimated using multilevel 
modelling or simple correlation analysis at the country level (as we do in this chapter) the main 
results and conclusions are remarkably similar. Moreover, we believe that the type of graphical 
representations provided in this chapter should be seen as complementing the more advanced 
analysis employed in the article – mainly because each country’s position in the diagrams is 
clearly displayed. 
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Empirical Results
The empirical analysis is performed in three steps. In the first step, the relationships between 
the aggregate level of social conflict and each of the macro-level factors are explored. The 
second step measures the associations between each of the macro-level factors and the size 
of political conflict. The third step analyzes the extent to which a potential country-level 
trade-off between the two types of class conflict is discernible in the data.
Step I: Exploring the relationships between country-level factors and social conflict
This step explores the extent to which the observed between-country variation in the 
aggregate level of social conflict is accounted for by the size of the welfare state, material 
inequality, and economic affluence, respectively. 
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Hypothesis H1a predicts a negative association between the size of the welfare state and the 
level of social conflict. As shown in Diagram A, the hypothesis receives empirical support. 
The aggregate level of social conflict tend to be smaller in large welfare states. The rela-
tionship is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level (p = .098). Next, as understood by 
hypothesis H1b, the central mechanism forging a link between the size of the welfare state 
and social conflict is the level of material inequality. The relationship between material 
inequality and the level of social conflict is shown in Diagram B. A strong positive rela-
tionship can be observed: social conflicts are more pronounced in countries with greater 
material inequality (p < .001). In other words, a substantial proportion of the observed 
between-country variation in the level of social conflict is explained by country differ-
ences in material inequality. In Diagram C, the importance of economic affluence (GDP per 
capita) is tested. Although the diagram shows a negative relationship, it is not statistically 
significant (p = .110). It is worth noting the position of USA in the diagram. While USA 
is among the wealthiest countries in the sample, it is among the top-scoring countries in 
perceived social conflict. 
 The empirical results in this section lend some support to our theoretical argument:  the 
larger the welfare state (H1a), and the lower the level of material inequality (H1b), the less 
severe the social conflict. 
Step II: Exploring the relationships between country-level factors and political conflict
As will be shown below, the level of political conflict, defined by the magnitude of class 
differences in support for state-organized redistribution, differs extensively across coun-
tries. The question now is to what extent can the observed cross-country variation in 
political conflict be accounted for by the macro-level factors?
Diagram D shows that class differences in preferences for redistribution are significantly 
greater in large encompassing welfare states than in meager welfare states (p < .001). Dia-
gram E, focusing on the role of material inequality, reports similar hypothesis-supportive 
findings: class differences are substantially weaker in highly unequal countries compared 
to countries with greater equality (p < .001). Diagram F indicates that economic develop-
ment does not have any substantive influence on the level of political conflict (p = .539).
In line with hypotheses H2ab, the results in Diagrams D and E indicate that the level of 
political conflict, measured as the magnitude of class differences in preferences for state-
organized redistribution, is comparatively higher in countries where citizens are embedded 
in a context characterized by an encompassing and redistributive welfare system with 
a relatively low level of economic inequality. It should also be noted that the economic 
affluence thesis advocated by DCT proponents (Diagram F) does not receive convincing 
empirical support.
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Step III: Exploring a potential country-level trade-off between social and political conflict
The next step of the analysis examines the relationship between social and political con-
flict at the country level. As stated in H3, a trade-off at the country level between the level 
of social conflict and the level of political conflict is anticipated. Interpreting Diagram G 
in terms of support/rejection of H3, the displayed association is clearly biased in favor of 
the hypothesis, suggesting a trade-off between social and political conflict. As shown, in 
countries where the level of perceived social conflict is higher, the level of political conflict 
is lower, and vice versa (Pearson’s r = -.49; p = .030). 
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Conclusions
Are contemporary welfare states characterized by class conflict or has the class concept 
lost its significance for understanding social and political struggles in today’s society? This 
chapter considers this issue from a new angle by studying class conflict from a “citizen 
perspective”. 
In our view, the results in this study make it difficult to defend the “death of class” thesis 
suggesting that the concept of class has become irrelevant in modern industrial democra-
cies. Instead, the results are in line with The Democratic Class Struggle thesis, which sug-
gests that the character of class conflict varies across national socio-economic contexts 
in tandem with between-country variation in the institutional setup of the welfare state.
Results show that in countries where the welfare state is meager and material inequal-
ity is extensive, citizens perceive that their society is characterized by social tensions 
and conflicts between classes to a greater extent than citizens living in countries with 
comparatively encompassing welfare states and lower levels of equality. When it comes to 
class-based conflicts in distributive processes within parliamentary politics, the opposite 
pattern can be observed. Hence, it is too simplistic to conclude that the welfare state has 
a uniform impact on class conflict tout court. Instead, the character of the welfare state 
matters for what aspect of class conflict – social or political – that dominates in a country.
Thus, while it is true that class is of limited importance in terms of our understanding of 
citizens’ political orientations in residual welfare states, this does not mean that class rela-
tions are in harmony or non-existent in these countries. In these countries, citizens – whether 
they are located at the upper or lower level of the socio-economic ladder – comparatively 
more often view their own society as marked by tensions between classes.7 In other words, 
7 The observation that class differences in perceptions of social conflict are in general quite 
small and, furthermore, do not vary significantly across countries, is described in more detail in 
Edlund and Lindh (2015).
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the role of class as a vehicle for social tension and antagonism should not be underestimated. 
Correspondingly, while citizens in encompassing welfare states perceive limited social con-
flict, distributive struggles remain institutionalized within parliamentary politics, as dif-
ferent classes continue to express highly diverging preferences concerning redistribution. 
Why are political conflicts more pronounced in encompassing welfare states? After all, 
material conditions tend to be relatively equally distributed across classes. From a power 
resources perspective, a key causal factor explaining these findings is the extent to which 
organized labor has been successful in transferring distributive struggles from the labor 
market into parliamentary politics, thereby converting these initially informal, particular-
istic, sometimes violent, non-institutionalized conflicts into democratic class struggles. As 
part of this institutionalization process, the institutional setup of the large redistributive 
encompassing welfare state – situated within a context of institutional translators orga-
nized along the class axis – preserves the concept of redistribution as a salient political 
issue and makes citizens orient themselves politically on the basis of class interests and 
identities. Correspondingly, while many citizens in meager welfare states – such as the 
USA – perceive society as marked by class-based social tension, they do not necessarily 
turn to the political system and asking for redistributive social policy reforms to negotiate 
and/or resolve class conflicts. 
The power resources approach suggests that broad layers of the citizenry have good 
reasons to prefer that distributive struggles get settled within the domain of parliamentary 
democratic politics, and not be scattered to other spheres of society. Similarly, normative 
democratic theory suggests that parliamentary democratic politics constitute a construc-
tive device for resolving societal conflicts in a legitimate and “peaceful” context. In this 
respect, it deserves to be underscored that our findings suggest that political cleavages 
do not have a negative impact on social cohesion. If anything, the results suggest that 
political deliberation is associated with a higher level of social cohesion. In this sense, 
this chapter offers some support for the claim that the encompassing welfare state can be 
understood as a manifestation of a successful large-scale societal compromise between 
partly conflicting interests rooted in the mode of capitalist production. 
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Is it Just that People with Higher Incomes Can Buy 
Better Education and Health Care? 
A Comparison of 17 Countries
Arvid Lindh1
Introduction2
A market can be understood as a “social structure for exchange of property rights, which 
enables people, firms and products to be evaluated and priced” (Aspers 2006, 427). In 
today’s “market society”, such structures are widespread and predominate in many differ-
ent spheres of life (Slater and Tonkiss 2013). The market conveys a specific justice principle 
– “market justice” – affording legitimacy to the allocation of goods and services on the 
basis of prices and ability to pay (Lane 1986; Streeck 2012). What is the legitimate scope 
of markets – and market justice – in society? While philosophers have focused intently 
on this question (e.g.; Waltzer 1983, Sandel 2000), there is a lack of empirical research 
examining public beliefs about which specific spheres of life should be subjected to, versus 
protected from, the market. 
This issue is particularly interesting from a country-comparative perspective since the 
actual role of the market differs considerably between countries. Such differences are 
to a large extent the consequence of between-country variation in welfare policy as the 
logic underlying state-organized welfare is very different from that of the market (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998; Huber and Stephens 2000). As T. H. Marshall 
portrayed the invention of social citizenship: “Social rights in their modern form imply 
an invasion of contract by status, the subordination of market price to social justice, the 
replacement of the free bargain by the declaration of rights” (Marshall and Bottomore 
1992, 40). 
1 This chapter is a revised and shortened version of Lindh, Arvid (2015) “Public Opinion against 
Markets? Attitudes towards Market Distribution of Social Services – A Comparison of 17 Coun-
tries”, Social Policy & Administration, 49: 887–910. Some estimates presented in this chapter 
are marginally different from the corresponding estimates in the journal article. This is because 
the journal article uses a sample consisting only of those active in the labor market (because 
the article partly focuses on the class-attitude link). Still the substantive results are the same 
independently of which of these samples that are used. 
2 I am grateful to Jonas Edlund, Mattias Strandh, Monika Ewa Kaminska, Paul Marx, Rune Åberg, 
Stefan Svallfors, Tomas Korpi, Insa Bechert, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments 
on previous versions of this manuscript. I also want to thank Volquart Stoy for providing data. 
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Against this background, this chapter examines how citizens conceive the appropriate-
ness of market criteria for allocating services commonly associated with social citizenship 
rights and welfare state responsibility. Education and health care services provide citizens 
with basic “capabilities” that are necessary for both social and economic participation 
in today’s society. Due to their basic importance, exploring normative beliefs about the 
potential role of the market in distributing these services can tell us something about the 
degree of legitimacy afforded to the market mechanism in stratifying life chances and 
quality of life among the population.
In recent decades, there has been an incremental recalibration of the institutional bal-
ance between state and market (Streeck 2012). Within the sphere of social services, user 
fees have become more significant, private firms have come to administer services on a 
more general basis, and public providers have been re-organized so as to compete inter-
nally and externally through “quasi-markets”. Such trends can be seen also in countries 
where market solutions have traditionally played a lesser role in social policy (Gingrich 
2011). Are these policy developments embraced by citizens? While it has been argued 
that these ongoing policy developments are triggered by a rise to prominence of “market-
friendly” ideology among ruling elites (Crouch 2004; Blyth 2001), it is widely held that 
public opinion is an important constraining factor (Pierson 1996; Brooks and Manza 2008; 
Starke 2012). Such claims are backed up by a vast body of empirical research demonstrat-
ing that popular support for state-organized welfare (the welfare state) is strong overall. In 
particular, public support for state-led social service provision (e.g. health care and elderly 
care) is strong in virtually all welfare capitalist countries, including the low welfare effort 
countries in North America and Australia (e.g., Edlund 2009; Bean and Papadakis 1998). 
Does the fact that social services are a core, and highly popular, component of welfare 
state effort entail that citizen’s find market distribution of such services unacceptable? Not 
necessarily. In theory, welfare policy models are distinguished by reference to their spe-
cific institutional mix, or division of labor, between state, market and family/civil society 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Powell and Barrientos 2004). Since the state carries significant 
responsibility for service finance and delivery in virtually all relatively affluent coun-
tries, it is not surprising that most citizens hold the state accountable for providing such 
services. Still, this does not necessarily mean that people ascribe to the state exclusive 
responsibility for service administration, or that people are convinced that services should 
be distributed exclusively as social citizenship rights; people might very well find other 
institutional logics viable as a complement. Since the degree to which markets function 
as a complement to the state in the provision of services differs between countries, and as 
contemporary policy developments are characterized by market expansion in this area, it 
is particularly important to pay more careful attention to citizens’ beliefs about the market 
in this respect. 
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Theory and Hypotheses
The actual role of the market in stratifying access to education and health care differs 
considerably between countries. In some countries, social services are mainly produced by 
public agencies, financed collectively via taxes, and provided in kind to the vast major-
ity of the population. In such contexts, social rights replace market principles as the main 
mechanism structuring access to services. However, in other countries, services are, to a 
greater degree, delivered by for-profit actors, funded by private sources, and distributed in 
accordance with individual ability to pay. Within such contexts, the market logic is more 
important in determining how services get allocated among the population (Huber and 
Stephens 2000). 
Institutional theory emphasizes how enacted policies and institutions tend to reinforce 
their legitimacy and popular support over time by shaping citizens’ economic interests, 
cognitive mindsets, and social identities (Campbell 2012). According to this line of the-
ory, the relationship between welfare policy institutions and public opinion is one of 
mutual influence: public opinion shapes policy (Brooks and Manza 2008), but attitudes are 
also shaped by existing policies (Pierson 1996; Rothstein 1998). For example, it has been 
argued that encompassing public programs, offering high-quality services equally to the 
whole population, nurtures a general interest in preserving these programs as the main 
providers of social welfare (Korpi and Palme 1998). In a similar vein, more market-based 
systems see large groups of citizens having resources vested in private schemes, making it 
less plausible for those groups to switch to collective solutions administered by the state.
The relationship between public opinion and policy design can be explored by compar-
ing attitudes across countries with varying institutional configurations. Most previous 
studies exploring the relationship between welfare policy design and attitudes from a 
country-comparative perspective have focused on state-organized welfare. The collected 
evidence from these studies is relatively disappointing in the sense that the theoretically 
anticipated relationships between institutions and attitudes are generally not confirmed by 
data. The general finding in previous research is rather that public support for government 
responsibility for the provision of basic social services is solid across Western countries 
(Gevers et al. 2000; Edlund 2009; Bean and Papadakis 1998). Based on these observations 
and related empirical findings, it has been suggested that citizens’ conceptions of social 
rights and justice are relatively similar across western countries (Arts and Gelissen 2001). 
Yet, a general weakness of previous research is that the market is not given explicit 
attention.  However, in a rare example of a study that focuses specifically on the role of 
the market in social services, Svallfors (2007) compared attitudes across four countries: 
Sweden, Germany, the United States and Great Britain (using ISSP data from 1999). This 
study found that in Britain 41 percent of the respondents believe it is fair that people with 
higher income can buy better health care (and, respectively, 44 percent for education) than 
people with lower incomes. In the United States the corresponding percentages are 28 (32) 
per cent, in Germany 12 (12) percent and in Sweden 10 (11) percent. These findings indi-
cate that support for market distribution of services is greater in countries with residual 
welfare states (Great Britain, United States) compared to countries with more ambitious 
welfare state arrangements (Sweden, Germany). 
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To summarize, we might suspect that citizens’ views about the legitimate role of the 
market are influenced by contextual characteristics at the country level. A market-based 
social service system might nourish beliefs that social services are ‘normal’ commodities 
suitable for market distribution, while a system of public provision might encourage the 
conception that services constitute social rights that should be provided independent of 
market resources. Thus, a point of departure in this study is that country-comparative 
political attitude research might gain from explicitly considering attitudes towards the 
market. In this regard, two aspects of policy design are considered in this study. First, 
citizens’ attitudes might be associated with the character of service funding, that is, the 
extent to which services are not financed by taxes, but by user fees etc. Second, attitudes 
might also be related to the way that services are delivered: provision by for-profit actors 
might nurture a stronger belief that social services are “normal” commodities that can be 
legitimately distributed according to market logic. Against this background, the following 
two hypotheses can be formulated:
H1: Aggregate support for market distribution of social services is stronger in countries 
with a higher share of private funding of services.  
H2: Aggregate support for market distribution of social services is stronger in countries 
with a higher share of private delivery of services.  
Data and Measurements
Data
This chapter uses data from the 2009 ISSP Social Inequality IV module. The working 
sample consists of respondents from 17 relatively affluent countries: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. 
Macro data on private funding and economic conditions come from the OECD. Data on 
delivery of services are from Stoy (2014) (see subsequent section for further discussion of 
these measures).
Dependent Variable: Attitudes Towards Market Distribution of Services
The survey measure used queries whether it is fair that people with higher incomes can buy 
better health care and education than people with lower incomes. The dependent variable 
was constructed from the following two items in the dataset: 
I. Is it just or unjust – right or wrong – that people with higher incomes can buy better 
health care than people with lower incomes?
II. Is it just or unjust – right or wrong – that people with higher incomes can buy better 
education for their children than people with lower incomes?
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Possible answers to each question were: Very just, definitely right; Somewhat just, right; 
Neither just nor unjust, mixed feelings; Somewhat unjust, wrong; Very unjust, definitely 
wrong. 
Taken together, these items provide a good measurement, since the questions highlight 
two core aspects of the market logic: (i) the role of economic resources as decisive for 
attainment, and (ii) the treatment of services as commodities that can be bought (and sold). 
Responses to these two items were highly correlated. At the individual level, the (Pearson’s 
R) correlation was 0.76 within the sample. At the country level, the correlation between the 
two items was an astonishing 0.93. Thus, it made sense to treat the two items as together 
covering an underlying attitude dimension. The two items were therefore combined into 
an additive index ranging from 0 to 100, where a higher score represents greater support 
for market distribution of services.
Contrast Measure: Attitudes Towards the Role of Government
To contrast estimates of support for market distribution, the descriptive analysis also 
includes an estimation of attitudes towards the role of government. This measure covers 
attitudes towards government responsibility for health care and has been used as a mea-
sure of welfare state support in previous studies (e.g., Bean and Papadakis 1998).
These data were taken from the 2006 International Social Survey Programme’s Role of 
Government module. Attitudes towards education policy were not included in this mea-
sure, since there is no indicator in the dataset asking about such responsibilities in broad 
terms.
III. On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government’s responsibil-
ity to provide health care for the sick?
Answer scale: Definitely should be (coded as 100); Probably should be (66); Probably 
should not be (33); Definitely should not be (0).3 
As stated, this measure was included to estimate, in rough terms, whether there is a trade-
off relationship (negative correlation) at the country level between support for state-led 
service provision, on the one hand, and support for market distribution of services, on the 
other hand. Thus, the reason that this variable was included was not to provide a fine-
tuned assessment of public support for state-led service provision as such. 
3 Responses were recoded to range from 0 to 100, whereby a higher score indicates support for a 
stronger governmental role. Unfortunately, Austria, Belgium and Italy did not participate in the 
2006 survey. Thus no estimates could be retrieved for these specific countries.
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Policy Design
Two different measures of policy design are used. The first covers the share of private fund-
ing as the percentage of total spending on services. This measure was obtained by adding 
together two separate sources of data, reflecting the content of the dependent attitude vari-
able: (i) the share of private funding as a percentage of total spending on education (see 
also Busemeyer 2013), and (ii) the share of private, out-of-pocket payments as a percentage 
of total health expenditure (see also Wendt et al. 2010). Data was taken from the OECD 
(2011; 2012) and covers the years 2007 (education) and 2008 (health care). 
The second measure is about the delivery of services. While it would have been pref-
erable to use data explicitly covering for-profit delivery, such cross-national data are 
unfortunately not available. Therefore the strategy chosen was to use data on public sec-
tor employment as a measure of public involvement in service delivery. More specifically, 
the construct measures public employment as proportion of total employment within the 
social welfare sector. The data covers the period 2005–2007, and was kindly provided by 
Stoy (2014). 
The correlation between these two indicators is quite strong (Pearson’s R= -.49), mean-
ing that countries with a higher (lower) share of private funding tend to have a lower 
(higher) share of public delivery of services. This was expected, since it is well known that 
welfare policy institutions tend to cluster together in more encompassing institutional 
configurations, or policy regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Economic Conditions
The level of economic affluence (GDP/capita) and market income inequality (pre-tax and 
transfer Gini), respectively, were also included in the analysis. The rationale for including 
these variables is an effort to distinguish between the importance of policy institutions, 
on the one hand, and the role of economic factors, on the other. What is it that shapes 
attitudes – social policies or crude economic conditions? 
Empirical Results
The empirical analysis consists of two steps. A first step explores the extent to which 
attitudes vary across countries. In a second step, the relationship between attitudes and 
country-level variables will be analyzed and illustrated in the form of plot diagrams.4
4 The main results were also retrieved using multilevel modelling. These multilevel models/results 
are presented in Lindh (2015). 
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Descriptive Analysis
Figure 1 reports the aggregate levels of market support found in the 17 countries (black 
bars). Attitudes are found to differ greatly between countries. Public support for market 
distribution of services is comparably high in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Great 
Britain, New Zealand, and the United States) and Japan, while support is the lowest in Bel-
gium and France. The standard deviation in country means is 9.8 scale points (not shown 
in the figure).
For a rough comparison, Figure 1 also includes an estimate of public support for the 
responsibility of government (grey bars). As shown, we can observe strong public support 
for state-led provision of services in all countries. In 12 out of 14 countries, the mean 
index score is above 80. The standard deviation in country mean is 7.7 scale points.
Market Government
Figure 1 Aggregate public support for market and government responsibility
Three observations are worth highlighting. First, though taken together, these measures 
are not perfectly comparable (emphasis and wording of the questions differed), a rough 
comparison still suggests that citizens ascribe a more fundamental responsibility for social 
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service administration to government than they do to the market. Second, at the country 
level, there is a zero correlation (Pearson’s R= - .03) between these two attitude measures. 
This means that, at the aggregate level, citizens’ support for market principles cannot 
be deduced from studying support for the role of government, and vice versa. Third, the 
cross-national variation is greater for attitudes towards market distribution than for atti-
tudes towards government responsibility. Taken together, these results signal that a study 
of market attitudes might render insights unregistered by previous research focused solely 
on the role of government.
Exploring the Relationship between Attitudes and Country Context
The preceding section established that there is significant between-country variation in 
public support for market distribution of basic social services. This step of the analysis 
explores the extent to which this variation in attitudes can be accounted for by country 
differences in actual policy design and economic conditions.
Figure 2 Plot diagrams: Relationship between attitudes and country context
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As discussed in the theoretical section above, we might suspect that aggregate support 
for market provision of services is stronger in countries where market principles are more 
prominent. In this regard, hypotheses predict that aggregate support for markets should 
be stronger in countries with more private funding (H1) and less state-led service delivery 
(H2). These hypotheses were tested in Figure 2. Diagram A plots the relationship between 
aggregate market support (country means on market index) and private funding (percent-
age of total spending). A relatively strong positive relationship is found that is not driven 
by single outliers (Pearson’s R = .69; p = .002). Diagram B plots the relationship between 
market support and service delivery (public employment as a percentage of total welfare 
sector employment). As shown, market support does not correlate with the size of public 
employment (Pearson’s R = - .04; p = .873). Diagrams C and D demonstrate that neither 
the level of GDP/capita (Diagram C, Pearson’s R = .03; p = .905) or the level of market 
inequality (Diagram D, Pearson’s R = .05; p = .858) account for country differences in pub-
lic support for applying market principles regarding the provision of basic social services. 
Conclusions 
Previous empirical research teaches us little about citizens’ beliefs concerning the appro-
priateness of the market for distributing social goods and services. Against this back-
ground, the objectives of this chapter were to study normative beliefs about the fairness 
of the market mechanism in stratifying access to basic social services, as well as to com-
pare how these attitudes differ across countries in conjunction with actual conditions at 
the country level. A number of important conclusions can be drawn on the basis of this 
country-comparative analysis.
Results show that public support for market distribution of social services is relatively 
weak in most countries. Hence, most people find it unfair that market relations stratify 
access to basic social services that are decisive for participation in today’s society. This 
result can be contrasted with previous research showing that “market-friendly” ideology 
has become popular among ruling elites (Crouch 2004). Taken together, this suggests that 
ongoing policy reform distinguished by welfare marketization is driven more by top-down 
political decision-making – and shifts in the ideological discourse of elites – than by ordi-
nary citizens pushing for such reforms from below. Thus, results are not at odds with the 
commonly held view that public opinion is rather a constraint than a driving force within 
processes of welfare marketization. 
In addition, considerable between-country variation in aggregate support for market 
distribution of services was found. Results suggest that popular beliefs about the legitimate 
scope of the market are shaped by the actual role that markets play in a society. In particu-
lar, results point to a connection between attitudes and existing policy arrangements: the 
aggregate levels of public support for market distribution of services are higher in coun-
tries with greater private spending on services. Citizens more used to market-based systems 
display greater willingness to accept market principles of justice playing a significant role 
in the distribution of services, whereas citizens used to public funding are more inclined to 
view these services as social rights that should be distributed independent of market logic. 
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This pattern is manifested in the low market support found across most of Europe, while it 
is relatively strong in the Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan. 
In contrast, no relationship was found between aggregate attitude patterns and macro-
economic conditions (level of GDP/capita and market inequality, respectively). This result 
suggests that existing policy arrangements are more important than crude economic con-
ditions for structuring these attitudes, and moreover, these views appeared unrelated to the 
character of service delivery. This shows that it is important for comparative research to 
make an analytical distinction between the funding and delivery of services.
Furthermore, country differences in welfare state effort and generosity are commonly 
conceived in relation to the market: some welfare states do more than others to pro-
mote social citizenship rights that free citizens from market dependence. This theoretical 
way of understanding state-organized welfare – and between-country variation in policy 
design – pertains to the lion’s share of research on political attitudes. Yet, previous empiri-
cal research bestows no explicit attention on attitudes towards the market. Against this 
background, it is interesting that this market-oriented study finds a systematic association 
between attitudinal patterns and welfare policy design. Also, in contrast to previous, state-
oriented, research, the findings in this paper suggest that popular beliefs about fairness and 
justice do differ in substantial ways between countries.
The theoretical arguments and the empirical results presented in this paper suggest that 
future research is well advised to place greater focus on the market institutions that, to a 
varying extent in different countries, act as complements to the state in the administration 
of social welfare. Such research should also look at other welfare policy areas, as the theo-
retical framework of this paper suggests that citizens’ beliefs about the legitimate scope of 
the market are likely to vary between both social spheres and policy domains.
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Public Support for State Redistribution in Western 
and Central Eastern European Countries
A Cross-National Comparative Trend Analysis
Anja Eder
Introduction:  
Increasing Inequalities and Public Support for State Redistribution
Even before the recent worldwide economic crisis, the distribution of incomes in many 
OECD countries has become more unequal during a period of economic growth and high 
employment since the 1970s and 1980s (OECD 2015). Whereas in the 1980s the top 10% of 
the population earned 7 times as much as the lowest 10%, in the early 2000s, the top 10% 
earned nearly 10 times, and today earn the “highest since records began” (OECD 2015). 
From this trend, several scholars have concluded the historical phase of equalization has 
ended (e.g., Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Grusky 2001; Nollmann 2006). Simultaneously, 
Western countries established third way policies (Giddens 1998) that make welfare ben-
efits increasingly conditional to guarantee “economic dynamism as well as social justice” 
(Powell and Barrientos 2004, 12). During this period, the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) established democratic and free economies, accompanied by extensive capi-
talization and privatization (Kollmorgen 2009, 76). Today, CEE countries are among the 
countries worldwide that have the highest between-country variation in inequality (Haller 
et al. 2016); however, average economic prosperity is still lower than in Western Europe 
(Aidukaite 2011, 212). 
Against the background of these developments, this chapter focuses on the question to 
what extent people think that their governments are responsible for reducing income dif-
ferences, according to data from the ISSP Module on Social Inequality (International Social 
Survey Programme). Public support plays a decisive role in political decisions and directly 
or indirectly influences social structural changes (e.g., Burstein 2003; Brooks and Manza 
2006). In democratic societies, voters have the opportunity to choose between political 
parties that are more or less prone to redistributive policies. In addition, from a histori-
cal perspective, it is clear that people’s convictions and values have always been decisive 
regarding the strength of labor unions, leftist and conservative political parties and the 
establishment of different types of welfare states across countries (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
This chapter pays special attention to potential changes in preferences for state redistribu-
tion throughout the 1990s and 2000s and to contrasts between countries and ideal-typical 
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welfare state regimes during a period of increasing income inequality, growing global 
economic competition and East European post-socialism. 
Previous research has focused on different hypotheses to explain the variation across 
countries and time. The present chapter aims to identify the explanatory power of three 
hypotheses: (1) the regime hypothesis, (2) the hypothesis of normative accommodation, 
and (3) government protection thesis. According to the regime hypothesis, support for state 
redistribution depends on historically grown and stable dominant values within specific 
welfare state regimes. In contrast, normative accommodation includes learning processes, 
leading to a delayed change in expectations and attitudes toward state redistribution, 
whereas the government protection thesis focuses on the perceived need for state redistri-
bution depending on the actual level of prosperity and the degree of unemployment and 
social spending within countries.
Based on the regime hypothesis, countries were selected as representatives of G. Esping-
Andersen’s ideal-typical welfare-state regimes (WFS): Norway (NO) and Sweden (SE) as 
representatives of social democratic WFS, West Germany (W-DE) and Austria (AT) as con-
servative/corporatist WFS and the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), New Zea-
land (NZ) and Australia (AU) as liberal WFS. In addition, NZ, UK and AU were treated as a 
subtype of the liberal WFS, namely, as “radical WFS” (Castles and Mitchell 1993). However, 
special attention should be paid to the potential differences between Eastern and Western 
European countries across time. Therefore, the typology includes seven contrasting CEE 
countries: Russia (RU), Poland (PL), Bulgaria (BG), the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), 
Slovakia (SK), and Slovenia (SI), as well as the special case of East Germany (E-DE).1 
For these countries, varying trends of income inequality at different levels are clear (see 
Table 1). Gini coefficients indicate the strongest increase at the beginning of the 1990s in 
the CEE countries, particularly in Russia and Bulgaria, and a remarkable heterogeneity 
among the CEE countries. In the Western European countries, income gaps widened to a 
lower degree and have always been biggest in the liberal WFS and smallest in the social-
democratic WFS. Increasing inequalities are the most distinct pattern at the beginning of 
the 1990s, followed by comparably minor decreases in the late 1990s in the CEE countries. 
1 The South European welfare state type (rudimentary type per Gelissen 2002) is not included in 
the analyses because countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal did not participate in 
all three survey waves.
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Table 1 Income inequality and average changes in income inequality across countries and time
NO SE DE AT US UK NZ AU RU PL BG CZ HU SK SI
Level of income inequality (Gini coefficients)
av. 1990–1995 23 22 27 29 35 34 32 30 38 28 27 22 30 20 21
av. 1997–2001 24 23 27 26 37 34 33 31 41 29 29 25 29 25 23
av. 2007–2011 23 24 29 27 37 36 32 34 41 31 33 25 27 26 24
Changes in income inequality (percentage points)
1988–1994 -0.4 1.2 1.0  3.5 2.2  2.5 4.5 0.1 18.4  2.6  7.8  5.0  7.4  3.1  4.2
1995–2001  2.1 1.7 0.1 -1.6 0.9 -0.4 0.4 0.9 -4.3 -3.2 -1.8  1.6 -3.7  3.3 -0.7
2002–2011 -2.0 0.5 1.1  1.3 0.1  1.5 -0.7 3.4  1.5  1.7  7.7 -1.7 -0.4 -0.6  2.8
Gini coefficients of Household Incomes after Taxes and Transfers (average Gini coefficients and 
changes in the Gini coefficients in percentage points)
Source: Frederick Solt (2009): Standardized World Income Inequality Database, Version 4_1
The ISSP surveys were conducted in 1992, 1999 and 2009.
The Regime Hypothesis:  
Historically Grown Worlds of Welfare State Attitudes
One of the most prominent approaches to explain country differences in public support for 
state redistribution is the regime hypothesis, which starts from the assumption of a forma-
tive effect of a country’s historically grown welfare state institutions (Gelissen 2002). “The 
identities and interests of social actors are (…) created in a process where the institutional 
framework within which people act, and the historical traditions through which events 
and processes are interpreted, have a decisive impact” (Svallfors 1997, 291). Welfare state 
institutions directly influence people’s life chances and incorporate distributive norms and 
standards of social justice. Thus, these institutions are normative settings and constitute a 
frame for political action and social conflicts (e.g., Mau 2004). 
From this institutional-historical perspective, people’s views of state redistribution are 
stable across time, at least in western countries. Regarding country differences, there has 
been a lot of debate on the classification of Western countries; however, only little effort 
has been made concerning typologies for CEE countries. G. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism is the most prominent approach to classifying dif-
ferent types of WFS in Western countries and even the work’s numerous critics conclude 
that “there is plenty of reason to continue to work on and with the original or modified 
typologies” (Arts and Gelissen 2002, 137). Therefore, Esping-Andersen’s classical typology 
of liberal, conservative and social-democratic regimes provides important theoretical argu-
ments for the ongoing analyses. To sum up, state redistribution in liberal WFS is small, and 
individualism in a free market economy, where trade unions are weak and minimum wages 
and social assistance benefits are low, is predominant. This leads to the social cost of high 
inequality and poverty for the benefit of high economic and employment growth (Esping-
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Andersen 1996, 15-18; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, 15f.). Castles and Mitchell (1993) 
introduced the radical welfare state as a subtype of the liberal WFS, which is characterized 
by higher benefit equality, comparably higher taxes and stronger labor movements and 
distinguishes the UK, New Zealand and Australia from the US. However, several scholars 
described the UK as a “borderline case” (e.g., Svallfors 1997, 286) that cannot be clearly 
subsumed as a liberal or radical type of welfare state.
In conservative welfare states, de-commodification2 is high, and the state takes far-
reaching responsibility for the pension system, unemployment insurance and social assis-
tance, financed by compulsory contributions. Conservative WFS, in particular, face prob-
lems of market rigidity, the “welfare without work trap” (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, 17), 
early retirement that strains the pension system and insufficient integration of women in 
the labor market (2002, 16f.). In social democratic WFS, the state intervenes most exten-
sively, and social benefits are universal (Esping-Andersen 1990; see also Sejersted 2011). 
Extraordinarily strong left-wing parties and labor unions contribute to the strength of 
egalitarianism. However, this regime is costly and relies on high employment and growth 
to manage the high tax requirements (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, 14).
Despite a similar past of high de-commodifaction and minimal social inequality,3 the 
CEE countries established varying social security systems during the course of the last two 
decades and today face highly differing levels of inequality (e.g., Aidukaite 2009). Esping-
Andersen (1996) early claimed that the post-socialist countries would adapt to one of the 
Western worlds of welfare capitalism. However, recent research suggests mixed patterns of 
social-democratic, conservative-corporatist and neo-liberal policies within individual CEE 
countries (Fenger 2007; Kollmorgen 2009). 
Table 2 Typologies of post-socialist welfare states based on M. Fenger’s (2007) and R. Kollmorgen’s 
(2009) work    4
Typologies Countries
Fenger (2007) 1. USSR
2. Post-communist European 
3. Developing type4
1. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic States
2. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia
3. Romania, Moldova, Georgia
Kollmorgen (2009) 1. Rudimentary-state-paternalistic
2. State-led conservative-corporatist
3. Neoliberal-social democratic
1. Russia, Ukraine
2. Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia
3. Estland, Lithuania
*  Fenger and Kollmorgen use different countries and methods in their typologies; therefore, 
comparability is limited. Nonetheless, they subsume the Baltic States to different welfare state 
types, Fenger to the USSR type and Kollmorgen to the neoliberal-social democratic type. 
2 “De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person 
can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 21-22).
3 They also share a phase of ad-hoc reforms after 1989, followed by a phase of privatization (more 
extensive than in the West) and in the last few years re-orientation and consolidation where 
neo-liberal policies have been balancing out (Kollmorgen 2009, 85-87).
4 The developing type is not relevant for the ongoing analysis.
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Table 2 shows two relevant welfare state typologies for the ongoing analyses: One typol-
ogy considers Fenger’s (2007) former USSR type and Kollmorgen’s (2009) rudimentary 
state-paternalistic type. In the USSR-type, government expenditures are similar to those in 
conservative WFS; however, less protection is provided, leading to a distinctly worse social 
situation. This type is called rudimentary and state-paternalistic because it is an authori-
tarian state, and family networks and the subsistence economy are important (Kollmor-
gen 2009).5 Whereas Kollmorgen attributes neoliberal programs in particular to the Baltic 
countries, several authors in the case of Russia speak of a “mix of neoliberal ideas and 
Soviet legacies and institutions” (Teplova 2007, 285). 
The post-communist European type and the state-led conservative-corporatist type face 
better economic development and are more egalitarian than previously. Kollmorgen points 
out that in particular the Visegrád states (PL, SK, CZ, HU) and Slovenia established a 
mix of neoliberal policies and state-led social policies during the course of the countries’ 
transformation (2009, 81). Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia followed 
a Bismarckian tradition and evolved towards conservative WFS (also see  Aspalter et al. 
2009, 180), whereas social protection is comparably lower in Slovakia (Aidukaite 2011, 
216). Bulgaria, in particular, adopted extensive liberal policies while facing severe reduc-
tions in public health spending, and a deterioration in the pension system, contributing to 
a high risk of poverty for elderly citizens (Sotiropoulus et al. 2003).6 A special case among 
the CEE countries is East Germany, which was integrated into the conservative regime of 
West Germany and the world economy much faster than any other post-socialist country 
(see also Riedl and Haller 2014). 
In line with the regime hypothesis, previous research has shown that people in liberal 
welfare states supported state redistribution the least in the 1990s (e.g., Dallinger 2010). 
Findings regarding social democratic and conservative welfare states, however, are not 
consistent with the classical typologies: Support for redistribution is higher in conservative 
welfare states than in social democratic welfare states (Svallfors 1997, 288; Dallinger 2010, 
340). In addition, the conservative welfare state of Germany confirmed its similarity to 
liberal welfare states in the 1990s (Dallinger 2010, 340), whereas support for redistribution 
was distinctly higher in Austria. Nonetheless, scholars argue that “welfare regimes affect 
both the mean and the variance in public support for state redistribution” (Jaeger 2009, 
734). Previous results regarding post-socialist countries confirm more support for state 
redistribution than in Western European countries (Dallinger 2010, 340; Andreß and Heien 
2001), although detailed analyses of heterogeneity are missing. Based on the classical and 
new typologies of welfare states for the CEE countries, the following hypothesis and sub-
hypotheses are formulated for the extended period throughout the 1990s and 2000s:
5 Additional characteristics are a comparably lower GDP and a high level of corruption (Ibid.).
6 Despite a low GDP, low social spending and high inequality and poverty risk, Bulgaria is included 
in this type.
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H1: Citizens of liberal welfare states least support state redistribution, followed by social 
democratic and conservative welfare states. The highest support for state redistribution 
is expected in post-socialist countries.
a) The US is expected to be less prone to state redistribution than the UK, Australia and 
New Zealand (see liberal vs. radical WFS).
b) Among the post-socialist countries, East Germany is expected to be least in favor of 
state redistribution, followed by Slovenia and the Visegrád states, whereas Bulgaria 
and Russia are expected to be the most likely to support state redistribution.
Processes of Normative Accommodation and the Subjective Need 
for State Redistribution
Whereas according to the regime hypothesis country differences in attitudes toward state 
redistribution are stable, several approaches offer different explanations for potential 
changes across time. One approach focuses on the processes of normative accommoda-
tion (e.g., Sachweh 2010, 64), meaning that people over time adapt their expectations to 
changed societal circumstances. Economic conditions might impact men’s consciousness 
(e.g., Marx and Engels 1970 [1859]: 10). Thus, if inequality rises, people tend to legitimate 
the growing gaps between the wealthy and less wealthy and vote for less state redistribu-
tion, although with a specific time lag. This effect might be more likely in countries of high 
inequality. Alternative approaches concentrate on the factual need for state redistribution 
considering a country’s affluence, level of unemployment, and public social spending. 
Under the government protection thesis, support for state redistribution is lower in coun-
tries where there is less need for government aid (Dallinger 2010; Blekesaune 2007). People 
in countries with high unemployment, for instance, perceive a higher risk of becoming 
unemployed, feel more concern for the unemployed, and are more in favor of state redis-
tribution (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003, 418). 
Whereas normative accommodation includes cognitive learning processes, leading to a 
change in expectations delayed in time, the government protection thesis focuses on the 
perceived need for state redistribution, depending on the actual level of economic prosper-
ity, unemployment, and social spending. Thus, both approaches focus on different start-
ing conditions and causal mechanisms. The three approaches are not mutually exclusive 
(see Table 3): People might adapt their expectations to social structural changes; however, 
regime differences might remain. In addition, processes of normative accommodation and 
the government protection thesis are expected to hold for the highly unequal and least 
prosperous Bulgaria and Russia. 
Recent findings show a mixed picture in answer to the question of people normatively 
accommodating to changing levels of inequality. Whereas according to the hypothesis, 
scholars report growing tolerance for inequality in times of rising inequalities (Gijsberts 
2002, 281; Osberg and Smeeding 2006, 461), others confirm a distinct preference for more 
equality in Western European countries with comparably low but increasing levels of 
inequality (Hadler 2007; Kenworthy and McCall 2008). In turn, other analyses show no 
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relation between the actual level of income inequality and people’s attitudes (e.g., Dal-
linger 2010). Particularly in the 1990s, a decrease in support for state redistribution was 
expected, mainly because the principle of individualism gained importance (e.g., Taylor-
Gooby 2001). However, empirical analyses did not support this assumption; even in liberal 
welfare states, approval of state redistribution increased (e.g., Taylor-Gooby 1995). The 
most consistent result considers the increasing support for state redistribution in several 
CEE countries, where income inequality rose the most (e.g., Örkény and Székelyi 2000). 
Overall, scholars also report constant and distinctly high preferences for state redistribu-
tion as the leading pattern (e.g., Ullrich 2000). On the backdrop of those previous results, 
the relation between inequality and approval of state redistribution will be investigated 
anew for the extended period of the 1990s and 2000s.
H2: In the sense of normative accommodation, increases in income inequality are 
expected to be related to a delayed decrease in approval of state redistribution. This pat-
tern will be particularly strong in countries where the income gap widened strongly and 
the level of inequality is high, namely, in Russia, Bulgaria and in Hungary as well as in 
the US, the UK and New Zealand.
In previous research, differences between Western and Eastern European countries were 
notably ascribed to varying levels of economic prosperity, and scholars concluded that 
“in transition countries high public expectations for state action aimed at more equality 
are the result of a weak economy [rather] than of post-socialist ideology” (Dallinger 2010, 
345). From this perspective, economic growth and employment determine public support 
for state redistribution but not the level of income inequality per se (Dallinger 2010, 341). 
This explanation is far from the regime hypothesis of historically grown distributional 
norms and seems especially instructive for the analyses of the variation between the CEE 
countries. Are people in the economically more successful CEE countries, who face lower 
unemployment rates and higher social spending (Dallinger 2010), less likely to support 
state redistribution compared to people in the CEE countries worse off? The underlying 
assumption considers that subjective need for state redistribution depends on comparisons 
with the level of prosperity in other countries and to a lesser extent on the changes within 
the own country (e.g., Delhey and Kohler 2005). Since upward comparisons with more 
affluent countries are most likely (ibidem), subjective need in the less prosperous CEE-
countries is expected to be highest at all three time points. In line with the government 
protection thesis, the following hypothesis is formulated for the extended period through-
out the 1990s and 2000s:
H3: People in more prosperous countries, facing comparably lower unemployment rates 
and higher social spending are less likely to support state redistribution throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. Among the CEE countries, Bulgaria and Russia show the highest sup-
port, whereas East Germany, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic show the lowest support 
for state redistribution.
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Table 3 The regime hypothesis, processes of normative accommodation, and the government 
protection thesis in comparison
Regime hypothesis Normative accommodation Government protection 
Mechanism Historically grown 
dominant values
Legitimating due to 
adaptation of expectations 
to circumstances via 
learning
Dependent on a 
country’s prosperity (and 
unemployment and social 
spending)
Changes  
across time
Stable ranking of countries 
(but adaptation of Visegrád 
countries to conservative 
regime)
->  no systematic changes 
across time (see H1)
Delayed cognitive 
adaptation to changes in 
circumstances  
->  negative association 
between changes of 
inequality and public 
support for state redis-
tribution (see H2)
Immediate reflection of 
actual level  
 
->  higher levels of pros-
perity go hand in hand 
with less need for state 
redistribution (see H3)
Countries Rank order West (from least 
to most support):
Liberal (US, UK, NZ, AU) 
Conservative (AT, W-DE) 
Social-democratic (SE, NO)
 
Rank order CEE (from least 
to most support):
East-Germany 
Visegrád countries and 
Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
Russia 
Delayed accommodation 
(by the end of the 1990s)  
in countries with the 
highest increase and a 
high level of inequality, 
expected in: 
RU, BG, HU
Delayed accommodation 
(by the end of the 1990s) 
in countries with a mean 
increase but a high level  
of inequality, expected in:  
US, NZ, UK
More need in CEE than 
in Western European 
countries
  
 
 
 
Most need in BG and RU, 
lowest need among CEE 
countries in SI, CZ, E-DE
Data, Variables, and Methods
The following analyses are based on data from the ISSP module on Social Inequality (1992, 
1999 and 2009). Countries were selected as ideal-typical representatives of social demo-
cratic, conservative and liberal welfare regimes and included seven CEE countries (see the 
Introduction). The total dataset included 57,807 respondents. 
The main dependent variable considers the following item: 
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between 
people with high incomes and those with low incomes.
Respondents rated their approval on a five-point scale (1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 
= neither agree nor disagree, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree). 
The scale was recoded so that higher values mean a higher preference for state redistribu-
tion. 
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The following items were also considered: 
Income differences in (country) are too large,
The government should provide a decent living standard for the unemployed, and 
The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
Answers again were on a five-point scale. 
Four macro-indicators were included in the analysis: (1.) The Gini coefficient of income 
distribution gives a general indication of the amount of income inequality within coun-
tries and varies (in principle) between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 100. The Gini 
data stem from Frederick Solt’s (2009) Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID). To look at processes of normative accommodation, changes in income inequality 
were taken into account and controlled for the level of income inequality. (2.) A country’s 
economic prosperity was measured with the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 
current U.S. dollars provided by the World Bank. In relation to the government protection 
thesis, (3.) unemployment rates from the World Bank7 and (4.) the degree of public social 
protection expenditure as a percentage of the GDP per capita (including public social pro-
tection and health expenditure; see International Labour Organization 2014) were included. 
The same macro-indicators were used for West and East Germany.
This chapter provides a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the cross-country varia-
tion and temporal changes in attitudes toward state redistribution. Variance analyses and 
post-hoc tests (Games Howell, Dunett’s T3, Tanhame’s T2) were conducted to test differ-
ences across countries’ welfare regimes. Table 4 and Figure 2 illustrate the relation between 
support for state redistribution and the selected macro-indicators across time.
Public Support for State Redistribution Across Different Welfare 
State Regimes Throughout the 1990s and 2000s:  
The Regime Hypothesis
In the first step, people’s views of the government’s responsibility to reduce income dif-
ferences across WFS regimes are examined. Figure 1 indicates three worlds of welfare 
state attitudes: Western European, Eastern European, and liberal views outside Europe. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, support for state redistribution is lowest in the liberal 
WFS (mean=3.2; SD=1.2) and highest in the CEE countries (mean=4.1; SD=1.1). Inconsis-
tent with Esping-Andersen’s regime typology but corresponding to earlier findings for the 
1990s (Svallfors 1997; Dallinger 2010), Sweden and Norway do not form a specific social-
democratic regime and Austria and West Germany do not belong to a unique conserva-
tive world of welfare attitudes (mean=3.7; SD=1.1/3.5; SD=1.1). Further, challenging the 
regime hypothesis, the UK does not fit into the liberal pattern, and only the Czech Republic 
deviates from the other post-socialist countries.
7 Unemployment rates correspond to the International Labor Organization (ILO) definition of “the 
share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment.”
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In the 1990s and 2000s, the UK shows distinctly higher preferences for state redistribu-
tion (mean=3.7, SD=1.1) compared to the US (mean=2.8, SD=1.2), NZ (mean=3.2, SD=1.2) 
and AU (mean=3.2, SD=1.2) and thus fits into the European social democratic and con-
servative WFS regime. The British deviation from the liberal pattern might be interpreted 
from the country’s positioning in the European cultural area, that is, by the historical tra-
dition and the deep impact of the British Labor Party. Nonetheless, the British Labor Party 
is considered less egalitarian than social democratic parties in other European countries 
(Heffernan 2000), and the country looks back to an era of extensive liberal policies dur-
ing Thatcherism (e.g., Hall and Jacques 1983). Therefore, the British welfare state has been 
characterized as collectivistic and individualistic (Ginsburg 1992, 104). This double charac-
ter is mirrored in other British views of social inequality. On the one hand, high support for 
state redistribution and the critique of income inequality indicate egalitarian views.8 The 
comparably low approval of the state to support the unemployed and poor demonstrates 
the dominance of the principle of individualism9 on the other hand (for a comprehensive 
comparison, see Edlund and Svallfors 2011).
In accordance with previous findings, support for state redistribution in Scandinavia 
is distinctly lower than one might expect based on the high level of state intervention, 
supporting the notion of “saturation” for the extended period throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. Particularly in Norway, the average support for state redistribution decreases dur-
ing the course of the 2000s, whereas in Sweden approval of state redistribution increases 
slightly throughout the 1990s. However, Sweden and Norway are likely to support state 
assistance for the unemployed and the poor10; thus, the saturation thesis is limited to a 
rejection of further state redistribution and does not consider a general refusal of state 
intervention. Within the ideal types of the conservative and social democratic WFS, Aus-
tria with the highest approval of state redistribution at all three time points (mean=3.8; 
SD=1.1) is positioned in-between the Western and Eastern European countries. This find-
ing corresponds to previous research for the 1990s and goes back to the deep impact of the 
Social Democratic Party in Austria, which covers a comparably broader left-wing political 
spectrum compared to Germany (e.g., Haller et al. 2015). Despite these peculiarities, simi-
larities between the neighbors Austria and West Germany are obvious in people’s high 
dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution of incomes and high approval for the state to 
support the unemployed and the poor.11
8 Income differences are too large (1 to 5): Mean 1992=1.9; Mean 1999=1.9; Mean 2009=2.0
9 Decent living for the unemployed (1 to 5): Mean 2009=2.9/ Spend less on the poor (1 to 5): Mean 
2009=3.5
10 Decent living for the unemployed (1 to 5): Mean in SE 2009=2.0; Mean in NO 2009=2.1  
Spend less on the poor (1 to 5): Mean in SE 2009=3.9; Mean in NO 2009=4.0
11 Income differences are too large (1 to 5): Mean in W-DE 1992=1.9; W-DE 1999=2.1; W-DE 2009=1.7 
Mean in AT 1992=1.9; W-DE 1999=1.8; W-DE 2009=1.7  
Decent living for the unemployed (1 to 5): Mean in W-DE 2009=2.5; Mean in AT 2009=2.6 
Spend less on the the poor (1 to 5): Mean in W-DE 2009=3.9; Mean in AT 2009=3.9
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Source: ISSP Module on Social Inequality 1992, 1999, 2009
Figure 1 “It is the responsibility of the state to reduce income differences” throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s (Means, 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)
The Czech Republic is positioned in-between the West and East European countries 
(mean=3.8; SD=1.2), with the exception of the late 1990s when the Czech Republic approx-
imated the other CEE countries. Including the Czech Republic, the variation among the CEE 
countries is similar to the variation among the liberal type. Taking into account further 
attitudes, it is clear that the Czech Republic is also comparably less critical of the prevailing 
income gaps by the beginning of the 1990s,12 and with Slovakia and East Germany, less 
12 Income differences are too  large (1 to 5): Mean in 1992=2.1
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often wants the government to provide a decent living for the unemployed.13 In contrast, 
Bulgaria shows the highest support for state redistribution, which, by the end of the 1990s, 
includes Russia. However, as Slovakia and Hungary share similar egalitarian views, the 
Visegrád countries do not form a specific group of welfare state attitudes. Moreover, East 
Germany still seems to fit the pattern of CEE countries, although East Germany’s support 
for state redistribution decreased during the course of the 1990s.
Taking into account these results, the ranking in Hypothesis 1 is partly confirmed. 
Overall, findings from post-hoc tests (Games Howell, Dunett’s T3, Tanhame’s T2) show 
significant differences (p<0.01) of people’s attitudes towards state redistribution across 
liberal, conservative, social-democratic and post-socialist welfare states. In accordance 
with the expected ranking, the post-socialist countries, on average, show the highest and 
the liberal welfare states the lowest support for state redistribution. However, contradicting 
hypothesis 1, citizens of social democratic welfare states are less prone to redistribution 
than people of conservative welfare states (with the exception of the late 1990s). Even 
more, by the 2000s the social democratic welfare states, on average, do not differ from 
radical welfare states. According to the expectation in Hypothesis 1a, the US is the least 
likely to support state redistribution throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Hence, the radical 
welfare states (AU, NZ, UK) significantly differ from the liberal US. Since the end of the 
1990s, the rudimentary state-paternalistic welfare states (BG, RU) have shown significant 
higher support for state redistribution than the state-led conservative-corporatist type (HU, 
PL, SI, SK, E-DE, CZ). However, in contrast to the expected between-country variation 
(Hypothesis 1b), the Czech Republic, and not East Germany and Slovenia, show the least 
support for state redistribution.
Public Support for State Redistribution and its Relation to 
Inequality and Economic Prosperity:  
Normative Accommodation and Government Protection
According to the regime hypothesis, public support for state redistribution is stable in 
Western democracies, whereas the CEE countries should adapt to one world of welfare 
capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1996). However, Figure 1 already indicated the remaining 
differences between Western and the CEE countries and an overall increase in the varia-
tion across all 15 selected countries during the course of the 1990s and 2000s (the range of 
means in 1992 is from 3 to 4.3 and in 2009 from 2.7 to 4.4). Approval of state redistribu-
tion significantly increased in Russia and to a lower degree in Sweden and Poland in the 
course of the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, approval also increased in Hungary 
and Slovenia. The opposite trend can be observed in the US, the UK, New Zealand and 
Norway. In Germany, approval of state redistribution decreased in the 1990s and again 
increased in the 2000s. A reverse-U trend occurred in the Czech Republic. 
These results illustrate the complex patterns of temporal changes and continuities. Do 
the processes of a normative accommodation and/or the government protection thesis 
13 mean=between 2.2 and 2.4 in comparison to 1.8 to 1.9 in the other CEE countries
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help understand them? Based on the government protection thesis, Table 4 indicates that 
the level of economic prosperity explains cross-country variation in the support for state 
redistribution, particularly by the end of the 1990s and in the 2000s. Lower affluence goes 
hand in hand with higher approval of state redistribution. Nonetheless, the effect of the 
level of unemployment diminishes, if a country’s level of economic prosperity is controlled 
for and there is no evidence that the amount of social spending is associated with people’s 
views of state redistribution (see Hypothesis 3). In contrast, the level of income inequality 
has no verifiable impact; however, its changes across time matter. Increases of inequality 
are associated with a more distinct public support for state redistribution. The negative 
correlation by the end of the 1990s is an effect of the country sample composition; it can 
be explained by the slight decreases in income inequality in the CEE countries. 
Looking at the cross-country trends in more detail, a delayed decrease in public support 
for state redistribution during the course of the 2000s solely took place in the most unequal 
Western countries: the US and the UK (see Figure 2). However, Australia in particular devi-
ates from this pattern by increasing support for state redistribution. Thus, processes of 
normative accommodation describe the trends in the US and UK and not, as expected in 
Hypothesis 2, the trends in countries with the highest increase and a high level of inequal-
ity (Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary). Overall, there is no evidence that growing income gaps 
are related to a delayed decrease in approval of state redistribution. The overall dominant 
pattern considers rather stable and minor but significant increasing public support for state 
redistribution across time (F(2, 55143)=79.974, p<0.000; mean 1992=3.6, mean 1999=3.8, 
mean 2009=3.7). 
Table 4 Correlation (Spearman’s rho) between support for state redistribution and selected 
macro-indicators across 15 countries
Income 
inequality
Change in 
inequality
Economic 
prosperity
Unemploy-
ment
Social 
spending
‘92 ‘99 ‘09 ‘92 ‘99 ‘09 ‘92 ‘99 ‘09 ‘92 ‘99 ‘09 ‘92 ‘99 ‘09
Support for state 
redistribution -.09** -.03** -.03** .19** -.21** .14** -.15**-.32**-.31** .07** .22** .14** .03** -.03** -.03**
Throughout the 
1990s and 2000s -.04** .01 -.24** 0.12** -0.01
Partial correlations
change in income inequality 
controlled for level of 
inequality
controlled for 
unemployment
controlled for 
GDP per capita
controlled for 
GDP per capita
.17** -.27** .16** -.07** -.20**-.27** .05** .01 -.08** .16** .09** .09**
Statistical Significance: ** p ≤ .001, * p ≤ .01
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Expanding the government protection thesis, it was further expected that the level of 
economic prosperity, unemployment, and the amount of social spending explain the dif-
ferences across the CEE countries (see Hypothesis 3). As shown earlier, support for state 
redistribution is significantly highest in Bulgaria and Russia since the end of the 1990s. 
However, approval of state redistribution is also high and increased in the wealthiest CEE 
countries of Slovenia and the Czech Republic and the less wealthy countries of Russia, 
Hungary, and Slovakia (in Bulgaria, approval remained stable at a high level). In addi-
tion, the levels of social spending and unemployment and their developments across time 
do not explain the variation across CEE countries and within-country trends in the sense 
of the government protection thesis (see Figure 2). On these grounds, the conclusion that 
especially “in transition countries high public expectations for state action aimed at more 
equality are the result of a weak economy [rather] than of post-socialist ideology” (Dal-
linger 2010, 345) seems to fall short from a time-comparative perspective. The level of eco-
nomic prosperity explains country differences between the CEE countries and the Western 
European and Anglo-Saxon countries outside Europe but not the heterogeneity across the 
CEE countries. Overall, Figure 2 illustrates trends of rising prosperity going hand in hand 
with both decreasing and increasing support for state redistribution.
Summary and Conclusion
Against the background of varying trends of increasing income inequalities in 15 West-
ern and CEE countries (on different levels), this chapter raised the question of potential 
changes in people’s public support for state redistribution in the course of the 1990s and 
2000s. The paper aimed to identify the explanatory power of three hypotheses: (1) the 
regime hypothesis, (2) the hypothesis of normative accommodation, and (3) the govern-
ment protection thesis.
Analyses of data from the Social Inequality Module of the ISSP show that public support 
for state redistribution differs between Western and CEE countries. The preference for state 
redistribution is lowest in liberal welfare states outside Europe and remains highest in CEE 
countries. In accordance with previous research, these findings support the assumption 
that the level of economic prosperity explains country differences between East European 
and Western countries. However, restricting the government protection thesis, economic 
prosperity does not explain the between-country differences in the CEE countries, and 
rising economic prosperity in the 1990s and 2000s does not go along with a decrease in 
public support for state redistribution. In addition, previous research has shown that status 
dependency regarding the preference for state redistribution – people in a lower social 
position are more prone to support redistributive policies than people in a higher social 
position – is also a characteristic of Western societies (e.g., Örkenyi and Székelyi 2000). 
These results leave doubts that rising economic prosperity in CEE countries in the future 
will lead to less need for government aid in people’s views. Simultaneously, evidence of 
delayed processes of normative accommodation concerns only liberal countries where 
income inequality is comparatively high and increased in the course of the 1990s and 
2000s.
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Thus, a combination of the government protection thesis and the regime hypothesis 
seems appropriate to explain the fundamental differences between Western and Eastern 
European societies. The overall temporal pattern shows rather stable and minor increasing 
support for state redistribution in the course of the 1990s and 2000s. These findings sup-
port the thesis of historically grown dominant values. Nevertheless, the regime hypothesis 
tells only part of the story. Contrary to the classical regime typology of Esping-Andersen 
(1990), citizens of social democratic welfare states are less prone to redistribution than 
people in conservative welfare states. According to the extended typology of Castles and 
Mitchell (1993), the radical welfare states (AU, NZ, UK) show significantly higher support 
for state redistribution than the liberal US. Findings regarding the CEE countries support 
the typologies of state-led conservative and rudimentary state-paternalistic types (Fenger 
2007; Kollmorgen 2009): since the end of the 1990s and early 2000s the approval of 
state redistribution is significantly higher in the latter. Thus, the two typologies might be 
instructive for future research. 
Despite these inconsistencies, the analysis of deviations from the three ideal-typical 
theoretical approaches is fruitful for investigating public support for state redistribution 
from a country- and time-comparative perspective. Within this framework, future research 
should concentrate on the question of the CEE countries’ potential adaption to liberal, con-
servative, and social democratic orientations and analyze differences between age cohorts 
and changes in distributive norms and values. In addition, for the Western European con-
text, this paper poses important questions for future research: Regarding the claimed end 
of the former universal social democratic welfare state, the question arises what the notion 
of “saturation” in individual Scandinavian countries really implies and if the attitudinal 
differences between Norway and Sweden will continue. In the liberal pattern, the bor-
derline case of Great Britain and deviating increasing support for state redistribution in 
Australia are of specific concern. Are Great Britain and Australia going to form a group 
of individualistic-collectivistic orientations distinctly different from the US and New Zea-
land? 
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Baby Boomers Driving Alone? 
The Dynamics of Dissatisfaction with Income Differences 
(1987-2009)
Frédéric Gonthier1
The social sciences have a long tradition of investigating perceived inequalities and their 
legitimacy dating back to Runciman’s pioneering work on relative deprivation (Runci-
man 1966). Recently a great deal of attention has been focused on public attitudes toward 
income inequality. Income inequalities indeed play a prominent role in the public debate 
on social inequality (Bartels 2008; Cingano 2014; McCall 2013; Piketty 2014). Effects of 
these inequalities are known to undermine the bases of social cohesion, such as interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions or civic participation (Larsen 2013; Rothstein 2011; Zmerli 
and Hooghe 2013).
One of the key findings obtained from the scholarly literature is that ordinary citizens 
do not gauge income inequality on an objective basis, by simply relying on economic news 
and information they receive about the state of their national economy. They also take into 
account their own financial situation and often make comparisons with the living condi-
tions of significant others. More subjective factors pertaining to social justice may come 
into play as well, such as political ideology, where individuals place themselves in the 
social hierarchy, how large they think the gap between top and bottom incomes actually 
is, how large they consider it should be, etc.
Cross-national research has mostly pointed to attitudinal gaps between countries, thus 
showing that dissatisfaction with income gaps and support for redistribution are also 
grounded in national specificities related to work ethics, labor market structure, welfare 
arrangements, and egalitarian or liberal values. However, very few scholars have thor-
oughly examined how dissatisfaction with inequality evolves over time. Far from being a 
fixed process, the way people perceive income inequality may indeed vary as a result of 
many changes occurring at the country-level and at the individual-level.
This study explores the dynamics of tolerance for income inequality. The ISSP Inequal-
ity cumulated dataset offers a unique opportunity to address this issue through the lens of 
longitudinal analysis. The study tracks who contributes the most to the overall change in 
attitudes toward income inequality; i.e. whether some subgroups are more reactive than 
others. A classic question of public opinion research is: Who moves when opinion moves? 
This is usually intended to address elites’ influence over public opinion, i.e. to what extent 
1 An extended version of this study, including additional analyses, has been published 2017 in a 
special issue of the International Journal of Sociology 47(1): 26-42. 
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is change in the general public driven by changes in small minorities of sophisticated and 
enlightened segments of the population?
Here, three subgroups demand closer scrutiny: The wealthy, the better-educated and the 
younger generations. The first two of these groups are usually considered as being more 
responsive to their changing environment. They receive more information, they make 
more accurate assessments, they more easily connect their opinions with what transpires 
in the outside world... (Enns and Kellstedt 2008). Thus, it is plausible to expect that the 
wealthy will contribute to opinion change more than the others. By the same token, income 
inequalities can be less tolerated due to an increasing influence of the most educated seg-
ments of the national populations, presumed to be more sensitive to “post-materialism” 
and to egalitarian values (Inglehart 1977). Likewise, income inequalities may be more 
accepted because people become accustomed to them, and also because older cohorts are 
being replaced by new, more well-educated ones, who are more opposed to income gaps. 
This study finds striking evidence of uniform moves among income groups, educational 
groups and cohorts since the beginning of the 1990s. However, contrary to what could 
be expected, results show that the generational dynamics are partly driven by the Baby 
Boomers’ increasing dissatisfaction toward income inequalities. This counterintuitive find-
ing and its substantive implications are discussed.
Who Moves When Public Opinion on Income Inequality Moves?
In cross-national research it is well known that aggregate trends can conceal impor-
tant variations within countries. It is also well known that economic inequalities can be 
perceived in very different ways, even by people who live in the same country (Lübker 
2004; 2007). This section first investigates whether the wealthy, the most educated and 
the younger generations are becoming more tolerant toward income differences than the 
rest of the national populations. Addressing these subgroups and their opinion moves is of 
critical importance since they are often depicted as “opinion makers”.
Many scholars have found that the have-nots are less likely to update their opinions. 
Given their low levels of political awareness, they receive a minimum of the economic or 
political information available (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Converse 1964).2 Therefore, 
they display random or stable survey responses, and are not contributing much to aggre-
gate measures of opinion change (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Stimson 2004). By 
contrast, the privileged citizens have access to more information on their economic and 
political environment. Because of this they can respond more quickly and more emphati-
cally. All in all, the wealthiest and the most educated segments of the public should be 
more reactive to their environment, and exhibit more salient patterns of opinion change 
than their less privileged counterparts (Gonthier 2016).
2 Since the ISSP cumulated dataset does not document political competence per se, I fall back on 
education as a reasonable proxy. Education levels indeed relate to political and economic infor-
mation insomuch as they reflect an individual’s exposure to information and ability to consider 
economic and political issues.
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A different rationale applies with cohorts and generational change. Inglehart argues 
that economic security experienced during socialization years could push individuals to 
adopt long-lasting postmaterialist values, thus giving priority to non-economic issues over 
economic security and material comfort. Much of this generational dynamic, Inglehart 
adds, is channeled through rising education levels (Inglehart 1977; 1997). More supportive 
of egalitarian values than their older counterparts, the younger generations should then 
be less tolerant toward income differences since income differences jeopardize individual 
autonomy and expression.3 Therefore, one can expect those born after 1945 to display a 
stronger rejection of inequality. More importantly to note is that although each cohort’s 
level of tolerance of is expected to remain stable over time (since socialization has a life-
long influence), generation renewal should gradually level up dissatisfaction with income 
inequality.
Since the first ISSP Inequality module in 1987, respondents have been asked to position 
themselves on a five-point agreement scale, capturing whether they believe that “income 
differences are too large” in their country. The following figures plot the percentage of 
respondents who agree or strongly agree with this statement in each country and for each 
ISSP wave. 
The analysis begins with income groups. Empirical studies on attitudes toward inequali-
ties and redistribution have repeatedly demonstrated that perceived inequalities are very 
likely to vary among social classes and incomes groups (Kulin and Svallfors 2013; Svall-
fors 2006). In order to isolate the wealthy and the underprivileged, a specific variable 
has been computed, collapsing respondents’ personal income into four equal categories 
for each country and ISSP wave.4 Figure 1 captures the evolution of dissatisfaction with 
income inequalities by country and depending on the two extreme income groups (income 
++ for the upper quartile, income - - for the bottom one).5
Mean levels of dissatisfaction with inequalities (ranging from 1 to 5) are quite high 
everywhere, but the gap dividing the wealthy and the underprivileged is far from being 
identical between countries. It is much more important in rich Western countries (Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, and France) than in Eastern ones (Latvia, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic). Social scientists vary in their views on what ultimately drives individual 
attitudes and behaviors. Following the theory of hedonic rationality, some posit that self-
interest is the major predictor of policy preferences: Ordinary citizens endorse opinions 
which are consistent with their tangible short-term material interests. Others argue that 
self-interested motivations can be countered by general social values: Symbolic predis-
3 Opposite arguments can be voiced. The young are usually portrayed as malleable and easily 
influenced by their external environment, and they have been shown to be more liberal (in 
the European sense) since their views on inequality are mainly shaped by abstract principles 
inherited from school (such as merit). By contrast, their older counterparts are more aware of 
inequality, which they have experienced in its various forms (notably at work).
4 Quartiles have been computed for each country and module so as to define specific income cut 
points with respect to time and space. For caveats when using income variables from the ISSP 
cumulated dataset, see Brien and Bechert 2014, 6.
5 For the sake of clarity, all income groups are not plotted. But the notion of “parallel publics” 
holds with higher-middle and lower-middle income groups. The same goes for intermediate 
educational groups, not displayed in Figure 2.   
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positions acquired through socialization in early life exert the strongest effect (Sears and 
Funk 1991; Chong, Citrin and Conley 2001).
Figure 1 provides evidence for both assumptions. Income groups may be divided in rich 
Western countries because the wealthy and the have-nots stick to their personal inter-
ests, with the former “understating” income differences they benefit from, and the latter 
“emphasizing” income differences they do not benefit from. But income groups may be 
divided as well because their views on social inequalities are shaped by different justice 
principles. The wealthy may, for instance, consider that income differences are not too 
large because they mostly value individual responsibility. And the lowest income groups 
may conversely assess income differences with stronger preferences for equality and redis-
tribution. The fact that income groups from Eastern countries similarly gauge income dif-
ferences can be explained just the same way. They may share the same perception of their 
economic environment as being very unequal; and they may also be united by a common 
set of values leading them to reject income differences.
Most importantly, Figure 1 reveals that respondents tend to move in the same direction 
and at the same moment whether they are rich or poor. This hypothesis of uniform patterns 
among various subgroups has first been formalized in the U.S. context (Page and Shapiro 
1992). Recently, Ura and Ellis have observed only marginal differences into how income 
quartiles respond to economic stimuli, with the wealthy showing a stronger reactivity 
(2008). Analyzing why the general public becomes less supportive of government expan-
sion, Kelly and Enns also stated that low- and high-income groups respond in the same 
way to increasing income inequalities (Kelly and Enns 2010). Other studies came to the 
same conclusion of uniform opinion moves in other liberal regimes (Soroka and Wlezien 
2009). Results from the ISSP Inequality modules tend to substantiate this “parallel publics” 
hypothesis. Even though income groups appear to be fiercely divided on income differ-
ences in many countries, their parallel movements give some credence to the idea that 
individuals respond in similar ways to stimuli coming from their changing environment 
(Enns and Kellstedt 2008).
With Figure 2, the study turns to educational subgroups. The figure charts opinion 
moves on income differences for two opposite segments: Respondents with no formal 
qualification or lowest formal qualification versus those above higher secondary level, 
with a university degree completed or with graduate studies. With the exception of Chile 
and the Philippines, the least educated are everywhere more dissatisfied with income dif-
ferences. However, gaps between educational groups appear to be much smaller than those 
observed among income groups. Scholars usually consider that education has an ambiva-
lent influence on how inequalities are perceived. On the one hand, people with higher 
education are more likely to believe in meritocratic ideology and value self-achievement 
(Andreß and Heien 2001, 348). But on the other hand, education is related to socialization 
to democratic values and tolerance. Therefore, the most educated are supposed to express 
stronger preferences for social equality. This balanced effect of education might explain 
why the most and the least educated segments do not display very different levels of toler-
ance for income inequalities.
Moreover, contrary to what could be expected, the most and the least educated segments 
of the public display very uniform variations. This result is also in line with the literature 
about parallel opinion movement on economic issues. For instance, with data from the 
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General Social Survey and the National Election Studies, Enns and Kellstedt have described 
how the least and the most sophisticated strata of American society change their opinions 
toward the economy in sync (Enns and Kellstedt 2008). Yet, once again, these two groups 
at opposite ends of the spectrum, the most and the least well-educated, appear to update 
their opinion in a very uniform way.
Figure 3 sketches the same picture for the various generations. Cohort cut points have 
been chosen according to accepted sociological categories: Those born in 1945 and before 
correspond to the “Silent Generation”; if born between 1946 and 1959 then “Baby Boomers”; 
between 1960 and 1980 called “Generation X” (also called “Gen Xers”); and if born after 
1980 known as “Generation Y” (aka “Millennials”) (Howe and Strauss 1992; Strauss and 
Howe 1997).6 Respondents from the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers and Gen Xers exhibit 
very similar levels of tolerance for income inequalities. This finding is somewhat counterin-
tuitive, since Baby Boomers and Gen Xers were expected to be much more dissatisfied with 
income inequality than their older counterparts. When it comes to attitudes toward income 
differences, birth cohort may not be as influential as income and educational background. 
In some countries (Bulgaria, France, Italy, Latvia, Switzerland or the U.S.), Baby Boomers 
do indeed display a slightly stronger rejection. Still, in many other countries, baby boomers 
and Gen Xers do not obviously stand out as the strongest supporters of income equality. 
They even seem to be outperformed by respondents from the silent generation.
At the country level cohorts tend to move in parallel, which is consistent with the 
notion that predispositions acquired through early socialization last throughout the life 
cycle. It confirms that the national context matters much for opinion change, and that it 
exerts the same influence on all segments of the public. However, one can also observe 
that Baby Boomers seem to be a little more mobile than other cohorts. This is notably the 
case in Israel, Japan and Sweden, where they carry an upward trend toward more dissat-
isfaction with income differences. It is as if the Baby Boomers were more reactive to their 
external environment. Since mean values provide a crude measurement of subgroup dif-
ferences, this cohort effect calls for closer scrutiny. More advanced statistical techniques 
will be applied to addressing this in the next section.
In short, noteworthy here is that all segments of the national populations conform to the 
global pattern and exhibit the same trend toward more or less dissatisfaction with income 
inequalities. These findings comply with studies demonstrating that individuals incorpo-
rate information about economic changes in similar ways, and update their opinions in 
unison. Although it has long been argued that the general public is not interested in poli-
tics or the economy and lacks the knowledge to develop informed preferences (Converse 
1964), results from the ISSP Inequality modules suggest that all citizens pay some atten-
tion and respond uniformly – though in varying degrees – to their changing environment.7
6 Other cut points are possible. Political generations could prove useful (Sears and Valentino 
1997). However, their major downside for cross-national analysis is that political milestones 
often vary from one country to the other. In Figure 4, the Millennials are not presented since 
their number is very limited in 1999 (n = 569 for the twenty-seven countries examined).
7 Since ISSP Inequality does not include variables tapping “sociotropic perceptions” (i.e., percep-
tions arising out of concern for the well-being of national economic life in general), it is labori-
ous to find out to which aspects of their environment individuals respond to or ignore.
108 GESIS Series  |  Volume 17
Frédéric Gonthier | Baby Boomers Driving Alone 
In
co
m
e 
- -
In
co
m
e 
+ 
+
Fi
gu
re
 1
 
D
is
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 in
co
m
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
by
 c
ou
nt
ry
 a
nd
 d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
in
co
m
e 
le
ve
l (
m
ea
n 
va
lu
es
, 1
98
7-
20
09
)
GESIS Series  |  Volume 17 109
 Social Inequality in the Eyes of the Public 
In
co
m
e 
- -
In
co
m
e 
+ 
+
N
o
 q
u
a
li
ﬁ
c
a
ti
o
n
 o
r 
lo
w
e
s
t 
fo
rm
a
l
A
b
o
v
e
 h
ig
h
e
r 
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
ry
 &
 g
ra
d
u
a
te
 s
tu
d
ie
s
Fi
gu
re
 2
 
D
is
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 in
co
m
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
by
 c
ou
nt
ry
 a
nd
 d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
 (m
ea
n 
va
lu
es
, 1
98
7-
20
09
)
110 GESIS Series  |  Volume 17
Frédéric Gonthier | Baby Boomers Driving Alone 
G
en
er
at
io
n 
X
B
ab
y 
B
oo
m
er
s
S
ile
nt
 G
en
er
at
io
n
Fi
gu
re
 3
 
D
is
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 in
co
m
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
by
 c
ou
nt
ry
 a
nd
 d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
co
ho
rt
s 
(m
ea
n 
va
lu
es
, 1
98
7-
20
09
)
GESIS Series  |  Volume 17 111
 Social Inequality in the Eyes of the Public 
How Cohorts Shape the Dynamics of Dissatisfaction with Income 
Differences
To clarify how characteristics of individuals and countries combine, different multilevel 
linear models were performed, regressing on dissatisfaction with income differences. The 
major focus of multilevel modeling is to account for micro-level variations in a dependent 
variable while controlling for variations in the mean response between different macro-
levels of analysis.8 In order to disentangle the impact of the ISSP waves and the impact of 
the countries, a three-level modeling strategy was used, with countries at the upper level 
(n=27), waves crossed by countries at the middle level (n=78), and individuals at the bot-
tom level (n=98,557 for the first model). This methodological approach has proven appro-
priate for cross-national analysis with comparative longitudinal survey datasets (Fair-
brother 2014). The dependent variable is dissatisfaction with income gap in its initial form 
of a five-point agreement scale. The larger a coefficient, the more respondents are prone to 
think that income differences are large.
Table 1 presents models estimating the influence of different individual-level and wave/
country-level indicators on dissatisfaction with income differences. Model 1 is a first 
step showing only the variance explained by the three nested levels. This model with no 
explanatory variable gauges whether dissatisfaction with income differences is more likely 
explained by differences within countries, across waves or across countries. The intraclass 
correlation coefficients indicate that around 11 percent of the variance can be attributed 
to the country-level, while around 14 percent can be explained by the waves. Most of the 
variance of the dependent variable comes then from the individual-level. It simply means 
that dissatisfaction with income differences depends more on differences between indi-
viduals than on differences between countries or between ISSP modules. It gives a first 
hint about the fact that individuals differ much more than countries with regard to their 
views on income inequality.
Model 2 introduces the variables displayed in previous figures so as to assess their direct 
effects with all other variables held constant. It confirms many correlations already stated 
in the literature in support of state redistribution (see e.g. Linos and West 2003; Svallfors 
1997). Gender has a significant but modest impact, whereas women are more dissatisfied 
with income inequalities than men. Tolerance for income inequalities decreases with age 
but increases with educational level.9 Being one year older adds 0.002 point to the propen-
sity for being dissatisfied with income differences; while moving up from one educational 
level to another reduces this propensity by 0.054. Not surprisingly, income is more influ-
8 Multilevel modeling is particularly appropriate for cases where individuals are clustered within 
different units. While ordinary least squares regression assumes restrictive hypotheses as to 
independence of error terms and homoscedasticity, multilevel modeling accounts for both the 
dependency of observations and the heterogeneity between error terms. On the one hand, it per-
mits a more complex specification of the residuals that are estimated at an individual-level and 
at an aggregate level. On the other hand, instead of constraining the variance of the residuals to 
be constant, it lets them vary depending on explanatory variables in order to assess variability 
between observed groups (see e.g., Snijders and Bosker 2012).
9 Educational level divides across five categories: No formal qualification or lowest formal quali-
fication; above lowest qualification; higher secondary completed; above higher secondary level.
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ential than other sociodemographics.10 Being worse-off (income quartiles - - and income 
quartile -) increases the probability of rejecting income inequalities by 0.26 and 0.289 
points. Here the magnitude of the coefficient represents a 5 percent increase of the five-
point scale dependent variable (0.26/5X100).
Table 1 Multilevel analysis of dissatisfaction with income differences (1987-2009)
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
  coef. p.value coef. p.value coef. p.value
Women (ref. Men)   .052 *** .049 ***
Age   .002 *** .017 ***
Age squared   -.0001 ***
Educational level    -.054 ***  -.054 ***
Income DKNA (ref. Income ++)   .175 *** .191 ***
Income --   .260 *** .278 ***
Income -   .289 *** .298 ***
Income +   .232 *** .236 ***
Baby Boomers (ref. Silent generation)   .044 *** -.101 **
Generation X   .010 -.097 *
Generation Y   -.046 * -.087 *
Silent Generation 1992 (ref. 1987)      -.082 ***
Silent Generation 1999      -.066***
Silent Generation 2009     -.031
Baby Boomers 1992 (ref. 1987)     .212 ***
Baby Boomers 1999     .287 ***
Baby Boomers 2009     .226 ***
Gen X 1992 (ref. 1987)      -.020
Gen X 1999     .029
Gen X 2009      .014
Gen Y 2009 (ref. 1999)      .034
Intercept 4.14 *** 3.94 *** 3.53 ***
N individual level) 98,557 97,362 97,362
N (country/wave level) 78 78 78
N (country level) 27 27 27
Country - Intraclass correlation coefficient .107 ** .104 ** .105 **
Country/wave - Intraclass correlation coefficient .138 ** .137 ** .126 **
Note: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 
10 Income categories have been computed as dummy variables to also introduce in the model 
those respondents for which income is not documented (Income DKNA). They account for 21% 
(n=22,204) of the cumulated sample.
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The results for cohorts are more mixed. Consistent with expectations, Baby Boom-
ers appear more prone to rejecting income inequalities than respondents from the silent 
generation when other variables are held at their mean. This substantiates the idea that, 
contrary to the silent generation which experienced the war and grew up fighting for 
material resources, post-scarcity generations value more equality and improvement of liv-
ing standards (Inglehart 1997). However, though the coefficient for the Baby Boomers is 
significant, its magnitude remains very modest (0.044) compared to the effect of income. 
Contrary to expectations, the cohort effect is far from being linear. Gen Xers are not sig-
nificantly more dissatisfied with income inequality than their counterparts from the silent 
generation. And Millennials even seem less dissatisfied than the elderly. Though caution 
is warranted due to the small sample size of this segment, this result suggests that a less 
lucky and less privileged cohort such as the Millennials might be more tolerant to income 
inequalities (Willetts 2011). Thus, the major divide in attitudes toward income inequalities 
may be more between Baby Boomers and younger cohorts than between scarcity- and 
post-scarcity generations.
To make sense of these differences and to account for the fact that cohort effects may 
vary over time, another model was estimated introducing a wave-specific variable for each 
generation.11 The results are striking. Model 3 reveals that most of the dynamic inherent 
in the cohort effect comes from the Baby Boomers. Compared to being a Baby Boomer in 
1987, being a Baby Boomer in 2009 (0.226) in 1999 (0.287) and in 1992 (0.212) increases 
the likelihood of rejecting income inequalities to the same extent as belonging to a dis-
advantaged income group (0.278). As for other cohorts, the effects are not as clear cut or 
as significant. All other variables held at their mean, respondents from Generation X and 
from Generation Y are not significantly more dissatisfied over time.12
Figure 4 provides a more vivid picture of who drives the generational dynamic of tol-
erance for income differences as it plots the predicted values for the dependent variable 
of Model 3, conditioning on cohorts and ISSP waves. The median-spline curve substanti-
ates the fact that the upward trend for the Baby Boomers dates from the beginning of the 
1990s, as is also shown by Model 3.13 Baby boomers clearly stand out in that their slope is 
not only steeper than the mean slope; it is also steeper than the slope of their older coun-
terparts from the Silent Generation and it is steeper than that of their younger counterparts 
from Generation X as well. This pattern is robust. It holds when countries are examined 
11 To also account for the fact that the effect age has may not be linear for all age groups, age 
squared has been included in the model. The positive effect of age combined with the negative 
effect of age squared, indicates that the relation between age and tolerance toward income dif-
ferences is more a quadratic than a linear relation; i.e., the impact of age on dissatisfaction with 
income inequality becomes less important as people get older.
12 Finer-grained analyses could be conducted. A similar wave-specific variable for income groups 
could be included in order to compare their effects with those of cohort groups. Interaction 
effects could also be computed to disentangle income and cohort, and to account for the fact 
that Baby Boomers may drive the generational dynamic simply because of their improved living 
standards. Such analyses are, however, beyond the scope of this study.     
13 To make sure that it is not an artefact coming from the different number of countries in ISSP 
waves, additional analyses were performed using the exact same countries for the last two 
waves. Results display an identical upward slope for the Baby Boomers.
114 GESIS Series  |  Volume 17
Frédéric Gonthier | Baby Boomers Driving Alone 
individually. To put it simply, Baby Boomers tend to become more dissatisfied since 1992 
with income inequalities, while respondents from Generation X and the Silent Generation 
tend to follow the average trend. 
This finding suggests that generational renewal will pull down dissatisfaction with 
income inequality, because of Baby Boomers leaving the scene and being replaced by 
younger cohorts not as sensitive to income differences. However, additional analyses (not 
presented here) demonstrate that all cohorts tend to grow less tolerant toward income gaps 
from the age of thirty years onwards. Thus, even though generational renewal will fuel 
tolerance for inequality, younger cohorts will still become more dissatisfied with income 
differences as they get older.
Figure 4  Predicted dissatisfaction with income differences by wave, depending on cohort  
(Model 3)
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Conclusion: Baby Boomers Driving Alone?
Attitudes toward income inequalities have been garnering increased attention from cross-
national research. Most scholars address the issue of opinion change by focusing on aggre-
gate trends at the national-level. Using comparable data from twenty-seven countries and 
at four different time-points, this article first showed that changes in tolerance for income 
differences are not connected with changes in actual income differences. In line with prior 
research, this suggests that individuals mainly respond to how they perceive changes in 
income inequalities. A complementary perspective was then adopted, disentangling aggre-
gate trends to examine changes among opinion groups. Whereas one could have expected 
the wealthy and the most educated to be more responsive, they tend to move in tandem 
with their less privileged counterparts. Put differently, all segments of the public seem to 
react evenly to economic and political stimuli they receive from their outside environment. 
Yet, since the ISSP cumulated dataset does not document respondents’ views on changes in 
inequality, it is difficult to dig further into what individuals are responding to when they 
grow more or less dissatisfied with income differences.
There are also parallel movements among cohorts over time, indicating that contextual 
messages can account for attitudinal change even when individuals have been socialized 
in different circumstances. However, in sharp contrast with the literature predicting that 
post-scarcity generations will be less tolerant toward income inequality, it can be shown 
that this is only the case for Baby Boomers. Respondents from both Generation X and the 
Millennials are not more dissatisfied with income differences than respondents from the 
Silent Generation. Surprisingly, compared to their younger counterparts, Baby Boomers 
are those most opposed to income differences, even tending to become more opposed to 
income differences than other cohorts since the early 1990s. All in all, Baby Boomers seem 
to be driving the generational dynamics of dissatisfaction with income inequality.
Two explanations can be put forward. The first stresses the influence of the environment 
on attitudes toward inequality. The 1980s are known to be a liberal turn (in the European 
sense) for both economy and politics in many countries (see e.g. Schmidt and Thatcher 
2013). One can presume that Gen Xers and Millennials are more tolerant toward income 
inequalities since they have entered working life or been socialized in a more liberal con-
text than Baby Boomers. Still, this line of argument leaves one aspect of the generational 
puzzle unaccounted for: How can Gen Xers and Millennials be that influenced by the 
economic and political climate, since many of them have been raised by Baby Boomers 
socialized in a less liberal context?
An additional explanation relates to generational conflicts and to age-group compe-
tition for social resources. It is often said that Baby Boomers have come to possess a 
monopoly on economic and social wealth, notably in continental European welfare states 
(Chauvel 2010; Chauvel and Schröder 2014). They enter retirement age with more dispos-
able income and more generous pensions than any previous cohorts, leaving future cohorts 
facing increasing social risks and no real hope of living standards improving throughout 
their adult lives. Generational resentment may well influence how Gen Xers and Millenni-
als value income equality. It may, for instance, increase their urge for financial recognition, 
and mitigate their will to level out income differences.
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Hierarchy
Evidence from European Countries
Ellu Saar, Jelena Helemäe, and Kristina Lindemann
Introduction1
Unemployment has risen during the recent recession. However, the experience of unem-
ployment varies considerably across European countries (Gallie 2013b). To study the 
unemployment experience in different European countries, a social exclusion approach 
was combined with a social stratification approach utilizing a measure of subjective social 
position which indicates how people perceive their relative position in the social hierar-
chy. In evaluating their social position people make comparisons within societal contexts. 
We hypothesize that the country-level economic and institutional context impacts the 
experience of unemployment, the way people interpret it, and thus affects the subjective 
social position of the unemployed. Our main goal was to study the impact of different 
macro-level economic and social characteristics on the subjective social position of the 
unemployed. We focused on a comparison of the subjective social position of unemployed 
persons against the remaining populations of 18 European countries2 using data from the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2009 Social Inequality module. 
1 The paper has been prepared as part of the research project “Cumulative processes in the inter-
play of educational path and work career: explaining inequalities in the context of neoliber-
alization” funded by the Estonian Research Council (project no IUT31-10). The research was 
supported by the EU through the European Social Fund.
2 As our main aim is to study the impact of contextual structural variables on subjective social 
position, our analysis was restricted to European countries because previous analyses have indi-
cated that Europeans are more likely to see themselves within a larger continental perspective 
than would Japanese or Americans see themselves within a global perspective (see, for example, 
Sweeney and McFarlin 2004).
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Subjective Social Position, Social Comparison and Societal Context 
Unemployment and the unemployed remain quite marginal for class analyses on a theo-
retical as well as a political level. In stratification research the measurement of social posi-
tion is often based on income, occupational position, or other occupation-related charac-
teristics. Critics claim that when measured in such a way, the objective social position does 
not specify how individuals are truly ranked in society (Bottero 2004) but on how certain 
visible characteristics possessed by all individuals are ranked (Hiller 1973).
The emergence of the concept of social exclusion was directly related to the emergence 
of the threat of high unemployment and the threat it posed to national modes of integra-
tion (Kronauer 1998). Thus, the social exclusion paradigm is acutely attuned to unemploy-
ment. In the literature, social exclusion is considered a multidimensional concept (Jordan 
1996; Nolan and Whelan 2007). Burchard et al. (2002, 39) state that “an individual is 
socially excluded if he or she does not participate in key activities of the society in which 
he or she lives”. One of these activities is work. 
From the perspective of the social exclusion concept, people are more ‘in’ or ‘out’ of 
mainstream society than ‘up’ or ‘down’ the class structure (Beland 2007). However, social 
exclusion is a relative concept, i.e. individuals are socially excluded merely with respect 
to other members of their society. Social comparison is a fundamental mechanism linking 
objective facts to subjective evaluations (Gruder 1977; Suls et al. 2002) and it should have 
a very important role in shaping how people interpret unemployment.
Subjective social position can only be adequately understood if due consideration is 
given to the role of frames of reference. Reference group theory argues that people evalu-
ating their own position compare themselves with other individuals or groups (Merton 
1957; Kelly 1968). People perceive a broader social world from their own viewpoint and 
their families’ and friends’ situations, and they assess their position in society in light of 
the people around them (Evans et al. 1992; Evans and Kelley 2004). Merton and Kitt (1950) 
maintain that people use others in their own groups as well as ‘non-membership refer-
ence groups’ to assess their circumstances and position. Subsequent research suggests that 
there is a great deal of diversity in the referent others with whom comparisons are made 
(Suls et al. 2002). Klein (1997) has established that aggregate information influences self-
evaluation more than individual objective characteristics. 
Thus, similar objective characteristics can lead to a different self-evaluation depending 
on the frame of reference and on the social context (Delhey and Kohler 2005; Fahey 2006; 
Marsh et al. 2008; Whelan and Maitre 2009; 2013). Literature on how subjective social 
position is affected by macro-level economic and social characteristics has been available 
for some time and is ever-expanding (see for example Evans and Kelley 2004; Andersen 
and Curtis 2012; Lindemann and Saar 2014). 
Andersen and Curtis (2012) find support for the classic arguments of Marx and Weber 
that class-related differences are larger if economic inequalities between social positions 
are more pronounced in a society. This result is also in accord with the expanded refer-
ence group argument: people may be increasingly aware of the extent of inequality and 
living in an unequal society might lower their subjective social position because they 
make comparisons across country boundaries and the whole of society (see also Wilkinson 
2000). Being unemployed in a highly unequal country might bring about both real and 
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perceived (self-)exclusion: because in such (probably neoliberal) countries support for the 
unemployed is rather limited and movement into unemployment is often brought about by 
poverty, uncertain future prospects and consequently low social status. In such countries 
a slide into unemployment might result in both a real and perceived individual period of 
sharp downward mobility of unknown duration. In highly unequal countries, i.e. those 
with high income inequalities, people might perceive that being unemployed means being 
“out” of the “legitimate” hierarchy of (classed) positions.
There are a number of competing hypotheses and empirical results on the influence of 
the unemployment rate on subjective social position. The threat of unemployment might 
lower the subjective social standing of individuals because it increases uncertainty in soci-
ety and makes all people feel vulnerable. A rise in the national unemployment rate might 
indicate an economic downturn, which might, in turn, have a significant negative impact 
on the subjective social position of individuals (Evans and Kelley 2004). However, being 
unemployed in a country where the unemployment rate is high is not the same as being 
unemployed in country where the unemployment rate is low. One possibility is that high 
unemployment will aggravate the distress felt by the unemployed because the perceived 
opportunity to escape in circumstances of high unemployment level is reduced (Gallie and 
Russell 1998). Alternatively, high unemployment may reduce the stigma attached to unem-
ployment, because in the countries with a high unemployment rate unemployment is part 
of the social system, thus the unemployed are not seriously marginalized. This explanation 
fits into a broader theory which holds that an individual’s relative, rather than absolute 
position matters most for their subjective social standing. Here “relative” is understood 
both in terms of comparison with others and with themselves at different times over the 
life course. The unemployed might not identify themselves with the current temporary 
situation of being unemployed, but rather think of themselves in terms of “what they usu-
ally” are (or were before becoming unemployed).
Development of active employment policies might have an effect on the experience of 
unemployment. Higher expenditures on active labor market policies can reduce the risk 
of long-term marginalization from the labor market. When the unemployed have the pos-
sibility of improving their skills through training, they are more likely to find a job and 
this might decrease their marginalization (Gallie and Paugham 2000) and also make them 
consider their situation as temporary. Financial support for the unemployed is also likely to 
be a critical factor for the way the welfare state affects the experience of the unemployed. 
In countries where generous financial support is provided over a relatively long period, 
the unemployed are more likely to live in similar conditions as the employed. They have 
more opportunity to search thoroughly when they are looking for a job and this will mean 
that they are less likely to be stigmatized, and will tend to be perceived to be more highly 
placed in the social hierarchy. 
Such quantifications of the various dimensions of the welfare state often start out 
as critiques of the oversimplification of welfare state typologies. However, these analy-
ses carry their own dangers. As Svallfors (2010) makes clear, researchers tend to assume 
that the effects of macro-variables are the same regardless of countries’ values and other 
dimensions. Svallfors considers this assumption highly questionable; the regime concept 
is intended to move away from this assumption. Palme (2006) and Esping-Andersen and 
Myles (2009) conclude that the most important effects derive from the institutional design 
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of the welfare state and that such design effects can take complex forms (Whelan and 
Maitre 2010). Hence, we suppose that, as well as objective measures of welfare policies, the 
regime concept also expresses norms, values and discourses, and among these the attitudes 
of the state (and indirectly of the society) towards the unemployed (see Clasen and Clegg 
2003). 
Gallie and Paugham’s (2000) unemployment welfare regime typology, distinguishing 
four regimes, focuses on the degree of benefit coverage and the level of financial com-
pensation for the unemployed and expenditure on active employment policies. The liberal 
regime provides a low level of financial compensation and there is little development of 
active labor market policies. The main idea is to encourage the unemployed to take respon-
sibility for themselves and in this type of regime there is a strong risk that the unem-
ployed will suffer from stigmatization. The Southern Europe sub-protective regime is dis-
tinguished by the crucial role of family support systems. Labor market policies are poorly 
developed and selective, few of the unemployed receive benefits, the level of financial 
compensation is low and the long-term unemployment rate is high. Due to strong family 
support and the high unemployment rate it would be reasonable to assume that the stigma-
tization of the unemployed is much lower than in liberal countries. The social democratic 
regime is characterized by an emphasis on universalism and the individualization of rights. 
It offers comprehensive coverage of the unemployed, a much higher level of financial 
compensation and a more ambitious active employment policy. This type of regime could 
be expected to be the least stigmatizing of the unemployed. The corporatist employment-
centered regime provides a much higher level of protection for the unemployed than the 
liberal and Southern European regimes, but entitlements depend primarily on life-long 
employment. This system tends to create a division between insiders and outsiders, and 
thus we expect the stigmatization of the unemployed to be at a medium level: higher than 
in Southern Europe and the Nordic countries, but lower than in a liberal regime. 
The Gallie and Paugham study did not include Eastern European countries. Some more 
recent studies have identified additional regime types applicable to these countries (see 
Stovicek and Turrini 2012; Gallie 2013b; Whelan and Maitre 2010; Bohle and Greskovitsh 
2012). The post-socialist corporatist regime comprises the Central European countries with 
mostly transfer-oriented labor market measures. The post-socialist liberal group comprises 
Baltic countries along with Bulgaria (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). These countries have low 
levels of coverage, relatively low-income support and very low levels of expenditure on 
active labor market policies. The differences in the subjective social position of the unem-
ployed and others could be expected to be similar to the post-socialist corporatist regime 
and the Western Europe corporatist regime. Furthermore, we expect that post-socialist 
liberal regime countries and the UK (a Western liberal regime) behave similarly. 
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Variables and Methods
Subjective social position was measured using a 10-box display from bottom to top. The 
question was formulated as follows: 
In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend 
to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would 
you put yourself now on this scale? 
This question differs from traditional class identification measures because it is compa-
rable across cultures, it avoids forcing respondents to choose one of several specified cat-
egories and eliminates highly politicized terms such as ‘working class’ and ‘middle class’ 
(Evans and Kelley 2004). 
One aim of the analysis was to identify how contextual variables modify the effect 
unemployment status has on subjective social position. Labor market status describes the 
respondent’s current position in the labor market. This variable distinguishes between 
unemployed and all other groups. The level of education indicates the highest level that 
the respondent has achieved and is recorded as follows: (1) below upper secondary educa-
tion, (2) upper secondary completed, (3) above upper secondary (other qualification than 
university) and (4) university degree completed. Household income is measured in quar-
tiles, which show the respondents’ relative position in the distribution of incomes in their 
country. Other independent variables included in the analysis are gender and age (also the 
quadratic term of age).
Several national-level social and economic factors that might affect subjective social 
position were analyzed. We measured income inequality using the Gini coefficient (based 
on disposable household income data). The Gini index measures the extent to which the 
distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households 
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 rep-
resents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Gini measures 
were obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2009). We 
use data on the long-term (lasting more than 12 months) unemployment rate, measured 
as the proportion of long-term unemployed among the labor force, to take into account 
time-sensitive dimensions of social comparisons. We expected that an active labor mar-
ket policy might have an impact on the experience of unemployment. To take this into 
account, expenditures on active labor market policies measured as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) are included in the models. Including Expenditures on passive 
labor market policies measured as a percentage of GDP in the models, allows us to estimate 
the impact of social support on self-placement in the social hierarchy.3 We differentiated 
six unemployment regime types based on previous typologies (Gallie and Paugham 2000; 
Bohle and Greskovits 2012). In our study the liberal regime includes the UK; the Southern 
3 The unemployment replacement rate (the ratio of unemployment benefits a worker receives rela-
tive to the worker’s last gross earnings) is another way of measuring the generosity of financial 
support provided to the unemployed by state agencies. Our preliminary analysis (not presented 
here but available upon request) confirms that expenditures on active and passive labor market 
measures are better predictors of subjective social position than the unemployment replacement 
rate. 
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sub-protective regime comprises Spain and Portugal; the social democratic regime Den-
mark, Finland, Sweden and Norway; the corporatist employment-centered regime Austria, 
Belgium and France; the post-socialist corporatist regime Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia; and the post-socialist liberal group Estonia, Latvia and 
Bulgaria.
Hierarchical linear models were used to estimate the effect of different country-level 
contextual variables on subjective social position. First, an empty model with no explana-
tory variables to predict subjective social position was calculated. The aim being to see 
how much variance exists at the country level. Then we calculated a model with individual 
level variables. This model was for comparison with all succeeding ones, except more com-
plicated contextual models. The next step was to analyze the effect of contextual variables 
on subjective social position. Different models were run where country level variables 
were entered stepwise in order to check whether the results were robust. A separate model 
for each contextual variable was then composed, and for each of these models we also 
added cross-level interactions based on our hypothesis. All models include individual level 
characteristics (gender, age, level of education, household income, labor market status). 
Our aim was to find out the extent to which different contextual variables affect how the 
unemployed and all other groups estimate their social position. In order to test whether 
the effect of unemployment is dependent on the macro context, employment status and 
macro-level characteristics were utilized (see Appendix 2). 
Subjective Social Position of the Unemployed in Europe
Previous analysis thus far indicates that estimation of one’s social position varies to a 
great extent between European countries – the mean of the subjective position ranges 
from 3.97 in Bulgaria to 6.50 in Finland (Lindemann and Saar 2014). Figure 1 shows that 
the differences for unemployed people are on the same level: from 3.02 in Bulgaria to 5.56 
in Finland. In general, Nordic countries (with the exception of Norway) have the highest 
average estimation along with Belgium, while the unemployed living in post-socialist 
countries and, surprisingly, in Norway, have the lowest opinion of their social position. 
There might be two different explanations for the big differences between countries. First, 
subjective social position might measure location in the social hierarchy as much as sub-
jective wellbeing. Second, respondents are using an extended reference group to evaluate 
their social position. 
However, the differences between the mean social position of the unemployed and of 
all of the population are the lowest, not in the Nordic countries, but in Southern Europe 
and also in Poland and Slovenia. The biggest differences are found for Norway, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. 
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Figure 1 The mean of the subjective position of the population at large and of the unemployed in 
European countries
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The Macro-social Context
We expected that income inequality, the long-term unemployment rate and public expen-
diture on passive and active labor market policies should have an impact on the subjective 
social position of the unemployed. Figure 2 shows that income inequality has a strong 
effect on subjective social position. Higher income inequality reduces one’s opinion of 
their social position. The difference in subjective position between the unemployed and 
other groups is smaller the more unequal the income distribution. In other words, the 
expected gap between the unemployed and other groups is markedly smaller in countries 
with higher income inequality. 
The analysis indicates that the long-term unemployment rate somewhat lowers people’s 
estimation of their social position. It might be that the higher long-term unemployment 
rate indicates higher social risks and lower living conditions for all people in European 
countries. However, the impact is similar for the unemployed and other social groups. Con-
trary to previous expectations the unemployed do not have a higher standing in societies 
where the unemployment rate is high. The reason could be that the survey was conducted 
in 2009, at which time it was not clear how extensive and long-lasting the economic dif-
ficulties and the related threat of unemployment in European societies would be. 
Expenditures on active labor market policies have an positive effect on subjective social 
position. The effect is stronger for the unemployed compared to all other groups. It seems 
that the development of active employment policies reduces the risk of the long-term mar-
ginalization of the unemployed. The level of financial compensation has some weak effect 
but only for the unemployed. This means that in countries where a high level of replace-
ment of earning is provided the degree of social stigmatization to which the unemployed 
are subjected is somewhat lower. In countries where financial compensation is more lim-
ited, the risk of cumulative growth of difficulties for the unemployed is higher.
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Figure 2 Relationship between subjective social position and contextual variables (income inequa-
lity, long-term unemployment rate, public expenditure on active labor market policies, 
ALMP), unemployed vs. other groups (employed and inactive).
Figure 3 demonstrates that, controlling for other factors, the gap between the unemployed 
and other groups is markedly smaller in the Southern Europe sub-protective regime4, indi-
cating that in these countries the effect of unemployment on subjective social position is 
significantly weaker compared to other European countries. For the remaining country 
groups the gap in subjective social position between unemployed and other groups seems 
to be quite similar in size, although the gap is largest in the UK. Notably however, the 
figure illustrates that while the gap between the unemployed and all other groups in the 
Southern countries is very narrow, the subjective social position of both groups, espe-
cially employed and inactive, is relatively low, while the subjective social position of the 
unemployed and others in the Nordic countries registers as higher than elsewhere. This 
raises the question about the greater insecurity of the employed in Southern Europe. The 
unemployed in the UK and liberal post-socialist countries have an especially low opinion 
of their position, indicating that the liberal regime tends to disadvantage and stigmatize 
unemployed people. 
4  See Appendix 3 for details of the model.
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Conclusions
Cross-country analysis indicates that unemployment has an effect on subjective social 
position. In countries where the long-term unemployment rate is high, people, irrespective 
of whether they are unemployed or not, generally have a lower opinion of their position in 
society. Our research though has not confirmed the big-fish-little-pond argument, which 
suggests that where unemployment is generally high, the experience of unemployment will 
be less distressing, as it will be less stigmatizing since it is a fate shared by many others. 
If anything, it seems that unemployment aggravates the difficulties that people experience 
when unemployed but also lowers the feeling of security for employed and inactive people. 
Income inequality lowers subjective social position for all members of society and not 
just those who are unemployed. In fact, the gap between the unemployed and other groups 
decreases in significance with increasing inequality. Rather than indicating that higher 
levels of inequality exacerbate the consequences of being unemployed, our analysis sug-
gests that unemployment has a stronger impact where inequality is lower. This means that 
experiencing unemployment where income inequality is low, and where one might expect 
that relative deprivation and stigmatization of the unemployed is avoidable, appears to 
exacerbate its impact.
Higher expenditures on active labor market policies increase the subjective social posi-
tion of all social groups, but particularly that of the unemployed, reducing their risk of 
marginalization and stigmatization. Surprisingly, expenditure on passive labor market pol-
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icies has no such effect. Thus, social investment policy seems to be more important than 
social protection policy to avoid the social deprivation of the unemployed. 
Our expectation was that the effect of unemployment on subjective social position 
would be filtered by the unemployment welfare systems in protecting the unemployed. 
However, we supposed that the unemployment regimes would also be differentiated by 
long-term political and ideological developments (e.g., in terms of balance of the state, 
market and family as three sources for managing social risks). Thus, even with similar lev-
els of expenditure and similar lists of measures, the way of political argumentation matters 
as well. For example, avoidance of victim blaming argumentation in “solidaristic” (Nordic) 
regimes might help to avoid stigmatization of vulnerable groups as well. 
Our analysis shows that cross-regime variation in the relative impact of unemployment 
on subjective social position is modest. The main difference observed suggests that the 
impact of unemployment is lower in the Southern regime countries (Portugal and Spain) 
and is substantially stronger in the liberal regime (the UK). It is likely that family structures 
in these southern countries play a more salient role and, that in situations of very low state 
welfare provision, strong family support may help to buffer the negative impact of unem-
ployment (see also Gallie 2013a). Some of the Southern distinctiveness may arise from the 
lower security and satisfaction among other social groups, especially the employed (see 
Steiber 2013). In a liberal regime financial support for the unemployed is relatively low and 
it has a negative impact on the subjective social position of the unemployed. Although the 
gap between the unemployed and other groups in Nordic countries is at a medium level, 
the subjective position of the unemployed in these countries is relatively high compared 
to all other countries indicating the positive effect of a protective unemployment welfare 
system. 
To close, we offer a few critical remarks related to the chosen design. We were not able 
to control who becomes unemployed. In some countries, specific occupational groups with 
lower objective status might have a higher risk of unemployment. Thus, the previous occu-
pational position of an individual might have contributed to a current low evaluation of 
their social position. Another issue concerns our choice to compare the levels of perceived 
social status of the unemployed with the rest of population. As the share of non-active 
people in the population may differ across countries, it should be pointed out that our 
analyses are not limited to strict comparisons between the unemployed and the employed.
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Appendix 3
Estimates from hierarchical linear regression models predicting subjective social position 
using types of countries, standard errors in parentheses
Individual level Model 1 Model 2
Men .138*** (.021) .138*** (0.020)
Age -.031*** (.004) -.031*** (0.003)
  Age2 .001*** (.000) .001*** (0.000)
Education (ref. below upper secondary)
  Upper secondary .449*** (.027) .450*** (.027)
  Lower tertiary qualification
  University degree
.693***
1.112***
(.034)
(.034)
.692***
1.112***
(.035)
(.031)
Labour market position (ref. all other groups)
  Unemployed -.802*** (.044) -.798*** (.124)
Income (1st quartile)
  2nd quartile .469*** (.030) .461*** (.032)
  3rd quartile .763*** (.032) .768*** (.032)
  4th quartile 1.268*** (.034) 1.264*** (.034)
Regime type (ref. social democratic)
  Corporatist -.276 (.280) -.298 (.283)
  Sub-protective -1.081*** (.318) -1.174*** (.322)
  Post-socialist corporatist -1.050*** (.246) -1.092*** (.249)
  Post-socialist liberal -1.537*** (.280) -1.586*** (.283)
  Liberal -.650 (.411) -.661 (.415)
Interactions 
  Unemployed x Corporatist .101 (.166)
  Unemployed x Sub-protective .455*** (.155)
  Unemployed x Post-socialist corporatist .241* (.145)
  Unemployed x Post-socialist liberal .136 (.157)
  Unemployed x Liberal -.261 (.244)
Country variance .136 .136
Likelihood-ratio test 1 .00 .00
Number of individuals 21,284 21,284
Number of countries 18 18
1 Compared to individual level model, Prob > chi2   * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Source: ISSP 2009
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who have extensive knowledge of the ISSP database. The selected chapters offer a cross-national comparative 
perspective on various issues related to inequality: social mobility; public perceptions of the mechanisms that 
generate social inequality; social constructs that indicate social inequality; and the effects of structural conditions 
(e.g., unemployment, income distribution) on attitudes connected with social inequality. In this book you will find 
critical input on questions related to the interplay between macro-structural conditions, citizens’ perceptions 
and attitudes towards social inequality. 
Die jährliche Bevölkerungsumfrage des International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) liefert einschlägige Daten 
zu sozialwissenschaftlich relevanten Themen. Der Sammelband Social Inequality in the Eyes of the Public - A Coll-
ection of Analyses Based on ISSP Data 1987-2009 untersucht soziale Ungleichheit aus der Bürgerperspektive im 
internationalen Ländervergleich über einen Zeitraum von zum Teil mehr als 20 Jahren. Alle Beiträge stammen 
von internationalen Autoren, die eine hohe Expertise im Umgang mit ISSP Daten aufweisen. Die einzelnen Kapi-
tel befassen sich mit verschiedenen Aspekten, die im Zusammenhang mit sozialer Ungleichheit stehen: soziale 
Mobilität; die öffentliche Wahrnehmung soziale Ungleichheit auslösender Mechanismen; Indikatoren für soziale 
Ungleichheit sowie die Effekte sozialstruktureller Voraussetzungen (z.B. Arbeitslosigkeit oder Besteuerung) auf 
die Einstellungen gegenüber sozialer Ungleichheit. Insgesamt liefert dieses Buch kritische Ansätze gegenüber 
dem Zusammenspiel von gesellschaftlichen Strukturen, öffentlicher Wahrnehmung und Einstellungen zu sozialer 
Ungleichheit.
